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ABSTRACT
At the beginning of the 1990s, the South African textile industry faced many
challenges, including the dismantling of protective barriers, requiring firms to
adapt to increased foreign competition in the local and global markets. Many
opted for investment in new technology. This study set out to analyse the
behaviour of South African textile firms in the process of introducing new
technology in pursuit of competitiveness.
The analysis was conducted following the evolutionary approach in economics
(discussedin Chapter 2). This approach incorporates time, pays attention to the
deliberate actions of firms to shape their environment, as well as persistent
diversity amongst firms.
This study asked two broad questions. First, what were the major trends in
textiles regarding technology, demand-side factors, the trade regime, etc.?
(Chapter3). Chapter 3 sets the scene for the rest of the study in that it
illustrates how the competitive environment of textile firms has changed and
argues that the aggregate picture is often not a true reflection of the dynamics
of the industry, thus paving the way for micro-level analysis of firms and
institutions. Secondly, what were the subsequent responsesby textile firms and
institutions to these changes?This question is investigated for the global textile
industry (Chapter 3), the South African, Italian and Mauritian textile industries
(Chapters 4 and 5), and for specific firms in the South African textile industry
(Chapters 6 and 7).
Institutions play an important role in shaping the development of industries, just
as firms in an industry may influence institutions. The role of institutions in the
South African textile industry is considered in Chapter 5, which serves as
background to Chapter 6, where we enquire about the significance of these
institutions from the firms' perspective. The central focus of Chapter 6,
however, is on the processof acquisition and implementation of new technology
in South African textile firms. The implications of this process for other
strategies, organisational processes, competencies, and routines are also
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analysed. Basedon the outcome of the firm-level analysis, three categories of
firms are distinguished, namely leading firms, moderate adapters, and laggards.
Using the characteristics of the firms in each category, we select three firms to
pursue further in case studies. Chapter 7 presents the results of these case
studies. Although the main focus of our study is on the implementation of new
technology, we want to illustrate in this chapter how the successof this process
critically depends on factors such as an appropriate organisational structure, the
competencies of management and labour, as well as the institutions in the
industry. We further highlight the important role that individuals, such as
entrepreneurs, play in shaping the paths of firms, their relationships with
institutions, suppliers, and customers, and even the structure of the industry.
We conclude that investing in new technology is a necessary but not sufficient
strategy for successful rejuvenation of firms in a mature industry.
Complementary changes, such as in organisational structure, use of human
resources, and supply-chain relations, are of crucial importance, too (Chapter
8).
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OPSOMMING
Aan die begin van die 1990s het die Suid-Afrikaanse tekstielbedryf menige
uitdagings (soos die aftakeling van beskermingsmaatreëls) in die gesig gestaar,
wat hulle gedwing het om meer doeltreffend in die plaaslike en globale markte
te word. Hierdie studie ontleed die gedrag van ondernemings in die
tekstielbedryf in die proses van verkryging en implementering van nuwe
tegnologie ten einde mededingingendheid te bevorder.
Die studie volg die evolusionêre benadering, wat tyd inbou en aandag skenk aan
doelbewuste aksies deur maatskappye om hulle omgewing te beïnvloed, asook
volgehoue diversiteit tussen maatskappye (Hoofstuk 2).
Die studie het twee breë vrae gestel. Eerstens, is daar gekyk na die belangrikste
tendense t.O.V. tegnologiese veranderinge, vraagkantfaktore, handelsregulasies,
ensovoorts, in die tekstielbedryf (Hoofstuk 3). Hoofstuk 3 skets die struktuur vir
die res van die studie deur die veranderinge in die omgewing waarbinne
tekstielmaatskappye meeding uit te lig, maar ook deur aan te toon dat die
globale prentjie nie altyd 'n ware refleksie van die dinamiek van 'n nywerheid is
nie, omdat soveel diversiteit daardeur verbloem kan word. Hierdie argument is
dus ten gunste van verdere mikrovlak analise van ondernemings en instellings.
Tweedens word gevra watter reaksies op hierdie veranderinge daar van
ondernemings en instellings se kant af was. Hierdie vraag word ondersoek vir die
globale tekstielbedryf (Hoofstuk 3), die Suid-Afrikaanse en Italiaanse
tekstielbedrywe, asook die bedryf in Mauritius (Hoofstuk 4 en 5). Verder word
die vraag vir spesifieke Suid-Afrikaanse ondernemings in Hoofstukke 6 en 7
bestudeer.
Instellings speel 'n belangrike rol in die ontwikkeling van nywerhede, net soos
ondernemings in nywerhede ook instellings kan beïnvloed. Die rol van instellings
in die Suid-Afrikaanse tekstielbedryf word in Hoofstuk 5 behandel, deels as
agtergrond vir Hoofstuk 6 waar die belangrikheid van instellings uit die
ondernemings se oogpunt van naderby beskouword. Die hooffokus van Hoofstuk
6 is egter die verkryging en implementering van nuwe tegnologie in Suid-
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Afrikaanse tekstielmaatskappye. Die implikasies wat hierdie proses vir ander
strategieë, organisatoriese prosesse, vaardighede en roetines van die
ondernemings inhou, word ook bestudeer. Voortvloeiend uit die
ondernemingsvlakanalise, word drie kategorieë van ondernemings onderskei,
naamlik leiers, middelmatige aanpassers en sloerders. Op grond van die
kenmerke van die ondernemings in elkeen van die kategorieë is drie
maatskappye vir verdere ontleding in gevallestudies gekies (Hoofstuk 7).
Alhoewel die hooffokus van die studie die implementering van nuwe tegnologie
is, illustreer ons ook in Hoofstuk 7 dat die proses sterk beïnvloed word deur
faktore soos die organisatoriese struktuur, die vaardighede van die bestuur en
werkers, sowel as die instellings in die industrie. Ons beklemtoon verder die
belangrike rol wat individue, soos entrepreneurs, speel t.O.V. die
ontwikkelingstrajek van ondernemings, sowel as die verwantskappe wat
ondernemings met verskaffers, instellings en klante opbou. Aksiesdeur individue
beïnvloed in die finale instansie ook die struktuur van die industrie.
Ons gevolgtrekking is dat investering in nuwe tegnologie 'n noodsaaklike maar
nie voldoende strategie vir die suksesvolle vernuwing van ondernemings in 'n
volwasse nywerheid is nie. Komplementêre veranderinge, byvoorbeeld in die
organisatoriese struktuur, die benutting van arbeid, en verhoudings in die
verskaffingsnetwerk, is ook van kernbelang.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
At the beginning of the 1990sthe South African economy faced turbulent times
and multiple challenges. Not least of these challenges was the competitiveness
of firms in the manufacturing sector. During the Apartheid years, South African
firms had been fairly insulated against foreign competition due to factors such
as government protection and international trade sanctions. This was
particularly true of the textile industry where protection measureshave showna
steady increase for the better part of the twentieth century (Maree, 1995).
Following the changeover to a democratically elected government and the
liberalisation of the South African economy in terms of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) agreement reached during the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations, the period of insulation came to an abrupt end. South
African firms were required to adapt to increased foreign competition in their
home market and to become competitive in global markets.
Many firms saw the introduction of new technology as a means of dealing with
these challenges. During the relatively protected years technology and
organisational structures had become outdated and productivity in the
manufacturing sector had been low compared to that of competitors. In the
textile industry the situation was even worse. During the 1970s and 1980s,
capital investment in this industry had fallen behind capital investment in the
manufacturing sector in total. Maree (1995) shows that the average age of
textile machinery used in spinning, weaving and knitting was between 14 and 20
years. Evenwhere relatively younger machinery like those for open-end spinning
was used, the average age was 8 years. Firms then embarked on an investment
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programme to replace some of this old technology in a rapidly changing
environment. The interest of this study lies in this processof adjusting to these
internal and external changes.
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION
While simple neo-classical microeconomic theory assumes that all firms have
access to the same technology and are able to implement new technology
without major obstacles, empirical work has shown that this is not the case.
Acquiring the new technology is only one of the first steps in a complex process
of change. The implementation of new technology invariably happens in a
dynamic environment, where most of the time the firm does not only
experience internal changes, but the external environment (e.g. government
policies, institutions, etc.) changes as well. The challenge to the firm is to
adapt its organisation and the use of its resources to get the better of the
changing environment. The ability of firms in an industry to adapt their
organisational structure to the changing conditions could make the difference
between survival and exiting the industry. Antonelli (1998) and Antonelli et al,
1992 have presented this argument in relation to technological and
organisational change in the textile industry. More generally, Pavitt (1998: 433)
with reference to firms in the industrialised countries, maintains that " Firms
rarely fail because of an inability to master a new field of technology, but
because they do not succeed in matching the firm's systemsof coordination and
control to the nature of the available technological opportunities."
If this is the case for firms in developed countries, the question is 'how would
firms in an economy emerging from a protected past deal with this process of
change?' More specifically, how would firms in the South African textile industry
deal with this process of change?There have been two major studies in recent
times focusing on this industry. The Swart CommissionReport (1994) is the result
of the work done by the commission appointed by the previous government to
research the position of the textile and clothing industries in relation to the
2
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reduced tariff protection in terms of the Uruguay Round of GATTnegotiations.
Given its brief, the report focused mainly on the trade regime, but it did make
recommendations for increased expenditure on technology both for the purpose
of replacement and expansion. There was, however, no systematic attention
paid to the processof introducing new technology. The second piece of research
on the textile industry forms part of a series of industry-level research projects
under the umbrella of the Industrial Strategy Project. 1 This report by Johan
Maree (1995) focused mainly on the performance of the textile industry, its
strengths and weaknessesand the changing trade regime. Apart from showing
how outdated textile technology in SouthAfrica had become and recommending
restructuring to become more competitive, the process of technological
acquisition and implementation was not addressed. However, its assessmentof
the state of technology in the industry at the beginning of the 1990sprovides a
useful point of departure for this inquiry.
1.3 PURPOSEOF THIS RESEARCH
The purpose of this study is to gain an understanding of the behaviour of firms in
a mature industry in the processof introducing new technology in the face of a
changing environment. The firm is, however, not studied in isolation, but in the
context of the South African textile industry as well as in its broader
environment, including the influences of policies, institutions, international
forces, etc.
While it is challenging and exciting to study the dynamics of emerging
industries, it remains true that in many economies, mature industries are a
significant presence. It is argued that the analysis of the processof decline and
renewal could yield useful insights, which will add to the existing body of
I The Industrial Strategy Project (ISP) has its origins in the Economic Trends Research Group, initially
convened at the behest of COSATU to study the impact of enforced isolation on the South African economy.
Under the ISP a number of researchers were engaged to study key sub-sectors of South African
manufacturing. The report on the textile industry, by University of Cape Town academic, Johan Maree, was
one of the series of reports generated by the project.
3
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knowledge in industrial economics. Issues such as training and education,
technology and employment and the role of trade unions also come to mind. The
textile industry in South Africa is without doubt a mature industry in the process
of restructuring and renewal. Firms in this industry have had to introduce new
technology at a fairly rapid rate with diverse implications for the organisation of
the firm, the creation, and destruction of competences in the use of resources
and the evolution of the industry.
1.4 THEORETICALFRAMEWORK
To investigate the aspects of technological and organisational change
elaborated on above, an approach is necessary, which allows for the
incorporation of time, deliberate actions of firms to shape their environment,
and recognition of persistent diversity amongst firms in an industry. The
evolutionary approach in economics promises to fulfil these requirements. In
chapter 2 we give an exposition of the foundations of the evolutionary approach
in economics. The evolutionary approach in economics introduces the concept
of evolution by means of natural selection. Using concepts and insights from
biology, the aim is to explain how 'species' (firms in economics) in an industry
survive by adapting to the new environment. Diversity is essential for the
selection process to work, while the transfer of characteristics that ensured
survival (heredity) and the existence of inertia allow for a relatively stable
system to facilitate the selection process. Explaining how systems change from
an evolutionary perspective also assignsa crucial role to time, i.e. recognising
that history matters. Employing these concepts, we attempt to explain the
evolution of the South African textile industry over time, with specific reference
to the role of firm behaviour in the face of internal and external changes,
especially where technology is concerned.
4
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1.5 METHODOLOGYANDOUTLINEOFTHESTUDY
The evolutionary approach to economic change (including industrial dynamics)
has resulted in three inter-related styles of investigation:
• analysis of specific sectors, technologies and firms over time;
• Constructing taxonomies of basic 'types', e.g. industrial structures,
learning processesand technologies; and
• Building formal models (including computer simulations)(Dosi and Pavitt,
2001: xiii).
In this study we employ the first form of investigation, and to a lesser extent the
second form, constructing composite profiles of firm 'types' in Chapter 6. We do
not attempt formal model building, but believe that the rich detail generated
by applying the other two methods could be useful in complementing the work
of model builders. The data for the analysiswere collected by meansof a postal
questionnaire to firms in the textile industry, followed by factory visits and
interviews. Interviews were also conducted with representatives of the relevant
institutions in the textile and clothing pipeline. The data were supplemented by
interviews with other knowledgeable persons in the industry, as well as
secondary sourcesof information.
The study proceeds as follows. After presenting the basic tenets of the
evolutionary approach in economics in Chapter 2 (see section 1.4. on the
theoretical framework), we proceed with an analysis of the major trends,
prospects and challenges in the global textile industry in Chapter 3. This chapter
sets the scene for the rest of the study in various ways. First, it elaborates on
the major changes, such as in technological development and consumer
preferences, which have taken place over the last 25 to 30 years, thus
illustrating the changing environment facing the textile firms now wishing to
compete in the global arena. It also argues that the aggregate picture is often
not a true reflection of the dynamics of the industry, masking considerable
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diversity. It thus argues for further study at industry and firm level to uncover
the sources of this diversity. To this end, Chapter 4 studies the South African
textile industry in historical and comparative perspective. In particular, the
history of the textile industry from inception to the major reduction in import
protection in the 1990s is considered. The industry's subsequent attempts at
restructuring and rejuvenation are studied in comparison with similar efforts in
the textile industries of Italy, a leading developed country textile producer, and
Mauritius, a developing country known for its success in textile and clothing
exports.
Institutions can play a very important role in shaping the development of an
industry, just as institutions may be influenced by the actions of firms in the
industry. The role of institutions in the South African textile industry is
considered in Chapter 5. Chapter 5 serves to an extent as background for
Chapter 6, where we amongst other things, enquire about the significance of
these institutions from the perspective of firms. The central focus of Chapter 6,
however, is on the processof acquisition and implementation of new technology
in South African textile firms. The implications of this process for other
strategies, organisational processes, competencies, and routines are also
analysed. Account is further taken of the impact of the technology
implementation processon the firm's relationship with suppliers, customers, and
other institutions in the pipeline and in broader context (such as research,
education and training institutions). Based on the outcome of the firm-level
analysis, three categories of firms are distinguished, namely leading firms,
moderate adapters, and laggards. Using the characteristics of the firms in each
category, we select three firms (one each per category) to pursue further in
case studies. Chapter 7 presents the results of these case studies, which enable
us to investigate some of the issues highlighted in Chapter 6 in more depth.
Although the main focus of our study is on the implementation of new
technology, we want to illustrate in this chapter how the successof this process
critically depends on factors such as an appropriate organisational structure, the
competencies of management and labour, as well as the institutions in the
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industry. We further want to highlight the important role that individuals, such
as entrepreneurs, play in shaping the paths of firms, their relationships with
institutions, suppliers, and customers, and even the structure of the industry.
Chapter 8 summarisesand concludes the study.
1.6 DELIMITATIONSANDLIMITATIONSOFTHESTUDY
This study is confined to the textile industry, comprising fibre production,
spinning, weaving, knitting, finishing, and non-wovens. Other sectors of the
textiles and clothing pipeline are referred to only when it is necessaryto employ
a {Were approach, such as in reference to integrated supply-chain management.
The questionnaire survey did not obtain a sufficiently high responserate. Almost
14% of the 273 questionnaires sent out were returned to sender (post box
closed), while 182 remained unaccounted for. Fifty-three replies were received,
which made up 19.4%of the total, but of these only 20 were usable. The results
must therefore be interpreted with caution. To supplement the questionnaire
results, however, factory visits and three detailed case studies were conducted.
1.7 EXPECTEDCONTRIBUTION
At a theoretical level, the study sets out to contribute to the body of work
aimed at the development of an evolutionary theory of the firm, currently in its
adolescence.
From a practical point of view, the insights gained may be useful to firms
engaged in processes of restructuring and technological change as well as
policymakers and individuals responsible for institutional change in the industry.
7
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CHAPTER 2
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the understanding of how firms in a
mature industry respond to changes in their environment. These changes may
arise from within, e.g. changes in the use of technology, or from external
sources, e.g. changes in consumer preferences, policy changesor changes in the
nature of competition. What strategic choices such firms make are likely to be
influenced by their past experiences, their capabilities and their strategic
objectives. To gain such an understanding, an analytical approach, which caters
for three important elements, is required. These elements are time, deliberate
actions by firms to shape their environment and the persistence of diversity
amongst firms and acrossindustries.
In this chapter we argue that the simple microeconomic textbook account of the
firm, where all firms are homogenous, produce identical products, have access
to the same technology and perfect information and pursue profit maximisation
in a given environment 1, clearly will not do. Thus, it is proposed that the
evolutionary approach in economics presents a relatively better alternative in
terms of the requirements stated above.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. We begin with a short overview
of the cross-fertilisation between economics and biology. In the section on
Malthus and Darwin, we show how the evolutionary process in biology came to
be expressed in economic terms. In the next section, we explain the concepts of
variety, heredity and natural selection and the role they play in evolution. This
section is followed by an exposition of how these concepts had gained relevance
in economics. We are particularly interested in showing how these concepts had
been useful in explaining the evolution of technological progress at the firm,
1 Important exceptions to this simplistic view are the neoclassical treatment of imperfect competition,
allowing for product differentiation and the game theoretic approach, which allows for strategy
differentiation [See for example, Hall (1994), Nelson (1994) and Kirman and Salmon (1995)].
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industry, and macroeconomic level. Since it is at the firm level that decisions
about technology are made, we need to focus on how different perspectives on
the theory of the firm have dealt with the concept of technological change.
However, since it is clear that the firm does not operate in isolation, we need to
place the firm in industry context and take account of broader institutional
influences that affect the firm's decisions.
2.2 EVOLUTION IN BIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS
Charles Robert Darwin (1809-1882)first introduced his ideas "On the tendency of
the species to form varieties; and on the perpetuation of varieties and species
by Natural means of selection" to the public in 1858. He had started working out
his ideas on evolution since 1837 and was planning to write his 'big book' on
Natural Selection, when in 1856 it came to light that Alfred RusselWallace, an
English naturalist had written a paper, which by coincidence, incorporated
several of Darwin's ideas on the subject. In order to solve the dilemma of
priority to publish, it was decided to present the work of both authors in the
same issue of the journal issued by the Linnean Society (the leading British
natural history organisation)(Porter 8: Graham, 1993:86-87). With this event
passed into history many of the concepts that are today in common usage in
evolutionary branchesof many subjects, including economics.
2.2.1 MALTHUS AND DARWIN
Over the years, there has been a significant cross-fertilisation between
economics and biology (Foster, 1994:23).
Having read Thomas Malthus's "Essay on the Principle of Population" (1803),
Darwin took Malthus' doctrine and applied it to the 'whole of the animal and
vegetable kingdom' (Darwin, 1859:110)2.According to Malthus, populations tend
to increase faster than the increase in the scarce resources needed to maintain
their numbers. This leads to a 'fierce struggle for survival' in which many may
2 Since then, as Marshall (1946:139) observed' biology has more than repaid her debt; and economists have
learnt much from the profound analogies which have been discovered between industrial organisation on the
one side and physical organisation of the higher animals on the other'.
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perish. Taking this essentially economic argument, couched in the terminology
of scarce resourceswith competing demands, Darwin proceeded to formulate his
explanation of evolution by means of natural selection", If we supposethat the
environment is undergoing change, as in a dynamic world it does, those members
of a population that varied slightly in such a way that would give them a better
chance to survive under the new conditions would prevail. In Darwin's words,
they would be 'naturally selected'. By means of inheritance, any selected
variety will tend to propagate its new and modified form. The argument is not
that those that are selected and prevail are necessarily the optimal form of their
kind, but simply that they must be sufficiently superior to existing forms to
survive. Darwin saw this processas taking place gradually over time and in large
enough numbers to generate sufficient variety for the selection mechanisms to
work. Whereas this belief in gradualism - Darwin's' natura non [acit saltum'
(nature does not perform leaps) forms the basis of the tradition that much of
technological change is incremental and gradual, there is another view allowing
for saltatory technological change, notably from Schumpeter (1935)4.
Since Darwin, the discovery of the gene has brought renewed understanding of
the process of heredity, but the essential concepts of variation, heredity and
natural selection remain unchanged (Dennett, 1996:20).
2.2.2 BIOLOGICAL 'CONCEPTIONS' IN ECONOMICS
In his Principles of Economics (1962: xii) Alfred Marshall lamented the larger
share assigned to 'mechanical' approaches in economics because of the
complexity of biological conceptions. The mechanical approach generally seeks
to explain the changes in systems or variables in terms of external natural laws
(as in physics). When the objective is to explain such change in terms of factors
operating inside the system (as in the biological sciences), the approach is called
evolutionary. Marshall considered this approach clearly desirable for economics,
3 Darwin himself was quite circumspect about using the term 'evolutionary' to describe his work because of
the controversy surrounding the subject and did not use the term until the sixth edition of his work (Hodgson,
1994:219)
4 When confronted with a gradualist view, Schumpeter (1935:7) retorted: "Add as many mail-coaches as you
please, you will never get a railroad by so doing."
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but was aware of many difficulties that needed to be overcome to reach the
,Meccaof economists' .
Since then, considerable work has been done to develop an evolutionary line of
thinking in economics (Seefor example, Freeman's 1994critical survey article in
the Cambridge Journal of Economicsand Stoneman's Handbookof the Economics
of Innovation and Technical change, 1995). It was never the intention to transfer
biological insights into economics indiscriminately. The limits to the use of
biological metaphors in economics have been well documented (see for
example, Sidney Winter's contribution in the New Palgrave Dictionary of
Economics (1991:614-617). On a lighter note, Nelson (1995: 54) observes that
sexuality and mating behaviour are important variables in biology but seldom
modelled in economics.
Nelson (1995:56) seesan 'evolutionary' approach as encompassingthe following:
• dynamic analysis, where the aim is to explain the movement of something
over time, why that something is what it is at that moment in time in terms
of how it got there;
• the explanation involves both randomness and systematic mechanisms of
sifting which work on existing variables; and
• the existence of inertial forces that ensure continuity in the variables that
survive the sifting processreferred to above.
Hall (1994:9) summarises these characteristics as variation, heredity, and
selection. The existence of diversity is central to evolutionary explanations of
how systems change. Without variety, there can be no selection. Heredity then
ensures that the system is relatively stable to facilitate the selection process.
Other than in evolutionary biology, evolutionary economics maintains that
learned behaviour could be transmitted and thus 'inherited'. In this sense,
evolutionary economics is t.amarcktan" rather than Darwinian.
5 According to Lamarck, acquired characteristics can be inherited (Hodgson, 1994:223).
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At the forefront of evolutionary thinking is also the notion that one can never
start with a clean slate: history matters. What happens today is strongly
influenced by what happened in the past. This idea of historicity underlies two
concepts in evolutionary analysis, namely path dependence and
cumulativeness. The concept of path dependence has been given much
attention, following the initial work of Paul David (1986, 1988) and Brian Arthur
(1986,1988). While their work tried to explain how paths taken in the past, may
not have been the optimal choice (see for example David (1986) on The
economics of Qwerty), relatively newer work on path dependency (e.g. in
Magnusson & Ottosson, 1997), extends the metaphor to ask additional questions,
for example: how do firms choose paths? Is it possible to escape from particular
paths? Do paths cross? In this study, these questions are addressed in Chapters 6
and 7. We return to the concept of cumulativeness in more detail later in this
chapter.
2.3 LEVELSOF ANALYSIS
Research in the evolutionary vein is conducted at three levels: the firm, the
industry, and the macro-economy. The aim is to find the analytical means to
reach a situation where the 'stories' that are told to explain micro-level
phenomena are compatible with explanations at the macro-level and vice versa.
For the purposes of this study, we concentrate on the views of evolutionary
researchers in the analysis of firm behaviour. We ask what sort of behaviour, i.e.
strategies and routines at the firm level, enable them to survive the industry
selection process. Relatedly, as Bart Nooteboom (1999), puts it 'How do firms
adapt to their changing environment, while at the same time maintaining
enough stability and continuity to remain in business?' Further, we need to know
what competencies and capabilities are necessary to deal with technology-
related issues. Are the answers to these questions the same for firms across
industries? However, since firms do not operate in isolation, some understanding
of industry dynamics and its influence on firms is required, too. Beyond the
industry, we need to look at institutions that shape the environment in which
firms and industries evolve. We ask what role institutions or the lack thereof
play in enhancing or retarding the creative forces that give us technological
12
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progress, and by extension, increased industrial output. Examples of these
institutions are the legal framework, industrial institutions, and training and
technology institutions.
We now turn to our discussionof the firm in an evolutionary world.
2.3.1 UNPACKINGTHE FIRM
The firm (like households), has been treated as an individual actor in the
economic game for so long, that it has only relatively recently become
convincingly clear that something could be learned from studying what is going
on inside the firm as opposed to seeing it as always responding to external
stimuli. Evolutionary scholars have long maintained that there should be more to
the theory of the firm than it being seen as a profit-maximising entity producing
a homogenous product with the aid of technology that is exogenously available
to all firms. The evolutionary approach argues that there is significant diversity
amongst firms, be it in size, strategies, or competencies that persists over time.
The evolutionary theory of the firm in the words of Nelson andWinter (1982:110)
has to set itself the task of explaining the ongoing interrelated processes of
change in technology and organisation. Dosiand Malerba (1996:4) define firms as
"behavioural entities, characterised by specific competencies, largely embodied
in their routines, and evolving over time, partly as the outcome of their internal
learning and partly as a response to environmental changes." [Emphasis in
original]. We will use the elements contained in this definition to discuss the
essential insights of the evolutionary approach in this field.
2.3.1.1 Competencies and the role of routines
The competencies of the firm refer to the ability to do certain things, i.e., to
take strategic decisions amid uncertainty, to manage specific functions or to
learn. Taking such decisions requires two types of knowledge. The first is
knowledge of the object that the decision is about and the second, knowledge of
the procedures and mechanismsthat make the decision-making processpossible.
In both cases, the decision-maker does not have perfect information, but is in
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fact subject to bounded rationality. This is in sharp contrast to simple textbook
microeconomics where decision-makers have perfect knowledge and are not
confronted by unimaginable occurrences down the road of time. The concept of
bounded rationality is generally credited to H. A. Simon. Essentially it refers to
the fact that time introduces uncertainty and that a person at any point in time
can make decisions only on the basis of information available to him/her then.
This implies that the decision maker is not optimising, but 'satisficing'. AsMarch
and Simon (1994:162, first published 1958) emphatically stated: "Most human
decision-making, whether individual or organisational, is concerned with the
discovery and selection of satisfactory alternatives; only in exceptional cases is
it concerned with the discovery and selection of optimal alternatives".
However, Williamson (1975:23) introduces a further element, namely
complexity:
" ...as long as either uncertainty or complexity is present in requisite degree, the
bounded rationality problem arises..."
For this reason, Langlois (1994:8) argues that it is in fact the person's ability to
handle complex information that is bounded, not strictly speaking his rationality.
According to Nelson and Winter, firms develop over time a set of 'rules of
thumb' that enables them to deal with day-to-day decisions. The authors use the
term 'routines' to describe such mechanisms. Nelson (1995:69) distinguishes
three different types of routines:
• 'standard operating procedures', for example those that determine
what and how much to produce, given the firm's circumstances and
constraints in the short run. A prime example here would be
production technologies;
• routines that determine the investment decisions of the firm, for
example the 'rules' that govern its growth and decline;
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• the deliberate processes of the firm, which include searching for
better ways of doing things. This 'search behaviour' could be focused
on any of the routines, but in practice search is presumed to be aimed
at discovering new production techniques or to improve prevailing
ones. Nelson and Winter call this process Research and Development(R
& D), while others call it 'learning.'
All activities of the firm then rest on 'routines', which evolve over time; the
ones that yield satisfactory results, are selected and the others are replaced by
new routines, which incorporate new knowledge. This process is clearly dynamic
(Gavetti, 1995: 187). The essential implication of this process is thus that a firm's
success depends upon its collection of routines and its ability to evolve such
routines in response to a changing environment.
However, Gavetti (1995: 185) argues that the concept of routines as defined by
Nelson and Winter still seems to be too much of an 'empty box' rather than a
rigorous theoretical construct. To give more content to this concept one needs
to look more closely at the nature of the competencies and knowledge of the
firm. One needs to decipher which competencies could be transferred (e.g.
traded) and which must be built. Also, what obstacles are there in the way of
replicating or imitating acquired capabilities? These questions are crucial for
firms in countries generally viewed as technological laggards. Teece and Pisano
(1994) and Gavetti (1995) in dealing with the development and diffusion of firm-
level technological capabilities stress the importance of learning opportunities
and the nature of knowledge in determining replicability or imitability. We look
at each of these in turn.
2.3.1.2 Learning
The ability to learn effectively underlies the dynamics of a firm's cognitive
system. Over the years, a vast literature on the process of learning has been
established. [See for example Bell (1984) and Malerba (1992)]. Carlsson and
Eliasson, following the work of Malerba (1992), distinguish different types of
learning, importantly linked to the sources of learning (Gavetti, 1995: 192):
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• learning by doing, leading to incremental improvements in processes
in the course of normal productive activities;
• learning by using, which refers to the improvements generated by the
useof machinery and new productive inputs;
• learning by searching - this involves research which is the classical
source of formal knowledge for the firm;
• learning from advances in science and technology. This comes from
the firm's relations with institutions such as universities, but also from
informal sources like publications, conferences and direct contacts;
• learning from industrial spillovers and imitation. The source of
knowledge is the imitation of products and processesof other firms.
Reverse engineering of the type employed in the Asian Newly
Industrialised Countries would fall into this category aswell (Smith and
Jafta, 1995:25);
• learning from interacting. The sources of information are clients and
suppliers.
The firm's ability to absorb new knowledge is strongly conditioned by its past
accumulation of knowledge. The experience of acquisition and use of knowledge
in prior phases may have two possible outcomes: enhancing new learning and
creation of new competencies or impeding new learning becauseof the difficulty
of unlearning skills that have become obsolete. The latter means that current
competencies of the firm could in future become constraints, or as Dosi and
Malerba (1996:8) put it, 'core competencies' could become core rigidities and
the firm could be 'locked-in' on a specific path, with the cost of changing course
growing with the lapse of time.
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Next, we consider in more detail the possibility of replicating or imitating
capabilities that have been obtained and implemented successfully elsewhere.
Replication means the transfer of competencies from one setting to another, for
example from one plant to another or from one firm to a subsidiary in the same
group. Imitation is then the same process performed by a competitor. The
argument generally is that successfulfirms and successfulcountries set examples
for others to follow. The followers are supposedly in an advantageous position,
because the road hasalready been travelled. Scholars in Evolutionary Economics
(as in Managerial Economics) point out that the process is far too complex to
assume ease of transfer. This concerns in particular, the competencies that
cannot be bought but must be built, i.e. dynamic capabilities (Teece and Pisano,
1994:549). We contend that factors that make replication difficult would also
make imitation difficult, with the added constraint of greater uncertainty on the
part of the imitator. Many of the difficulties around replication and imitation of
competencies follow from the nature of the knowledge to be transferred. These
characteristics of knowledge are placed on a continuum of variations to
illustrate the influence it has on replicability and imitability. The extreme
opposites are illustrated in Figure 2.1.
A competence exhibiting the characteristics on the left of the table will be very
difficult to replicate or imitate. Someknowledge exists in the minds of people in
an organisation and cannot be codified. Sometacit knowledge could be codified
but would require investment in this process. This would be relatively easier for
replication, but difficult in the case of imitation (bar the transfer of key
individuals). Also, where a competence is localised, it will be almost impossible
to transfer and implement it outside its environment. This underlies the problem
with transferring technology developed and tested in the developed countries to
developing countries where the circumstances are different in so many ways. It
has been recognised that to imitate successfully requires considerable
capabilities on the part of firms.
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FIGURE 2.1: THE DIMENSIONS OF KNOWLEDGE AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
IMITATION
DIFFICULT TO IMITATE EASYTO IMITATE
TACIT CODIFIABLE
CANNOT BETAUGHT COULDBETAUGHT
NOT OBTAINABLEIN USE OBTAINABLEIN USE
COMPLEX SIMPLE
NOT CODIFIED CODIFIED
PARTOF A SYSTEM NOT PARTOF A SYSTEM
Source: Adapted from Gavetti (1995:189; originally in Winter, 1987).
Lall (1992: 168) discusses three essential capabilities that a firm must have to
use opportunities for imitation successfully. The firm must be able to make
investment decisions with all the accompanying requirements, have production
capabilities and the skills to use linkages with various agents of technology
transfer, e.g. suppliers, subcontractors, R ft D institutions, clients, consultants,
etc. Evidence from developing countries has shown that these capabilities are
often lacking. One can reasonably argue that firms in these countries where
requisite skills are not readily available and linkages between firms and
technology institutions are weak, will use available technology less efficiently
than their counterparts in developed countries (Lall, 1992: 168).
Given the insights garnered from the firm level studies of technological and
organisational evolution, we now cast the net a bit wider, i.e. to industry
studies. We ask whether industry studies add to our understanding of the co-
evolution of technology and organisations.
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2.3.2 INDUSTRY LEVEL ANALYSIS: TECHNOLOGICAL REGIMES, SECTORAL
PATIERNS, AND THE KNOWLEDGE BASE
Following from the 'evolutionary' theory of the firm, one should expect
persistent differences in strategies and performances basedon different learning
patterns prevailing in firms. This means that even in the same industry firms'
behaviour and performances may differ greatly. Efforts to define patterns of
learning or more generally, technological evolution in industries, have been
premised on the idea that this diversity is not unlimited in the sense that
'anything can happen'. On the contrary, it is asserted that regularities in the
development of industries can be discerned (Dosi and Malerba, 1996:11). In this
regard, there is a central place for the link between the knowledge base,
technological regimes, and sectoral taxonomies.
The concept of a technological regime emerged from the work of Nelson and
Winter (1982), Winter (1984) and Dosi (1982). Malerba and Orsenigo (1993)
articulated the technological regime to mean the environment in which firms
develop their innovative activities. They describe this environment as a
particular combination of four essential dimensions (Dost and Malerba, 1996:11,
Breschi, 1995: 195-196). These dimensionsare:
• technological opportunities, which refer to the ease of innovation for
a given level of investment. These can be measured based on two
criteria. One refers to the level of opportunities the firm faces, e.g.
high or low. The second refers to the sources of technological
opportunities, e.g. universities, suppliers, etc. as well as the number
of products and markets to which the new knowledge can be applied;
• appropriability conditions, which refer to the extent to which the
firm could protect the innovation from imitation by competitors and
appropriate profits deriving from the successful innovation. The
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instruments of protection may include patents, licensing and
intellectual property rights.
• cumulativeness has to do with the relationship between the current
innovative activities and that of the future. A strong and stable
relationship implies that a firm who innovates today would have a high
probability of innovating tomorrow ('success breeds success');
• the nature of the knowledge base. This concept refers to the
characteristics of knowledge already discussedearlier (tacitness versus
codifiability; complexity versus simplicity; independent competencies
versuscompetencies encompassedin a system, etc.).
It is thus argued that different firms in similar activities of production may be
highly affected by the technological regimes in which they operate. If a
technological regime could be identified for different industries, it might be
possible to derive general patterns and regularities in the development of
industries. Such sectoral patterns have been developed by various authors.
Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) have identified distinct Schumpeterian patterns of
innovation basedon patent data for 49 technological classesin six countries (we
discussthis contribution a little later). A widely quoted sectoral pattern analysis
had been Pavitt's 1984 taxonomy of the organisation of innovation activities and
the features of technological change. Pavitt's taxonomy includes three
categories of industries, namely 'supplier dominated', 'production intensive',
and 'science based'. The production intensive category is further divided into
'scale intensive' and 'specialised suppliers'. We give a brief description of each:
1. Supplier dominated: Suppliers are the sourcesof technology that is mostly of
the process type. The type of user is price sensitive and innovating firms are
relatively small. Intensity of technological diversification is low, while the
direction thereof is vertical. Examplesof these industries are private services
and traditional manufacturing sectors (suchas textiles).
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2. Production intensive: (a) Scale intensive. Innovations are of the process type
and come mainly from production engineering departments (in house) and
suppliers' R &. D. The user is price sensitive and firms are relatively large,
with high levels of vertical technological diversification. Examples of such
industries are those involving bulk materials (e.g. steel and glass) and
assembly (e.g. consumer durables and motor vehicles).
Production intensive: (b). Specialised suppliers. In this sector, the sourcesof
technology are in-house design and development and customers. Innovations
are mainly of the product type, firms are relatively small and technological
diversification is low in intensity and concentric (i.e. a significant percentage
of innovations are both produced and used outside the main sector of the
firm's activities). Users are performance sensitive, rather than price
sensitive. Industries of this type are those producing machinery and precision
instruments.
3. Science based: Both product and process innovations occur in this industry
category. Innovating firms are relatively large and fall along a spectrum from
low intensity in technological diversification of vertical form to high intensity
and concentric form. The sources of technology are in-house R &. D, public
services and production engineering departments. Users are price and
performance sensitive. Examples in this category are electronics, electrical
and chemical sectors.
Keith Pavitt (1984) stressesthat the diversity in the patterns of technical change
that has been observed implies that most generalisations based on very specific
practical experiences or any particular simple analytical model are likely to be
wrong. This means that policy makers will have to make an effort to acquire
better and more comprehensive data and understanding to inform their policy
decisions.
Combining the notion of a technological regime discussedabove with the results
of sectoral studies gives a framework for making sense of the evolution of
industries. In this regard, the concept of a technological regime has been
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usefully employed to interpret empirical observations on the organisation and
strategies of firms and sectoral patterns of technical change and industrial
structure. For example, Malerba and Orsenigo (1996) have distinguished distinct
patterns of innovative activity in two sets of technological classes. These sets
are called SchumpeterMark I and Schumpeter Mark II, respectively. The concept
of Schumpeter Mark I refers to the pattern of innovative activity described by
Schumpeter in The theory of Economic Development (1934). This pattern is
characterised by no or relatively low barriers to entry, large numbers of
participants of small size and a very important role played by entrepreneurs and
new entrants in innovation. Schumpeter Mark II patterns come from the older
Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942). This situation is
characterised by the relative concentration of innovators, entry is more
difficult, and firms are fewer and larger in size. Malerba and Orsenigo (1996)
have shown that Schumpeter Mark I sectors exhibit high opportunity and low
appropriability conditions, (which serves as an invitation to new entrants). Low
cumulative conditions furthermore mean that it is virtually impossible for any
one innovator to hold a persistent technological advantage. Schumpeter Mark II
patterns are determined by high opportunity, high appropriability and high
cumulative conditions. This allows innovators to accumulate technological
knowledge and capabilities in piece-meal fashion and to build up innovative
advantagesover non-innovators and potential entrants.
The evolutionary approach puts a lot of store in the idea that 'all firms within a
country are likely to share some common behavioural and organisational traits
due to their embeddedness in a common institutional context.' (Dosi and
Malerba, 1996: 17; emphasis in original). This institutional context is the subject
of discussion in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.3 INSTITUTIONALEMBEDDEDNESS
The term 'institutions' has been used to describe a loose collection of things
ranging from universities, banks and banking systems to laws and regulations as
well as values and beliefs (Nelson, 1994: 315).
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Douglas North (1996) quoted in Fransman (1997:2) has given the following
definition of institutions:
"Institutions are the rules of the game of a society or more formally are
the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They
are composed of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations),
informal constraints (conventions, norms of behaviour, and self imposed
codesof conduct), and the enforcement characteristics of both."
Whereas other conceptualisations have included organisations in instttuttons",
North makesa distinction between institutions and organisations:
"Organisations specify the constraints that structure human interaction
inside the organisation but in addition they are action groups. They are
composedof groups of individuals bound by a common purpose to achieve
objectives. They include political bodies (political parties, the senate, the
city council, a regulatory agency); economic bodies (firms, trade unions,
family farms, co-operatives); social bodies (churches, clubs, athletic
associations); and educational bodies (schools, colleges, vocational
training centres)."
Nelson (1994: 316) has difficulties with the broad spectrum of things included
under the label of 'institutions', but nevertheless argues that all of them are of
importance in the evolution of technologies. The argument is that these
institutions exert an influence on the choices that firms make and in turn are
influenced by the behaviour of firms (Nelson, 1994:316). Institutions themselves
are subject to forces of change and do change, albeit in most casesslower than
firms.
If markets and the institutions supporting them are well developed and function
efficiently there would be no need for concern over institutions. However, the
deficiency of necessary institutions is a defining characteristic of
underdevelopment and requires serious attention (Lall, 1992:172). Which
6 Notably earlier Institutionalists who chose the 'institution' as the unit of analysis [Spechler, 1990:254].
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institutions then, are of importance for the creation of firm-level and national
technological capabilities?
Institutions external to the firm include the legal framework, industrial
institutions, training institutions and technology institutions. The legal
framework has to support industrial activities and property rights, while
industrial institutions are those that are aimed at building linkages in
production, technology and training. Exampleswould be industrial councils (e.g.
the Textile Federation) and entities designed to promote small business
development, such as the Ntsika Enterprise Promotion Agency in South Africa.
Training institutions are aimed at providing the necessary training when firms
under-invest in in-house training. Under-investment in training may occur
because firms who undertake training activities generate positive externalities
for which they are not properly compensated. Technology institutions include
public and private institutions involved in the production and diffusion of
technology. The South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR)is an example of such an institution. Of particular relevance in this study,
is the work of the Textile Division of the CSIR(Textek).
In country comparisons, it has been noted that the effectiveness of education
and training institutions in providing the required inputs to firms could have a
marked effect on the pace of development. The strong linkage between
universities and innovating firms in the computer industry in America has been
underlined by many scholars (Bresnahan and Malerba, 1996). An efficient
venture capital market is another institution that has been identified as
important to enhance the innovation process (Nelson, 1993: 512). It has often
been argued that the linkages between institutions and firms in developing
countries are generally weak. Compared to developed countries with long
histories and the more recent success stories of Asia, South Africa and other
African countries have not had the same success in creating institutions that
effectively support the development process. Generally speaking, education and
training systems have not provided industry with sufficient quantities and
qualities of personnel. Also, the research at universities does not become
innovations at a significant rate. The reasons for this outcome are partly
24
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
shortages in funding for basic research, but also a lack of venture capital and
investment capabilities to turn inventions into commercially successful products
(Blankly and Kaplan, 1997:70-71).
2.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR DIFFUSION OF TECHNOLOGY
Drawing together the insights from evolutionary economics discussedabove, we
are now in a position to consider the diffusion of new technology'. If we take the
discussionabove seriously, we cannot but recognise that innovation (such as new
technologies) and its adoption and diffusion depend critically on the absorptive
capacity of firms. This in turn, is conditioned by their skills and competencies
acquired in the past, organisational structure, routines and strategic decisions,
and institutional relations, to name but a few of the crucial factors. As Farrand
(1997:78) puts it: 'Firms and other institutions (networks, pubUc bootes) have
h;ghly aitterentiatea capacities to respond to innovation. Furthermore, tn a
global business environment, we should expect that d;fferentjatjon to be that
much greater, since knowledge is more imperfect, skj{{s more varied,
uncertaintv Mgher, oUgopolymore prevalent, and reguïatiot: more diverse."
Underhill (1997:140) emphasisesthat the diffusion of technology is 'governed by
complex social, institutional and economic structural factors .'
When time" is allowed for in the diffusion process (as in intra-firm studies), a
gradual adoption process is recognised and the speed at which a single
innovation reaches a certain diffusion level within single firms is measured. In
inter-firm studies the 'rate of imitation' is measured, i.e. the number of actual
adopters out of a potential number of adopters. Lissoni and Metcalfe (1994: 108)
observe that this measure does not take into account that some of the adopters
often differ in their commitment to the new technology and may even reverse
7 Our purpose here is not to give a comprehensive overview of the channels through which technology is
diffused, but to deal with the interpretations of technological diffusion. For a good overview of the channels
of diffusion, see for example Audretsch (1995) and for an excellent review of the main themes, Lissoni and
Metcalfe (1994).
8 Firms in standard economics textbooks are usually able to adopt a new technology without any diffusion lag
and are able to adapt their organisations to benefit from the new technology relatively cost-free in negligible
time (Lissoni and Metcalfe, 1994: 108).
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the decision to adopt. Suchdiffusion measuresmay thus overstate the successof
diffusion.
Many of the factors underlying the diverse patterns of innovation and diffusion,
for example, organisation and management 'culture', institutional
embeddedness, and tacit knowledge are not easily susceptible to economic
modelling. Detailed case studies of firms, and across industries over time,
however, serve to generate regularities amid the diversity (such as the
Schumpeter Mark I and II innovation regimes discussed above), which could
eventually be incorporated in models.
2.5 SUMMARYANDPREVIEWOFCHAPTER3
To sum up, the evolutionary position thus links micro-level processeswith the
wider environment to show how these co-evolve. According to Dosi and Malerba
(1996:17), "micro-level entities path-dependently learn (and get stuck) in the
generic way described by the 'evolutionary' theory of the firm, but sector-
specific knowledge basesand country-specific institutions restrict the 'seeding'
of the evolutionary process, and also channel the possible evolutionary
trajectories. "
In chapter 3, we study the long-term evolution of the world textile industry. On
the supply side, we look at the development of technologies and changes in
inputs, such as synthetic fibres. We also consider changes in demand patterns
and market structure. We also pay attention to changes in the nature of
competition in the world textile industry and link this to the international rules
and regulations governing the industry, e.g. the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA)
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). Before concluding we consider
challenges and prospects for the global textile industry in the 21st century.
26
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER3
THE LONG-TERMEVOLUTIONOFTHEGLOBALTEXTILEINDUSTRY
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The word 'textiles' comes from the Latin texere' (to weave), but, as we show in
Figure 3.1. the global textile complex comprises so much more than weaving.
The global textile industry displays considerable diversity, from the highly
protected handloom industry in India (Meyanathan, 1994) to the highly capital-
intensive textile industries of the industrialised countries. This diversity is
evident in the nature of the fibres used, the methods of production employed as
well as the end usesenvisaged for the products of the textile complex. It is also
one of the most globalised industries (after airplane manufacturing, higher
education and soft drinks) (The Textile Institute, 1994). The question to answer
is "How did the textile industry become so globalised?" To this end, this chapter
focuses on the long-term evolution of the global textile industry. The earlier
history of the textile industry, however, is well documented (see for example,
Lazonick, 1979, 1981a & 1983; Von Tunzelmann, 1995, Mokyr, 1990 and
Dickerson, 1995). In this chapter we are interested in the more recent evolution
of the global textile industry, i.e. the latter part of the twentieth century. In
particular, we seek answers to the following questions:
• On the supply side of the industry, what have been the most salient
trends in production, employment and technological development?
• What have been the most important changes facing the global textile
industry on the demand side of the market?
• How can these trends be explained?
• Are existing explanations sufficient, or
• Should further anglesof investigation be pursued?
• What are the most significant challenges and prospects facing the global
textile industry in the new millennium?
I Simpson, 1959:603.
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Although we deal with these different aspects in separate sections, it is
important to bear in mind that the developments in the different 'compartments'
have feedback effects. For example, technological developments influence the
direction that the evolution of the textile industry takes, but the exigencies of
the market for textiles and changes in the trade regime, on the other hand,
elicit particular responsesin terms of technological development.
3.1.1 The textile complex
Figure 3.1 illustrates the elements of the textile complex. The textile industryforms
part of a larger complex, comprising the whole range of activities from fibre
production to distribution of final products. Many of the sub-parts of the process
may be done separately, thus allowing for the break-up and relocation of parts of
the industry, which hastaken place over the last few decades. One firm may also be
involved in the whole processfrom fibre manufacturing to end product.
FIGURE 3.1: THE TEXTILE COMPLEX
Materials Processes End uses
HOUSEHOLD GOODS
Furnishings,
Carpets, etc.
/
/ CLOTHING INDUSTRYYARN AND FABRIC FORMATION GARMENT
MANUFACTURE
DISTRIBUTION
~
Raw cotton,
~
FABRIC
(Designing, cutting, sewing,
~ RetaillWholesale
~ ---+ packing)wool, etc. YARN MANUFACTURE i. mass-production Operations
PREPARATION Weaving / knitting, garments
Spinning finishing
~;;
fashion garments
T
PRODUCTION OF TECHNICAL TEXTILESI Wood, oil, 1+ Chemical plants & Ill- MANUFACTURED Medical textiles, geo-
natural gas petrochemical FIBRES textiles. industrial soods
refineries a. Cellulosics
b. Synthetics
Source: Adapted from Dicken (1987:222).
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Somesuch vertically integrated firms even have their own retail outlets. For our
purposes, the textile industry comprisesthe pipeline from fibre manufacturing (in
the case of manufactured fibres) up to the finishing of fabrics indicated by the
darker boxesin figure 3.1).
3.2 WORLDPRODUCTION,EMPLOYMENTANDTECHNOLOGICALCHANGE
The latter part of the twentieth century has been a turbulent time for the global
economy and the global textile industry did not escape this turbulence; it has, in
fact, in some cases been the harbinger of major changesand in other instances
borne the incidence of developments elsewhere. These changes are observed
broadly on the supply as well as the demand side of the market. In this section
we concentrate on the trends on the supply side, as they are expressed in world
production, employment and technological change.
3.2.1 World Production
World output of textiles stood at US$517 billion in 1995, compared to US$418
billion in 1980. The trend during this period, however, was mixed: there was a
decline in output between 1980and 1985, a rise of 27%in the latter part of the
1980sand a slight increase between 1990 and 1995. World output in USdollar
terms was 24 %higher in 1995 than in 1980. An attempt to calculate the real
change in output value cannot be made, becauseworld price rises in textiles are
not known. Judging from the general producer price changes in several
countries, the International Labour Organisation (2000: 4) concludes that textile
output in real terms over the period may have changed little or even declined.
How then do reports of massivegrowth in textile production in some regions and
declines in other regions fit into this production picture?
3.2.1.1 Shifts in the distribution of output
Shifts in the distribution of textile production have several dimensions: the
geographical shifts, which have a domestic and international dimension, the
shift in type of inputs used in textile production (e.g. the movement away from
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natural fibres to manufactured fibres), as well as the change (especially in
developed countries) in focus with respect to the end use of textiles (e.g. from
textiles for apparel to technical textiles). This last shift will be discussedunder
a section on challenges and prospects.
As input costs in certain locations rise, producers tend to seek out locations that
offer an advantage in the form of lower input cost, especially, but not only,
labour. Within a country's borders, this processhas been called decentralisation
by some and delocalisation by others. This is, of course not a new phenomenon.
Mykor (1990: 77) observes:
" As manufacturing in urban areas became more expensive, industry
discovered the countryside. For goods whose production required
relatively low skills, so that cheap and unsupervised labour could be
profitably employed, rural workers in slack seasons were gradually
recognised as an efficient source of labour. "
The reference is to the period of early capitalism of the late seventeenth
century. However, the scale at which this process took place in the
industrialised countries of the twentieth century outstrips the magnitude of such
processesin early capitalism.
Firms relocating across borders in search of lower costs and higher profitability
contributed to a trend now known as internationalisation. The production
processesin textiles (see figure 3.1.) lend themselves to being fragmented into
separate steps, which allows for the parts requiring lower skills to be relocated
to low-wage countries, while the functions of design, marketing and innovation,
amongst others, may remain in the more developed home country.
This trend is at the heart of the change in the distribution of output amongst
regions. [This is, however, not the only explanation, as will emerge from later
discussion].
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The 1970ssaw strong competition coming from new entrants as well as existing
textile-producing countries and this trend continued through the 1980s and
1990s.
World output of textiles continued to be dominated by three regions in the
1990s. By 19982, Asia held 41%of world textile output, while Europe and the
Americas contributed 28 and 29 per cent respectively (Figure 3.2). Figures for
Africa and Oceania were not available, but the ILO (2000:4) estimates that they
produce only about 2%of world output of textiles.
FIGURE 3.2: WORLD PRODUCTIONOF TEXTilES - 1998
Asia
41%
World Production of textiles 1998
Africa and
Oceania
Americas
29%
2%
Source: ILO, 2000:4.
Secondly, there has been a shift away from natural fibres to manufactured
fibres. Cotton, the quintessential growth industry of the early stages of the
industrial revolution, in the latter part of the twentieth century started losing
ground in global textiles (IOC, 1999:33). In 1950, natural fibres accounted for
eighty per cent of total output; by 1980 they contributed little more than half
(Dicken, 1987:223). Of the manufactured fibres, polyester (staple and filament)
is by far the most dominant, followed by acrylic and nylon (Meyanathan,
1994:40). Various factors explain the shift to manufactured fibres (IOC, 1999:
33):
2 More recent comparable production figures for all textile-producing countries are not yet available, but it is
expected that the trend observed here would not have altered dramatically in the past few years.
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• Fluctuations in the quantity, quality and price of natural fibres relative to
manufactured fibres
• The properties of manufactured fibres relative to natural fibres that make
them suitable for increasing machine speeds
• Falling relative prices of manufactured fibres
• Lower stock-keeping costs of manufactured fibres relative to natural fibres
since the former can be delivered just in time
• The blending of natural and manufactured fibres (such as poly-cotton) to
improve the properties of natural fibre yarn.
Cotton makes up about 90%of the natural fibres. A relatively new development
in cotton production, namely bio-cotton, allows for the improvement in cotton
quality, less contamination (allowing better and more consistent dye affinity)
and resistance to pests. Genetically modified (GM) cotton eliminates the need
for pesttctdes' (a high cost item for developing-country cotton farmers),
produces higher yields and offers higher profitability. India, one of the largest
cotton-producing countries, currently only gets about 300kg per hectare with
traditional methods (the world average is 650kg). Bio-cotton yields 30 to 40 per
cent more than non-GMseeds and it is hoped that this will help cotton to gain
back some of its market share lost to manufactured fibres (Abraham, 2002:6).
The growth in technical textiles, including medical textiles, also opens up new
demand avenuesfor cotton.
3.2.2 Employment trends
As textile producers relocated in favour of lower-wage countries (see Table 3.2
for wage rate comparisons), it is expected that employment will decline in
industrialised countries and increase in developing countries. This has indeed
been the case in the 1970swhere overall textile employment between 1970 and
1980 declined by 15.3%in the major industrialised textile-producing countries
(Hamilton, 1990:38, Table 2-14). In the beginning of the 1980s world textile
employment stood at 16.4 million, declining between 1980and 1985, but picking
3 For example, to control bollworm, a common pest regarding cotton.
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up again towards 1995, to reach 16.8 million and subsequently declined again by
2.5% between 1995 and 1998 (Table 3.3).
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Table 3.2: Comparative wage rates in global textiles (in US$ per hour) -2000
Position Country Wages
1 Japan 26.10
2 Denmark 22.27
3 Switzerland 22.15
4 Belgium 19.55
5 Holland 19.48
6 Germany 18.10
7 Norway 17.97
8 Sweden 17.00
9 Austria 15.80
10 Italy 14.71
11 Canada 14.29
12 USA 14.24
13 Finland 14.06
14 France 13.85
15 United Kingdom 12.72
16 Australia 10.85
17 Ireland 10.31
18 Spain 8.32
19 Israel 7.43
20 NewZealand 7.28
21 Greece 7.24
22 Taiwan 7.23
23 Malta 6.62
24 HongKong 6.10
25 Argentina 5.90
26 South Korea 5.32
27 Portugal 4.31
28 Uruguay 3.63
29 Brazil 3.20
30 Venezuela z,78
31 Turkey '·-2.69
32 Hungary 2.63
33 Poland 2.35
34 Lithuania 2.23
35 Mexico 2.20
36 CzechRepublic 1.97
37 Colombia 1.92
38 Morocco 1.87
39 SouthAfrica 1.82
40 Peru 1.74
41 Tunisia 1.65
42 Slovakia 1.61
43 Estonia 1.53
44 Mauritius 1.47
45 Thailand 1.18
46 Malaysia 1.13
47 Egypt 1.02
48 China 0.69
49 Kenya 0.60
50 India 0.58
51 Sri lanka 0.46
52 Madagascar 0.37
53 Pakistan 0.37
54 Indonesia 0.32
Source: Werner International, quoted in Villa (2001: 1-2).
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TABLE3.3: EMPLOYMENTOFTEXTILES1995 -1998 (BYREGION)
Countries in: (in '000)
1995 1998
% changes % shares in total
1990-95 1995-98 1995 1998
Africa 595 478 -1.2 -19.7 3.5 2.9
America 1 355 1247 -8.1 -8.0 8.0 7.6
Asia 11 627 11 914 17.2 2.5 69.0 72.5
Europe 3207 2733 -30.9 -14.8 19.0 16.6
Oceania 65 62 12.1 -4.6 0.4 0.4
Total 16849 16434 0.9 -2.5 100.0 100.0
Source: ILO, 2000:14.
The aggregate figures thus remained fairly unchanged; not so the distribution of
employment. The overall trend of decline in employment in advanced countries
observed in the 1970scontinued. The largest share of employment (72.5%up
from 69%in 1995) is to be found in Asia, with China the single largest employer,
followed by India (Table 3.3). The second largest regional share is taken up by
Europe (16.6% down from 19% in 1995), where Italy is the largest textile
employer: 8th in the world (Table 3.4). The Americas provide the third largest
share of textile employment (7.6%), where the United States is the largest
employer in this region. Africa follows some distance behind with a share of
2.9%,with Egypt the largest employer, while Oceania's share amounted to 0.4%
only (ILO, 2000:14 and 18).
Asia's share in textile employment is much higher than its share in world output
of textiles, reflecting the lower productivity in the industry in the developing
region (ILO, 2000:14).
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TABLE 3.4: TWENTY PRINCIPALWORLD EMPLOYERSIN TEXTILES (1998)
Ranking Countries Employees ('000)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
China
India
Bangladesh
United States
Indonesia
Russian Federation
Japan
Italy
Pakistan
Thailand
Korea, Republic of
Mexico
Turkey
Egypt
Brazil
Taiwan, China
Romania
Spain
United Kingdom
Germany
7672.4
1 470.5
679.1
588.0
515.4
495.0
432.0
341.1
279.6
257.5
248.8
240.0
227.5
223.0
188.0
159.4
159.0
151.4
146.9
141.2
Source: ILO, 2000: 18.
Although employment in textiles in the developed countries has declined,
several of these countries experience a shortage of skilled workers to employ in
the ever-more sophisticated textile plants (Rigamonti, 1999:22). In the United
States it is a question of school leavers who are willing to work in textiles not
having the basic education required, while in Italy the younger generation does
not see the textile and clothing industry as an appealing career choice. In the
district of Biella in Northern Italy, for example, they experience such severe
shortages of skills that they go as far afield as Bulgaria and Morocco to attract
workers (Industria tessile, 2002, Nr4).
According to Rigamonti (1999:23), world-class textile plants require a level of
education for supervisors of sixteen years of schooling (the equivalent of a
college degree). For production workers twelve years of good schooling are
required. With sophisticated technology, physical strength is no longer a central
requirement, but brainpower is. Today'swork place requires continuous training
at all levels of the organisation, including management. This meansthat training
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programmes should be well thought-out and updated regularly, especially in an
industry where technological upgrading is an important strategic imperative.
3.2.3 Technological change
Not only has technological change occurred in virtually every section of the
textile complex described in figure 3.1, but other enabling technologies and
organisational and management processes have also impacted on the global
textile industry. It is not our intention to undertake a full stocktaking of all the
technological advances that have taken place in textiles and related industries;
we therefore concentrate on four broad categories of change:
• Technological advancesembodied in textile machinery.
• New inputs or hybrids of old and new inputs, resulting in new products,
such as intelligent fibres.
• Enabling technologies, specifically Information and Communications
technologies (ICT).
• Innovations with respect to organisational and management processes.
3.2.3.1 Textile machinery
The changing nature of competition, requiring ever faster delivery, higher
quality, yet more custom-made and differentiated products has challenged
textile producers and their technology suppliers to respond with technologies
that will deliver economies of scale, scope and time." The result has been ever
faster and more sophisticated machinery, by and large reducing the need for
high cost labour in advanced countries, and, at the same time enhancing the
productivity of labour still in employment. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 bear evidence of
the improvements with respect to speed and labour productivity. Product
innovation contributed to further automation in textiles. Some of the major
developments include shuttle-less looms, rapier, water jet, open-end frotor, air jet
4 Whereas economies of scale derive from being able to produce larger volumes, reducing the cost per unit,
economies of scope derive from factors that make it cheaper to produce a range of related products. Factors
that allow reduction in throughput and delivery times, for example, result in economies of time (Bannoch, et
al,1998:122-123).
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and vortex spinning" as well as various improvements in finishing, dyeing and
printing of textiles. Even in the fibre preparation stage the machines are smaller,
but with greater efficiency. For example, the application of micro-sensors and new
technology that regulates the airflow in the process of cleansing fibres ensure that
the fibre is cleaned gently without breaking it.
TABLE 3.5: EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY
Process 1959 1999
Carding (Cotton)
Drawing
Spinning"
Weaving'"
3 - 5 Kgs/Hr
40 M/Min
12 M/Min (Ring)
220 MIMin (Shuttle)
100+ Kgs/Hr
800 M/Min
350 M/Min
6000 MIMin (Wave)
• Medium yarn count
•• Weft insertion rate
Source: Rigamonti, 1999:21
TABLE 3.6: LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY (YARN - MEDIUM COUNT)
Year Kg/Oper Hr
1750
1800
1850
1900
1950
2000
0.0083
0.11
0.33
1.25
3.30
100
Source: Rigamonti, 1999:21.
3.2.3.2 New and hybrid inputs
New inputs and hybrids of old and new materials allow for the expansion of the
choices offered to consumers as well as supplying other needs outside of the
textiles for apparel market. The development of intelligent fibres," for example,
5 One of the latest developments is the magnetically elevated ring spinning system, which eliminates for the
first time the metal upon metal contact between the traveller and the ring, which has been the primary
impediment to increasing production speed in currently installed ring-spinning systems. Because the traveller
is 'floating', it can be permanent rather than disposable, resulting in a 17% cost saving (a disposable traveller
usually lasts between six days and three weeks). Production speed is substantially higher, resulting in a 43%
manufacturing cost saving per spinning unit on average (Abdel-Hady, et al, 2002).
6 The natural fibres and fibres regenerated from natural materials are often referred to as the first generation
of fibres, Second generation fibres are those manufactured fibres synthesised after the discovery of nylon.
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employs knowledge at the cutting edge of R&D (traditionally in chemistry, but
now also in biology, especially biotechnology). The key characteristic of
intelligent materials is their ability to adapt their properties becauseof external
stimuli. A textile material may be required to be hydrophobic at one point and
hydrophilic at another, conductive or non-conductive, change colour, be coolon
the skin when it is hot and provide heat when it is cold, etc. Two examples serve
to illustrate: 1. Work is underway at the National Textile Centre in the United
States to develop bioactive fabrics, i.e. fabrics that contain micro-fabricated
bio-environments and biologically activated fibres. These fabrics will have
genetically engineered bacteria or mammalian cells incorporated into them that
will enable them to generate and replenish chemical coatings and chemically
active components. Applications in the medical and defense industries, e.g. drug
producing bandagesor protective clothing with highly sensitive cellular sensors
are obvious, but commercial applications are also promising, e.g. odour-eating
fabrics, self-cleaning fabrics and fabrics that regenerate water and dust
repellents. 2. Another project at the National Textile Centre is exploiting
recombinant DNAand plant transgenic technologies to create and produce novel
protein polymers in adequate quantities for fibre spinning (National Textile
Centre, June 2002: CD Rom). Researchers in China have already managed to
extract an environmentally friendly new fibre from soybean protein, which
resembles natural silk and improves on cotton and natural silks in as far as its
properties for moisture transportation, ventilation and warmth retention are
concerned (Textiles Unlimited, 2001b:12).
3.2.3.3 Enabling technologies (lCT) and organisational management
changes
ICT and the textile industry have a 'familial' connection that goes back to the
first usage of binary code. This was in the use of the Jacquard loom, perfected
These were new generic fibres based on differences in chemical composition. For the third generation fibres
of the last two decades, technology has focused primarily on developing manufacturing processes and fibre
modifications to produce high performance fibres. These fibres are usually developed for specific purposes
or end uses. They are also called high technology fibres and super fibres. High technology fibres have
specially engineered properties such as flame resistance, chemical absorbance and biodegradability. A
polyester fibre with the cross section of silk and micro-slits to simulate silk's lustre and seroop is one
example. Micro-fibres are another example of high technology fibres. Super fibres are manufactured to have
exceptionally high strength (tenacities higher than 20 grams per denier). (Tortora & Collier, 1997: 132).
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by Joseph Marie Jacquard in 18017. This loom was a sophisticated piece of
machinery (for that time) that could weave patterns into fabric. The patterns
were coded on cards by means of holes representing the information in a binary
code. Rodsconnected to wires probed the cards, and in so doing transmitted the
information embedded in them. This loom inspired Charles Babbage in the design
of his famous Analytical Engine and the American, Herman Holleridge, in using
punch cards to store information from the 1890 US census (Mokyr, 1990:103).
These were thus early forerunners of the information and communication
technologies now ubiquitously embedded in textile machinery". What then, are
the nature and significance of ICT used in textiles today?
The ICT embodied in textile machinery pertains mostly to the use of computer
software and statistical methods such as Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC)
machines, Computer Aided Design (CAD), Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM)
and Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM). The specific details and
implications of these technologies are discussed in chapter 6 (Section 6.4).
Suffice it here to note the major advantages and impact of such technologies on
the textile complex. Apart from its contribution to the increased operational
speed, it also delivers real time, detailed information to management on all
aspects of the procurement, production and distribution processes. The
communication aspect of the technology [such as Electronic Data Interface (EDI)
and Electronic Point of Sale (EPOS)] allows for the development of management
techniques and processes that have become indispensable in modern textiles,
viz. Quick Response (QR), global supply-chain management and adherence to
quality and environmental standards. Some commentators believe that
technological and supply-chain practices are redefining the conditions of
comparative and competitive advantages in the global textile industry (Coughlin,
et al, 2000:3). Further, it is these technologies that enhanced the 'inter-
7 The loom was the invention of two Frenchmen in the late 1720s. One of them, Basil Bouchon, was the son
of an organ maker. This, according to Mokyr (1990: 101), is significant, because the organ was the fust direct
application of the binary coding of information.
8 It is interesting to note that the textile industry, in the 21 st century, is also making a significant contribution
to the advancement of information and communications technologies: because of the need for more
information capacity, the demand for polymer optical fibres (POFs) is accelerating. The most used industrial
material for this purpose has been polymethyl methacrylate (PMMA), but the current and future trend is for
POF systems to be optimised at wavelengths at which PMMA does not work so well. Researchers are
currently working to develop a fluoropolymer optical fibre that will enable the reliable reception, routing and
secure broadcasting of information (Ballato, et al, 2002: 1).
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relationships between firms of different sizes and types (which) increasingly
span national boundaries to create a set of geographically nested relationships
from local to global scales. These inter-firm relationships are the threads from
which the fabric of the global economy is woven.' (Dicken, 1987:184).
3.3 CHANGING DEMAND CONDITIONS
Over time there has been a marked increase in the consumption of textiles
(Table 3.7). As the population increased, the demand for textiles, especially in
providing a basic need (clothing) grew as well. Especially between 1950 and
2000, the average annual percentage growth in the demand for textiles (in
millions of tonnes) had been 3.2%, compared to 1.9% in the first half of the
twentieth century. Per capita consumption (kg/p.c.) rose from 4.5 kg in 1950 to
7.9%in 2 000. However, these broad growth trends do not tell us much about the
nature of demand. As far as textiles for apparel is concerned, Engel's law9 has
set in in developed countries, that is, as household income increases, spending
on clothing forms a smaller percentage of income. Further, with increasing
incomes, consumers become more discerning, spurning mass-produced goods in
favour of more differentiated products to suit their lifestyles. Supplying more
differentiated goods in smaller quantities adds to the production costs of firms.
To reduce costs, firms need to find new production and marketing strategies.
One option is to identify market segmentsabroad with similar tastes, in order to
increase volumes and bring down costs per unit. This leads to increased intra-
industry trade, especially in the high-end of the market. The other option is to
change the set-up of production, becoming more flexible to the extent that a
batch of one can easily be produced to suit customer needs. This approach has
been called many names, e.g. flexible specialisation, lean production, etc. The
need to supply more specialised, higher value-added products has given a new
life-line to textile producers in developed countries with sophisticated design
facilities and innovativeness in new products, such as new intelligent fibres, with
applications in fashion, leisure and sports apparel.
9 The law relates to food, but has also been applied to basic goods, such as clothing and shelter (Underhill,
1997; footnote 1, page 150).
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Changes in consumer preferences, especially in developed-country markets,
have also included more stringent demands with respect to quality, increasing
concerns for the environment and labour standards in textile-producing
countries. This has led to the development of integrated systems of quality,
environmental and social standards. The latter not only includes concerns for
labour, but also the safety and dignity of the consumer of the product. These
concerns have seen the development of internationally recognised standards,
such as ISO9000 for quality and ISO 14 000 for environmental standards. A
further standard (SA8000) regarding social norms is not yet as widely accepted
and implemented. The introduction of e-commerce has also prompted the
development of a standard for firms trading on the Internet. In Europe, for
example, certification can be obtained for websites. This certification vets a
firm with respect to quality standards as well as reliability and secure trading
conditions on the site. In Italy, CERTITEX, the textiles standards body,
administers the Qweb label, which testifies that the firm complies with the
aforementioned criteria (CERTITEX,2003).
TABLE 3.7: WORLDCONSUMPTIONOFTEXTILES
Year Pop mm MTons Ave% Kg/Cap
Growth
1770 750 1400 1.9
1800 860 1600 0.5 1.9
1850 1091 2200 0.6 2.0
1900 1571 3893 1.2 2.5
1950 2513 9939 1.9 4.0
200010 6083 47743 3.2 7.9
Ave%
Growth
o
0.1
0.5
0.9
1.4
Source: Rigamonti (1999:20)
Sophisticated information and communications technology allows for the
continuous collection and analysis of data on consumer preferences. To turn
these volumes of information into cost-effective feedback for producers and
10 Estimate for 2000.
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retailers remains a daunting task. To face this challenge, many researchers seek
online (web-based) solutions. For example, Solomon, et al at the National
Textile Centre in the United States (2002:1) are attempting to chart 'consumer
constellations', which would record and reflect the cross-category (e.g. in
clothing and home furnishing) preferences of consumers across the whole
lifespan (e.g. young adult, single professional, families, etc.). The outcome
would be a programme able to provide highly automated data-collection,
analysis, and presentation tools in order to gain more timely and cost-effective
feedback about customer preferences in textile and garments industries.
3.4 INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN TEXTILES
3.4.1 Shifting Comparative advantage and the evolution of trade in textiles
According to the neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin model, comparative advantage is
the rationale for nations to trade. The basis for comparative advantage is the
different endowments of factors of production and the fact that these factors of
production are put to different usesin different countries. Thus, Heckscher and
Ohlin conclude that countries will specialise in the production and export of
those products which use their relatively more abundant factor of production
more intensively and import those products which use their relatively scarce
factor of production more intensively. With respect to textiles, a World Bank
publication (Meyanathan, 1994:6) argues that the global textile industry is
evolving as predicted by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of comparative advantage,
i.e. that as labour becomes more expensive in developed countries (DCs), they
started to lose their comparative advantage in textiles and clothing to the Newly
Industrialised Countries (NICs), and the latter soon found their comparative
advantage eroded by the so-called second-tier NICs and other low-wage
developing countries. Indeed, when we peruse the trends in for example the
share of the developed countries, the NICsand the developing countries in world
output and trade in textiles (see Sections 3.2.1 and 3.4.1), this would seem to
confirm the predictions of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. In 1963, only one
developing country (India) was in the top ten leading exporters of textiles, while
there were four in the top 15 (Table 3.8). These developing countries
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contributed only 14.59%of the exports of the top 15 (who themselves accounted
for 84% of world exports of textiles). By 1985 there were four developing
countries in the top 10 exporters' list and they now accounted for 32%of the
total for the top 10, while by 1994 there were seven in the top 15 accounting for
54.69%of the exports by these top exporters (the top 15 were responsible for
78.3%of world exports of textiles). By 2001, world exports of textiles stood at
US$147.00billion, of which the top 15 produced 89.1%(Table 3.9).
TABLE 3.8: LEADING EXPORTERSOF TEXTILES, 1963, 1973, 1985, 1994
(BILLIONSOF DOLLARS)
1963 1973 1985 1994
Japan 0.92 Germany, Fed. 3.04 Germany, 6.0 Hong 12.57
Rep Fed. Rep. kong"
UK 0.71 Japan 2.45 Japan 4.9 Germany 12.56
France 0.63 France 1.69 Italy 4.7 China" 11.82
India 0.54 Belgium- 1.69 China 3.6 Italy 10.86
Luxembourg
Germany, 0.53 Italy 1.53 Hong Kong 3.0 Korea, 10.69
Fed. Rep. Rep.of
Italy 0.53 UK 1.45 Belgium- 3.0 Chinese 10.20
Luxembourg Taipei
Belgium- 0.51 Netherlands 1.29 France 2.9 Belgium- 6.80
Luxembourg Luxembour
g
US 0.49 US 1.22 Korea, 2.5 Japan 6.78
Rep.of
Netherlands 0.36 India 0.69 Taiwan 2.5 US 6.59
Switzerland 0.21 Hong Kong13 0.67 US 2.4 France 6.22
Hong Kong" 0.14 Switzerland 0.64 N/a UK 4.37
Austria 0.11 China 0.60 N/a Pakistan 3.99
China" 0.10 Taiwan 0.56 N/a lndia" 2.92
Portugal 0.09 Austria 0.45 N/a Netherland 2.69
s
Pakistan 0.09 Pakistan 0.44 N/a Indonesia 2.50
Above 84. 79 64 78.3
countries as a
percentage of
world exports
Source: Dickerson, 1995:GATT, 1985-86;WTO, 1995
However, the biggest exporter was now the integrated EU (15) earlier shown
separately; the lists are therefore not strictly comparable. Next to the EU,
11 Domestic exports (1994) were US$ 1.95 billion, re-exports amounted to US$10.63 billion
12 Includes significant shipments through processing zones
13 Includes re-exports: domestic exports were US$ 0.46 billion in 1973.
14 Includes re-exports: domestic exports were US$ 0.11 billion for 1963
15 Includes trade through processing zones
16 1993 instead of 1994
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though, Mainland China is the single largest exporter, accounting for 11.4% of
exports, up from 6.9% in 1990 (Table 3.9). If we add Taiwan Province of China,
Tatpet" and Hong Kong, China's share moves up to 18.78 for 2001.
TABLE 3.9: LEADING TEXTILE EXPORTERS2001 (BILLIONS OF US DOLLARSAND
PERCENTAGE)
Exporting country Value in 2001 %of world exports
1990 2001
EU (15) 50.5 48.7 34.4
China 1 16.8 6.9 11.4
Hong Kong2 12.2
Rep. Korea 10.9 5.8 7.4
USA 10.5 4.8 7.1
China, Taipei 9.9 5.9 6.7
Japan 6.2 5.6 4.2
India 3 5.9 2.1 3.8
Pakistan 4.5 2.6 3.1
Turkey 3.9 1.4 2.7
Indonesia 3.2 1.2 2.2
Canada 2.2 0.7 1.5
Mexico 4 2.1 0.7 1.4
Thailand 1.9 0.9 1.3
Switzerland 1.4 2.5 1.0
Total top 15 131.0
Total world 147.0
% of world exports 91.7 89.1
Note: 1. Includes trade through processing zones; 2. Re-exports amounted to US$
11.2 billion; 3. f.o.b.; 4. Data for 2000 instead of 2001
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2001 (www.wto.org; accessed
November 2002)
As far as imports are concerned, the developed countries dominated in 1963 and
1973, with Germany, the UK, and the US the largest importers. By 1985, the US
topped the list of importers with the UK and France still important, but Hong
Kong was now established in third position and by 1994 it was in the top spot.
Germany was still a significant importer, followed by the US, China and the UK.
By 2001, many developing countries feature in the top 15 importers. This is
partly explained by the textiles shipped there to be processed under Outward
17 Taiwan Province of China. These terms are used interchangeably in the literature. In this study the term
Taiwan Province of China will be used except where doing so will result in altering the content of a quotation
or extract from a source.
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Processing Trade (OPT) arrangements (e.g. Mexico and Turkey), but developing
countries such as China import both low-value fabrics for processing as well as
high value-added products from industrialised countries.
TABLE 3.10: LEADING IMPORTERS OF TEXTILES 1963, 1973, 1985, 1994
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
1963 1973 1985 1994
Germany, 0.77 Germany. 2.74 US 5.0 Hong Kong'S 15.29
Fed. Rep Fed. Rep.
US 0.68 US 1.58 Germany, 5.0 Germany 10.72
Fed. Rep.
UK 0.41 France 1.40 Hong Kong 4.3 US 9.66
Netherlands 0.37 UK 1.26 UK 3.9 China 9.35
USSR19 0.30 Japan 1.13 France 3.4 UK 6.68
Canada 0.27 Netherlands 1.10 China 2.8 France 6.59
Australia 0.24 Belgium- 1.01 Italy 2.5 Italy 5.62
Luxembourg
Belgium- 0.23 Hong Kong 0.94 Japan 1.9 Japan 5.15
Luxembourg
Sweden 0.22 Italy 0.91 Netherlands 1.8 Belgium- 3.62
Luxembourg
Hong Kong 0.20 Canada 0.78 Belgium- 1.7 Korea, Rep. of 3.34
Luxembourg
South Africa 0.20 USSR 0.63 N/a Netherlands 3.05
France 0.19 Australia 0.62 N/a Canada 2.91
Italy 0.15 Sweden 0.51 N/a Spain 2.22
Denmark 0.15 Switzerland 0.50 N/a Mexico 2.15
Switzerland 0.15 Austria 0.48 N/a Singapore2ore 2.02
Above 64 67 58 57.4
countries as a
percentage of
world imports
Source: Dickerson, 1995: GAn, 1985-86; WTO, 1995
18 Retained imports are defmed as imports minus re-exports. These amounted to 0.67 billion US$ in 1994.
Re-exports amounted to 0.025 billion US$ in 1963, and 0.210 billion US$ in 1973.
19 Imports f.o.b.
20 Retained imports amounted to 0.85 billion US$ for 1994.
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TABLE 3.11: LEADING IMPORTERSOF TEXTILES 2001 (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
AND PERCENTAGE)
Importer Value in 2001 % of world imports
1990 2001
EU (15) 45.6 46.7 29.2
USA 15.4 6.2 9.9
China 1 12.6 4.9 8.0
Hong Kong2 12.2
Mexico 6.0 0.9 3.9
Japan 4.7 3.8 3.0
Canada 3.8 2.2 2.4
Rep.of Korea 3.1 1.8 2.0
Poland 2.6 0.2 1.7
Rumania 2.0 0.1 1.3
Turkey 1.9 0.5 1.2
United Arab Emirates3ft4 1.8 0.9 1.1
Thailand 1.5 0.8 1.0
Bangladesh 1.5 0.4 1.0
Morocco 1.5 0.3 0.9
Total top 15 importers 105.0
Total world 156.4
Above countries as % of world imports 73.7 67.2
Note: 1. Includes trade through processing zones; 2. internal imports amounted
to US$1 billion; 3. f.o.b.; 4. Data for 2000 instead of 2001
Source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2001 (www.wto.org; accessed
November 2002)
3.4.2 The trade regime
The textile industry has been vital in the industrialisation process of the
developed countries and has likewise acted as sunrise industry in the
development efforts of the Newly Industrialised Countries. It is also an important
source of employment and foreign exchange in other developing countries,
hoping to benefit from industrialisation and freer trade.
The question is, however, as Anderson (1994:83) put it: "Will advanced
industrial countries continue to make room for further generations of NICs
seeking to export their way out of poverty?"
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To answer this question, it helps to look at history, i.e. what do we know about
the responses of industrialised countries to increased competition? These
responsescan be placed into two broad categories:
• Attempts to facilitate restructuring in the textiles and clothing industry in
industrialised countries, and
• Attempts to protect domestic textiles and clothing from foreign
cornpetitton."
The attempts by developed countries to protect their industries and the
persistent efforts of developing countries to penetrate those markets, led to a
regulatory framework for textile trade that has not been entirely satisfactory to
any of its participants. This section reviews the evolution of this framework and
the unintended consequencesthat eventually may lead to its demise. Attempts
to facilitate restructuring are studied in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.4.2.1 Early protection
Although attempts at protection have a very long history,22 these attempts
gained in determination in the period between the First and SecondWorld Wars,
when the then leaders in textiles (Britain and America) perceived their
industries to be under threat from Japanese competition. Other developing
economies to a lesser extent also posed a threat to the leaders. In 1932 Britain
instituted protective measuresagainst Japaneseexports into her markets. Other
countries followed suit and by 1936, there were quantitative restrictions on
Japanese exports in 40 out of 106 markets (GATT, 1984, quoted in Dickerson,
1995: 321).
The Second World War gave British and American textiles a respite from the
competition emanating from Japan, but the latter's rapid recovery after the war
soon had the protective hackles up again in the US. In addition, increased
21 Some countries, of course, pursued both, making categorisation a question of degree.
22 The attempt by the British Parliament in the late 1600s to protect the young English textile industry by
prohibiting Indian cloth imports is one of the earliest records of textile trade regulation (Dickerson,
1995:319).
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competition from the NICs (for example, Hong Kong and South Korea) spurred
the American Cotton Manufacturing Institute into action. They commenced
earnest efforts to limit textile imports (Dickerson, 1995:322).
However, when Japan became a member of the GATT in 1955, the Voluntary
Export Restraints (VERs)ran contrary to the GATTprinciple of non-discrimination
and Japan could retaliate. After persuading Japan to accept another VER in
1957, the United States in 1959 proposed that the protective measures" that
until then had been ad hoc, be made more formal. The result was the Short-term
Arrangement (STA), which lasted from October 1961 to September 1962
(Meyanathan, 1994:8; Dickerson, 1995:329).
The STAcovered only cotton textiles, but was, like its successor, the Long-term
Arrangement (LTA), a very important departure from GATT rules. It meant that
textiles and apparel would be the only sectors to have their own trade regime.
The LTA remained in force for 11 years (Dickerson, 1995:330).
3.4.2.2 The Mult;-f;bre Arrangement, counterpoint to the GATT
The diverse ad hoc and bilateral arrangements to restrict developing countries'
exports into the industrialised countries, primarily the US and the EU,24were
systematised and extended under the first Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA),which
came into effect in 1974 (Meyanathan, 1994). The language of the first MFA
seemed benign enough. The basic objective of the MFAwas " ...to achieve the
expansion of trade, the reduction of barriers to such trade and the progressive
itberalisatton of world trade in textile products, while at the same time ensuring
the orderly and equitable development of this trade and the avoidance of
disruptive effects in individual markets and on individual lines of production in
both importing and exporting countries." (Article 1, paragraph 2, quoted in
Meyanathan, 1994:9, emphasis added). The history of the MFAdiscussed below
23 While the US made use of VERs, Britain tried to restrict cotton textile product imports 'voluntarily' under
the Lancashire Pact and the other European nations used a variety of measures under Article XII of the
GATT (Dickerson, 1995:326).
24 At this stage still the European Economic Community, but we use the term European Union throughout,
providing clarifications where confusion from such use may arise.
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shows that it was neither an instrument of ltberattsatton, nor of equitable
development of trade in textiles and clothing.
The MFA set the general rules, while the quotas and export volumes were
negotiated under bilateral agreements. The rules allowed for flexibility in that
some swing (switching between product categories), carry-forward (advance use
of following years' quotas) and carry-over (use of quotas not utilised in previous
years) were permitted (Meyanathan, 1994:9). It was under the bilateral
negotiations, however, that the import-restraining countries turned on the
screws and hardly any flexibility remained in the bilateral agreements. The
consecutive renewal of the MFA became both more restrictive and extended its
terms to cover an ever wider range of textile products beyond cotton textiles.
Renewals in the 1970s and 1980s came against the background of deepening
industrial crises in the industrialised countries. As our figures earlier in this
chapter show, the industrialised countries were facing increasing job losses, loss
of market share domestically and internationally and increasing costs. In
addition, given the generally poor economic conditions (first and second oil
shocks and their consequences) investment levels in the industry were falling
and profitability of many firms was poor (Underhill, 1998:3). Textile producers in
developed countries complained of 'unfair' competition from low-cost
developing countries. In France, employers protested in the streets against
'cheap imports' (Underhill, 1998:243). As a result, the governments of the
import-restraining countries were under pressure to tighten protective
measures; and tighten them they did.
Referring to the first two MFAs, Raffaelli (1990:60) concludes: rt ••In both textile
Arrangements the notion of comparative advantage was ignored, and
competitiveness became something 'threatening': low cost (IncidentaLLy a much
used term that does not appear in the MFA) is implied to be the result of
disreputable manoeuvres, such as paying slave wages, receiving hidden
subsidies, and so on." (Emphasis added).
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Two particular 'innovations' to allow further restrictions stand out. 25 The first
was the introduction of the idea of 'cumulative market disruption', which
permitted import-restraining countries to limit even the imports from small
suppliers, provided aggregate import levels had reached a specified ceiling. The
second was the clause on 'agreed reasonable departures' from MFA I. This
permitted the reduction of import levels below those agreed upon earlier
(Meyanathan, 1994:9). The Protocol for MFA III, which came into effect in
January 1982, did away with this 'reasonable departures' altogether and added
an 'anti-surge' provision to restrict export growth of a product whose quota had
not been utilised. One restrictive instrument was thus simply substituted for
another. Upon the third renewal of the MFA(MFAIV), the United States insisted
that all natural products be incorporated under the MFA, and imports from
major suppliers be fixed to make room for increased imports from poorer
developing countries. The flexibility provisions referred to above were made
more restrictive (Meyanathan, 1994: 9). Thus, when the protocol for MFA IV was
signed, the protectionist groups in the developed countries seemed firmly in the
driving seat. After considering the impact of the MFA, we will examine the
factors that led to the agreement to return textiles and clothing to the fold of
GATTprinciples.
3.4.2.2.1 The consequencesof the MFA
Much has been written about the consequencesof the MFA(Seefor example,
Dicken, 1987;Meyanathan, 1994, Dickerson, 1995; Raffaelli, 1990; Hamilton,
1990; Trella and Whalley, 1990; and Martin and Suphacalasai, 1990for extensive
accounts).
Asearly the beginning of the 1980sthe immense effects of the MFAwere
evident:
"The MFA has become the key to trade flows of textiles and apparel and has
had a particularly significant impact on the growth of textile and clothing
25 Underhill (1998) and Raffaelli (1990) give a fascinating account of the interplay and collaboration between
governments and industry associations to achieve this result.
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exports from the NICs. The data show a marked slowing in the growth of
clothing exports from developing countries, principally the NICs, after the MFA
came into effect in the mid-1970s. From 1963 to 1976, the real growth in
exports of clothing was about 21% per annum, whereas real growth from 1976
to 1978 was about 5% per annum. The impact of the MFA is unmistakable, since
1976-78 was a period of general economic recovery ..." (McMullen, 1982: 91,
quoted in Dicken, 1987:249).
The MFA had to a certain extent made life more difficult for producers in
developed countries in that:
• It encouraged production in developing countries, which before the
introduction of the MFAhad virtually no textile and clothing industry. As
producers in search of unused quotas and lower production costs settled
in these countries, new competitors for the industrialised countries were
born.
• It led to diversification into manufactured fibre (MMF)products, in direct
competition with developed-country producers who had found
competitiveness in this branch of the industry. The MFAinitially covered
cotton, so to escape the limitations on cotton exports, developing-
country producers turned to other products, including manufactured
fibres. Countries such as China, South Korea and Taiwan invested heavily
in MMFproduction capacity.
• The reduction of imports from restrained exporters were replaced by
imports from developed countries and developing countries with whom
they had preferential trade agreements, such as the Mediterranean
countries for Europe and the Caribbean for the US.The United States for
example, was a major beneficiary of the restrictions on the NICsin the EU
market. The USincreased its volume of textile exports to the EUby 64 %
between 1977 and 1979, while its exports of clothing grew by an
impressive 90 % during the sameperiod (Dicken, 1987:250).
• It encouraged the development of supply-chains between developed and
developing country producers, undermining the interests of developed
country firms who would not, or could not adopt this strategy. In the US
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for example, the result of outsourcing provisions (re-imports under special
legislation) made up only 5%of the textiles and clothing imports in 1987.
By 1997 these imports had increased more than fivefold (Levinsohn and
Petropoulos, 2002:7).
• It prevented much-needed structural adjustment in the developed-
country textile and clothing industries. The United States and France are
prime examples of instances where the necessary restructuring to regain
competitiveness did not take place to a satisfactory extent (Underhill,
1998).
3.4.2.3 The MFA and the Uruguay Round of GATT negot;at;ons
By 1986, at the launch of the Uruguay Roundof GATTnegotiations, the capture
of the global textile and garment trade regime by protectionist groupings
seemed as unbending as ever. This was evident in the fact that the USinitially
refused point blank to have the MFAput on the agenda for the Uruguay Round
negotiations and the EUput it on the agendawith a myriad of provisos (Faini, et
al, 1997:109; see Table A3.1 for details of shifts in position during the Uruguay
Round).
However, some changes had been brewing, which eventually moved the
entrenched interests in the developed countries to accede to what became
known as the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) under GATT auspices.
These changes and their impact on the negotiations are discussed in the next
sub-section.
3.4.2.3.1 The chang;ng landscape of textile trade, inertia and the role of
institution:
The changesto the global textile and clothing trade landscape included:
• Increased use of Outward ProcessingTrade (OPT) instruments by firms in
developed countries; the result being that much of the import
competition was generated by domestic firms and their activities abroad
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(Firms from Holland, Germany, and Belgium were the first to use this
strategy; the US,Franceand Italy followed later).
• Firms involved in OPT found their quota access for certain categories of
products into their home markets inadequate and thus felt constrained
by the MFA (German firms in particular had this problem, but some
American oneswere in the same boat, too).
• A new export mix from LOCsand NICs, including products made from
fibres other than cotton and products with higher value-added
(Dickerson, 1995:431).
• 'Quota-hopping', creating more producer countries, which then as
members of GATTgave the developing countries more bargaining power
(e.g. as part of the International Textile and Clothing Bureau).
• The desire of some developed country governments to use the MFA as
leverage to wring market access from developing-country negotiators.
This made them amenable to eventually agree to the dismantling of the
MFA, when it was way past its peak of usefulness for the textile and
garment interests in developed countries (Underhill, 1998:243).
Despite this reality on the ground, the tnstituttons" in developed countries
continued to lobby for protection and their governments assumed a
protectionist stance at the GATT negotiations. It was only after about three
years into the GATT negotiations that their attitude started to soften. But,
textiles (in particular ramie) still stopped the clock on the last day of
negottations." Underhill (1995: 95) calls the reluctance of the developed-
country institutions to adapt a form of inertia:
26 The French industry associations - the Union des Industries Textiles (UIT) for textiles and the Union des
Industries de I'Habillement (UIH) - were already during the successive rounds of renegotiating the MFA
renewals very successful in winning the French government over to their cause. This expertise they employed
successfully to capture the EU trade policy on textiles through their dominance of the European textile
organisations (COMITEXTIL and the Association Européenne des Industries de I'Habillement). In the United
States the American Textile Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) and the American Apparel Manufacturers
Association were powerful lobbying organisations, sponsoring several pieces of protectionist legislation even
during the Uruguay Round of negotiations (Underhill, 1998: 197-230). The Apparel association in the US
gradually became less enthusiastic about maintaining restrictions under the MFA, but the textile association
was unrelenting until the very last day of GATT negotiations.
27 When the deadline for the conclusion of negotiations arrive, the staff at the WTO (previously GATT)
headquarters in Geneva stop the clock at one minute before midnight and the negotiations continue until an
agreement is reached. When this is achieved, the clocks are started again. On the last day of the Uruguay
Round negotiations, the United States representatives, at the behest of fibre producers in the US, insisted on
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" the dynamics of demand and international trade called for change and
adaptation; organisational ineptitude and the traditional practices of firms
resulted in inertia."
Dickerson (1995) concurs with this view.
While the developed-country institutions thus seemed unable to look beyond
calls for protection, the developing countries, however, had their own
institution acting on their behalf at the negotiations. While much has been
made of the role of the Cairns group in advancing the interests of developing
countries, the efforts of the International Textile and Clothing Bureau (ITCB)
had received much less attention. But, it is worth noting that the ITCBconsists
entirely of developing country representatives, which presented a united front
during the negotiations (Underhill, 1998:226and ITCB, 2002). This organisation
was instrumental in resisting the developed countries' attempts at maintaining
the MFAor to demand a phase-out period of 15 years instead of 10.28 When the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing was finally reached, the ITCBundertook to
monitor the phasingout of the separate regime for textiles and clothing. At the
time they believed that the biggest advantage of the Uruguay Round for the
developing countries would come from the integration of textiles and clothing
under GATTrules (lTCB, 1999:1).
3.4.2.3.2 TheATC: a victory for liberalisation?
The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), which came into effect on 1
January 1995, and expires on 31 December 2004, rests on six pillars. The first
pertains to the products covered under the agreement, the definitions of which
are set out in an Annex to the ATe. The second pillar involves the integration of
the sector into GATT,which is to take place in four steps over ten years. On the
1st of January 1995each party had to integrate into GATTproducts from the list
additional fibre coverage under the new agreement. This position was fiercely opposed by China and India,
for whom ramie had become an important fibre (Dickerson, 1995:343).
28 Although the GATT negotiations dragged out so long that, counting from the end of MFA IV (1991) to the
end of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (31 December 2004), they almost had their 15 years
(Underhill, 1998:243)
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in the ATC, which accounted for not less than 16%of its imports in 1990. This
meansquotas on these products need to be removed and trade in these products
be governed by GATT rules. At the beginning of phase two (1 January 1998)
products, which accounted for not less than 17%of 1990 imports had to be
integrated and on 1 January 2002, a further 18%had to be integrated. The rest
(49%)would be integrated in the last phase (by 1 January 2005). The process is
thus heavily back-loaded in that almost 50%of the integration is left to the very
last phase. At every stage products should be chosen from each of the following
categories: tops and yarns, fabrics, made-up textile products and clothing.
For products remaining under quota restraints, progressive liberalisation is
required. For the first phase, the annual growth rate (enlarging the quota)
should not be less than 16%higher than the rate applicable under the previous
MFA. For phase two the annual growth rates should be 25%higher than the rates
in stage one, while for phase three it should be 27%higher than the phase two
rates. This is the third pillar.
The fourth pillar is the recognition that some members maintain non-MFA
restraints on imports that do not comply with GATTprovisions. Such restrictions
should be adapted to GATTrules within a year of the commencement of the ATC
or be phasedout by 1 January 2005.
The fifth pillar is the provision of a transitional safeguard mechanism to deal
with further surges in imports causing serious damage or threatening to do
damage to the domestic industry. This allows the importing country to impose
temporary restrictions on specific exporting countries, provided it can prove
damage as a result of increases in imports from all sources and a sharp and
substantial increase from the country against whom they want to impose
restrictions. The safeguard measures can be implemented either by mutual
agreement following negotiations, or even unilaterally. Such restrictions are
subject to review by the Textile Monitoring Body (TMB). The TMBsupervises the
implementation of the ATCand reports to the Council on Trade in Goodsof the
WTO,which reviews the implementation of the Agreement before each new step
of the integration process.
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The ATC makes provision for special treatment for certain categories of
countries, such as least-developed countries, cotton-producing countries, small
suppliers and new market entrants. It further contains rules and procedures
concerning circumvention of quotas, through for example, transhipment,
rerouting, false declaration of origin or fraud with respect to official documents.
The agreement also established the principle that members should make
provision for continuous autonomous industrial adjustment and increased
competition in their markets.
At the time of the agreement, at least two points of concern had been raised
regarding the first two pillars. First, since import-restraining countries are free
to choose the products for integration, they could select from 'a list of all
products under restraint anywhere in the textile and clothing trading system,
whether imported by that country or not, or indeed whether a threat to the
domestic industry or not.' "It was fully possible to 'liberalise' imported
products a country did not even produce or trade and had never restrained or
intended to restrain, depending on how the list was manipulated." (Underhill,
1998: 242, emphasis in original). Secondly, the developing countries could not
help but be sceptical about the developed countries' commitment to fulfil the
requirements for full integration in the last stage.
The comprehensive report of the TMB (2001) for the review of the ATC
implementation process by the Council on Trade in Goods, revealed some
interesting developments, which the mouthpiece for the developing countries,
the ITCB, was quick to seize as justification for their scepticism. First, it was
clear that although the minimum percentages to be integrated had been
achieved", little attention was paid to the implicit encouragement in the ATCto
accelerate the processof integration (Table 3.12).
29 The EU had to re-evaluate and correct its programme for first stage integration following a complaint by
Colombia to the TMB that the programme included certain products not eligible for integration, implying
that the exclusion of these products will result in the EU's integration programme accounting for less than
16% of the total volume of 1990 imports. The TMB essentially concurred with Colombia's view (WTO,
2000:16-17).
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TABLE 3.12: INTEGRATIONPROGRAMMES:FIRSTSEVENYEARSOFTRANSITION
PERIODOFATC (Aspercentage of 1990 import volumes)
WTO Yarns Fabrics Made-up Clothing
member textiles
Total
USA 16.46 4.15 8.73
EU 16.04 9.47 5.27
Canada 10.26 6.43 15.50
Norway 10.10 14.26 14.66
3.90
2.53
2.78
4.32
33.24
33.31
34.98
43.34
Source: ITCB,1999:6 (Basedon TMBnotifications)
The figures indicate a preference for integrating lessvalue-added products, with
clothing not quite reaching a share of 5%for any of the members. If we further
look at the percentage that the freed products make up of the total imports
under restraint in the two largest members (the EU and the US), it could be
inferred that very little really meaningful phase out of quotas has so far
occurred (Table 3.13). According to the ITCB, eight years into the agreement,
very few quotas have been eliminated, leaving the bulk until the end of the last
phase: 701 out of 758 in the US, 167 out of 219 in the EUand 239 out of 295 for
Canada. If the quotas applicable to China and Chinese Taipei, who have only
recently become members of the WTO, are added, the picture looks even
bleaker: 851 out of 932 in the US,222 out of 303 in the EUand 292 out of 368 in
Canada (lTCB, 2002:3).
TABLE3.13: RESTRAINEDTRADEFREEDOFQUOTAS(As% of imports)
YEAR EU USA
In volume In value In volume In value
1995
1996
1997
4.74
4.92
4.77
4.28
4.34
4.18
6.23
6.03
6.00
6.40
6.14
6.12
Source: ITCB,1999:8
On the positive side, both Canada and Norway have made progress beyond the
minimum requirements for integration. Norway, in fact, has lifted all quotas
that it imposed under the MFAasof 1 January 2001 (WTO, 2000:2).
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In their submissions to the Council on Trade in Goods, dealing with the
implementation issuesunder the DohaRound, developing countries voiced their
concerns regarding a number of instances where they believe the developed
countries' behaviour was not in line with the letter and spirit of the ATe. One
concern is about the use of the special safeguard measure to introduce new
restrictions.
The special transitional safeguard mechanism was invoked on 24 occasions in
1995by the US,eight times in 1996 (7 times by Brazil and once by the US), twice
by the USin 1997and nine times by Colombia and once by the USin 1998 (WTO,
2003). On several occasionsmembers have simply ignored a ruling by the TMBto
rescind a restriction imposed under the transitional safeguard provisions (The
USAand Colombia were the most prominent cases). This forces the exporting
countries to request a review panel at the WTODispute Settlement Body (WTO,
2002:71). Even in caseswhere the TMBor on appeal the WTO's Appellate Body
found that the new restrictions were unjustified, the damage to exporting
countries have been substantial. In the event that an import-restraining member
requests a consultation with the view to using the special safeguard measure,
the exporting country is already disadvantaged in that it has to seize exports of
the particular product until the consultations are concluded". Thus, whether the
safeguard mechanism is eventually applied or not, the exporting country stands
to lose.
Developing countries are also concerned that importing countries will be using
anti-dumping duties on a massive scale after quotas have been eliminated. The
recent WTO Dispute Settlement Body's ruling against India regarding their
complaint against the EUanti-dumping duties on Indian bed linen is considered a
decisive indicator of things to come for developing-country exporters (Textile
Topics, 2002:14). The Foreign Trade Association (based in Belgium) in its
submission for the WTOMinisterial Conference (2002) underlines the fact that
the number of anti-dumping caseshas risen sharply over the last few years. Anti-
30 During the first implementation stage, the TMB received notification of 33 requests for consultations (26
from the US and 7 from Brazil), while the number was down to 29 in the second stage (TMB, 2002).
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dumping seems to be viewed as an acceptable way to protect domestic
industries in the face of reduced tariffs and disappearing quotas. An increasing
number of former targets of this policy (e.g. Mexico, India, Argentina and Egypt)
now also embraces this view of anti-dumping measures as a 'tool for all
seasons', joining the USand the EUin their use of this instrument for protection
against 'undesired' imports (Foreign Trade Association, 2002:3).
The developing countries also assert that import-restraining countries have
eliminated restrictions on non-WTO members (e.g. Russia), while maintaining
them on WTO members. They further allege that countries under import
restraints have benefited relatively little from healthy growth in demand in
developed countries. To support their argument, the ITCB (2003a: 1-7) has
shown that between 1990 and 1994 imports of textiles and clothing from
preferential suppliers" into the EU 15 market has grown by 12.63%,slowing to
7.51% between 1994 and 2001. For restrained supplters" however, growth has
been much more subdued: 6.10%between 1990 and 1994 and 3.30% between
1994 and 2001. Imports of textiles only from preferential suppliers grew at a
slower rate (5.44%)but picked up to 9.81%since the implementation of the ATC
between 1994 and 2001. For restrained suppliers EU 15 textile imports grew by
5.46%in the first period, slowing to 4.34%between 1994 and 2001. During the
same periods intra-EU imports of textiles declined by 2.83% and 0.27%
respectively. For the United States the picture is different. While its imports of
textiles from the world market grew by 9.40%between 1990and 1994and 6.97%
between 1994 and 2001, the most significant growth was in imports under
specific arrangements (CB133and NAFTA): 18.95%and 13.74%respectively. In
contrast, imports from restrained suppliers" grew by 9.94%between 1990 and
1994, then slowed down to 7.21%between 1994and 2001 (ITCB,2003b: 1-7).
31 Preferential suppliers include 10 exporters: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovak,
Malta, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey (lTCB, 2003a: 7).
32 Suppliers whose imports are restrained by the EU include 16 exporters: Argentina, Brazil, China, Chinese
Taipei, Hong Kong (China), India, Indonesia, Korea (Rep.), Macao (China), Malaysia, Pakistan, Peru,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (ITCB, 2003a: 7).
33 The Caribbean Basin Initiative includes 25 exporters: Anguilla, Antigua, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, British Virgin Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Rep., EI Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitt-Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent/Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago (ITCB, 2003b: 7).
34 Restrained exporters into the United States include 45 exporters: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, Bulgaria,
China, Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Egypt, EI Salvador,
Fiji, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea (Rep.),
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With respect to the special provisions in the ATC for small suppliers, there is
some dispute over the interpretation of the requirement that the small suppliers
be advantaged by the advancement of one stage of the growth rates for products
remaining under constraints applicable to other members (see page 29 for
details). The EU interpreted this to mean that in the first stage, the pre-ATC
quota growth rate should be increased by 16%+ 25%,whereas Canadaand the US
ignored the cumulation and simply substituted the second stage growth factor
for the initial one, i.e. instead of 16+25%they simply used 25%(ITCB, 2002:5).
The latter resulted in lesser accessfor small suppliers in the USand Canada. As
far as provisions in favour of least-developed and cotton-producing exporting
countries are concerned, the US and Canada stand accused of completely
ignoring the provisions for least developed countries, while all three remaining
restraining members apparently ignored the provisions for cotton exporting
members (ITCB, 2002:3). In addition, the US changed its rules of origin for
textiles and clothing effective from July 1996. The result was that the coverage
of cotton made-up articles was enlarged, e.g. products with as little as 16%
cotton by weight are now classified as cotton products. This change had
widespread disruptive effects on trade, also detrimental to the EU35 (ITCB,
2002:3).
With reference to the dismantling of the MFA,Underhill (1998:344) concluded:
" Globalisation was here to stay, for a good while anyway. At the end the MFA
had few real friends in the Roundand few look back today."
With hindsight and taking into account the progresswith implementation to date
and the repeated calls for increased protection from developed-country
institutions, one is tempted to conclude that Underhill's conviction of the
demise of what the MFAstood for was premature.
Kuwait, Macao (China), Malaysia, Mauritius, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania,
Singapore, Slovak, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, U.A. Emirates, Uruguay, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos,
Macedonia, Nepal and Ukraine (ITCB, 2003b:7).
35 Because of the change in the rules of origin based on the definition of 'cotton', products that previously did
not face import restrictions were now classified as cotton and subject to trade restrictions (ITCB, 2002:3).
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Next, we consider various explanations for the evolution of production and trade
patterns in world textiles and develop an argument that analysis beyond the
aggregate level is necessaryto explain the diversity in global textiles.
3.4.2.4 Comparative advantage and the problem of aggregates
To explain the evolution of production and trade in the global textile industry,
various theoretical approaches had been applied. We have already mentioned
the Heckscher-Ohlin theory above and referred briefly to other reasonsfor trade
in Section 3.3. Toyne, et al (1984) proposed a stages-of-development framework
for explaining the evolution of the global textile industry. This conceptual
framework sees the industry as developing in stages ranging from an embryonic
stage to the last stage of significant decline. All stages can be discerned in the
countries of the world today and it is possible that one country may be in
different stages of the continuum simultaneously, depending on the relative
sophistication of the different sections of the textile pipeline (Dickerson,
1995:129). Dickerson (1995) gives an updated exposition of Toyne's original
scheme, which we briefly discusshere.
In stage one, producers focus on production of simple fabrics and garments for
domestic market use, using natural fibres. Such countries are net importers of
fibre, fabric and garments. Most least-developed countries find themselves in
this stage.
During stage two production of mostly standard clothing for exports,
incorporating 'craft' techniques for developed markets, takes place.
Competition is on the basis of low prices. The less advanced Asian, African and
Latin American countries are in this phase.
In stage three the quantity, quality and sophistication of domestic fabric
formation increase, while the clothing sector expands and improves quality.
Development of domestic fibre manufacturing also takes off. There is now
increased involvement in exports of fabric, clothing and synthetic fibres.
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Examples of countries at this stage include the most advanced members of
ASEANand EastEuropeanproducers.
Stage four sees further development and sophistication of fibre, fabric and
garment production as full members of the international trading system.
Significant trade surplusesoccur. Examplesinclude South Korea, Hong Kong and
China.
During stage five, output of textiles and clothing continues to grow, but
employment declines and capital intensity and specialisation increase in the face
of fierce international competition. Examplesinclude Japan, the USAand Italy.
The final stage brings a substantial reduction in employment and the number of
establishments in the industry, with declines in both relative and absolute terms
in some sectors, e.g. the commodity end of the market. Countries in this phase
experience severe import competition and trade deficits. The United Kingdom,
Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands fit this picture (Dicken, 1987:236
-237; Dickerson, 1995:129-135).
Another heuristic device for explaining the pattern of development of an
industry in relation to trade is the product/industry lifecycle/technology gap
concept. Essentially the pattern unfolds as follows. A new product is developed
for the domestic market. Production is un-standardised and the product is rather
expensive. As the product wins over consumers in the domestic market of the
innovating country, the production volumes can increase and economies of scale
be achieved. The product becomes more standardised. At this stage the
innovating country sees a marked growth in exports of the new product. In the
next stage the importing country acquires the new technology and starts to
produce the imported product. Once it has developed the capacity to produce
the product in large volumes at reasonable prices, the importing country
becomes the exporter and the innovating country becomesa net importer of the
product (Wakelin, 1997:16-21). The notion of birth, growth and decline applied
by Toyne, et al specifically to textiles is also evident in these theories.
However, the reality of textiles in the world indicates that firms in these
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industries did not all go gently and quietly into this expected decline and finally,
death. Many firms sought to rejuvenate themselves, to adapt to new forms of
competition and to new demand conditions. Both Underhill (1998) and Dicken
(1987) have shown that the strategies adopted by textile firms in different
industrialised countries were a crucial factor in explaining the evolution of the
textile and clothing industries.
A further problem with talking about the 'comparative advantage' of 'nations' is
that so many factors influence comparative advantage that are not adequately
captured by a single theory, nor easily recognised by analysis at the aggregate
level only. As our aggregate level analysis above indicated, textile industries in
developed countries have been in decline for decades. There is, however,
remarkable diversity across countries and across industry sub-sectors.
Comparative advantage (measured in volume terms, e.g. tonnes, or USS terms)
in a sub-sector does not tell us anything about the variety of products traded
under that sub-sector heading. For example, Canada is losing market share for
blue denim in the USmarket in favour of Taiwanese, Turkish, Indonesian, Italian
and Japanese producers. On closer inspection, though, it is evident that the
Asian producers (excluding Japan) saw remarkable increases in volume terms,
but they are still focusing on the lower end of the market. Turkey, on the other
hand, is joining Italy and Japan at the higher end of the market, with its imports
increasing by 57% in value terms and 'only' 46% in volume terms between
January and September 2002 (US Import analysis: Blue Denim, Emerging
Textiles, 2002). A less aggregated" level of analysis is thus necessary to
uncover the sources and nature of this diversity. Often the picture painted by
the aggregate data is much more complex and nuanced at the micro-level. In a
study of the American textile and garment industry, for example, Levinsohn and
Petropoulos (2001) wanted to determine whether these industries were really
dying or whether it was a case of creative destruction (as opposed to a declining
36 Schumpeter (1942) warned about the perils of drawing conclusions about an industry solely on the basis of
a snapshot of aggregate data: "Since we are dealing with an organic process, analysis of what happens in any
part of It - say in an individual concern or industry - may indeed clarify details of mechanism but is
inconclusive beyond that. Every piece of business strategy acquires its true significance only against the
background of that process and within the situations that created it. It must be seen in its role in the
perennial gale of creative destruction; it cannot be understood irrespective of it or, in fact, on the hypothesis
that there is a perennial lull".
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industry where things (employment, production, profitability, productivity) are
going just one way: down. Bycreative destruction" they mean:
• Although some jobs are destroyed, new and hopefully better jobs are
created to replace someof those lost;
• As some firms exit, there is significant simultaneous entry of new firms;
• that the less efficient firms exit, while remaining firms become more
productive and smart new firms enter.
The distinction between declining industries and industries experiencing creative
destruction is important, since policy prescriptions for the two differ markedly.
For the former, policy is usually aimed at easing adjustment (exit), whereas for
the latter policy may well enhance adjustment by promoting entry. The study,
conducted with the aid of plant-level panel data for 1972 to 1995, found that
the US textile and garment industries are indeed examples of creative
destruction. These industries have experienced tremendous simultaneous entry
and exit, much job creation and remaining firms are increasing their productivity
(Levinsohnand Petropolous, 2001:4).
When we consider these points together, it is clear that it is necessary to dig
further than the aggregate level to improve our understanding of the evolution
of the textile industry. Porter (1990)'s idea of the competitive advantage of
nations, giving a more prominent role to the competitiveness of firms and the
environment in which they operate, goes some way towards explaining the
diversity observed within the industry and across countries. It is Malerba and
Orsenigo (1996:84), however, who address the problem more directly when they
suggestfurther aspects of analysis that may throw more light on the dynamics of
industry evolution and the persistence of diversity. Specifically, they emphasise
(amongst other things) the "need to:
• Analyse firms according to several dimensions at once: competences,
innovative activities, productive specialisation and organisational
structure.
37 Creative destruction in this context refers to a process within the textile and clothing industries.
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• Focus on the connections that firms develop with suppliers and users.
Suppliers and users do not interact with the firms solely through the
exchange of products, knowledge and people: in several cases (as in
vertical integration and in long-term relationships) they are also involved
in the very processof structural change.
• Pay attention to institutions. Universities, research organisations,
financial institutions and the government affect structural change within
the industry, by influencing the stock of scientific knowledge, the
diffusion of new technical knowledge, the amount of R&D, the speed of
development and the extent of production, the entry of new firms and
the exit of existing ones".
These aspects of analysis are pursued in the chapters to follow.
3.5 GLOBALTEXTILESIN THE 21sT CENTURY:CHALLENGESANDPROSPECTS
Most of the factors that present challenges to the global textile sector also hold
opportunities. These challenges and prospects may differ for developed and
developing countries. Hence, in the following discussionwe distinguish between
challenges and prospects for developed and developing countries where
necessary.
3.5.1 The expiry of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2005
In terms of the ATCall quotas maintained under the MFA (and brought over to
the ATC) should be eliminated by 1 January 2005. This will intensify competition
for developed-country markets and some regions may be harder hit than others.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that Africa's apparel trade will
be 30%lower than before the dismantling of the MFA (Mattoo, et al, 2002:4).
This may be compensated for by increased access to other markets under
preferential agreements, regional integration agreements and further
multilateral trade liberalisation. The proliferation of trade agreements is
discussedin the next section.
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3.5.2 Proliferation of regional and bilateral trade agreements
The proliferation of regional blocs, bilateral free trade agreements and
preferential access treattes''threatens to undermine the multilateral trade
regime under the WTO. It further makes for a very complicated trade
administration system with differentiated duty structures and rules of origin
requirements. This, of course, adds to administration costs in the importing and
exporting countries and imposes extra compliance costs on firms. From the
exporting firm's point of view this becomesanother trade barrier.
On the other hand, the increased market accessmay allow for better utilisation
of resources and specialisation in textile producing countries. One such form of
market access, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)39is seen as a
timely lifeline to Sub-SaharanAfrican (SSA)countries. AGOAis not a negotiated
trade agreement, but rather like a gift with strings attached. AGOAis part of the
American Trade Development Bill (2000). It gives preferential access" to
exporters of specified goods from eligible countries. To be eligible countries
must meet a comprehensive list of conditions. Rules of origin requirements,
especially for clothing, are quite stringent. Whilst AGOA offers a welcome
opportunity for SSAcountries to accelerate economic growth through exports,
some commentators argue that the benefits would have been so much more
substantial if the terms of market access were less restrictive. Mattaa, et al
(2002:3), for example, estimated that the benefits from AGOAcould have been
in the region of US$0.54billion of additional non-oil exports, rather than the
expected US$100-$140 million in the presence of the restrictions. The
restrictions referred to are the triple transformation (or 'yarn-forward') rule,
38 Examples abound: the United States have concluded or is in the process of negotiating a large number of
free trade agreements (with South Korea, Vietnam, the Southern African Customs Union, several Central
American countries, Taiwan, etc.), while the EU has recently concluded a free trade agreement with Pakistan,
several North African countries and Canada's free trade agreement with Costa Rica is viewed as one of the
most generous as far as textiles is concerned (Alden, 2003; Emerging Textiles, 23 October 2002 and 14
November 2002).
39 AGOA and other trade agreements of particular importance to Southern Africa are discussed in more detail
in Chapters 4 and 5.
40 It offers quota and tariff-free access to specified products from eligible SSA countries until 2008. Only
Mauritius and Kenya were under MFA quota restrictions. There are currently 38 eligible countries (Just
Style, 2003: January 7).
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which is more stringent than the MFArules of origin, and the exclusion of certain
items. Textiles, for example, benefits only indirectly through garment exports.
AGOAalso foresees the creation of reciprocal Free Trade Agreements with SSA
countries. The first of these will be negotiated between the USand the Southern
African CustomsUnion (SACU)in 2003.
Another offer of preferential accessfor less developed countries came from the
EU in the form of the Everything-but-Arms initiative, which came into effect on
5 March 2001. It allows for duty-free accessto the EUmarket for the 49 poorest
countries, excluding weapons and certain sensitive agricultural products. The
latter is a temporary barrier that should fall away for bananasin 2006 and sugar
and rice in 2009 (Casadio, 2001).
3.5.3 Intensification of competition from low-wage countries
The textile industries in developed countries will have to face increased
competition from developing countries (in commodity type products) and NICs
(in higher value-added, diversified products), especially after the expiry of the
ATe. Such increased competition from abroad challenges developed-country
firms to make important strategic decisions. For example, should they invest in
high technology, labour-saving machinery or in R&Dto develop new products for
new markets or changing existing markets or should they opt for ICT to enable
them to use supply chains more efficiently? All these decisions must be made
under great uncertainty.
One particular developing country and its membership of the WTOseem to be a
major cause for concern. Textile industry representatives in the United States",
Canada and Europe clearly view China as the most important threat to their
domestic industries. As part of China's protocol of accession to the WTO, both
the USand the EU insisted on the right to invoke safeguard measures against
China even after 2005, when the MFAhas come to an end. This assessmentof
41 The American Textile Manufacturers' Institute, in a newly-launched S-point survival plan, agitates for
renewed import quotas on imports from China and Vietnam (Dalyan, 2002).
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China as a threat is not unfounded. Although China has been a strong competitor
in textiles and apparel for the better part of the second half of the twentieth
century (Tables 3.8 and 3.10), it was prevented from fully exploiting its
comparative advantage in these industries, by its own government's domestic
policies and the import-restraining measures imposed by developed countries.
China'sAssociation of Textile Industry estimates that the industry has generated
output to the value of $121 billion in 2002, an increase of 15%over 2001.
Industry profits grew by 23%year on year and exports exceeded $60 billion (Just-
style, 2003, January 6). Exports are expected to grow by five to six per cent in
2003 (Global Sources,2002).
China certainly is a strong contender for world leader in textiles for the next
decade or so. Currently, its textile production is concentrated on the East coast,
but the government's 'Go West' programme provides, amongst other things,
investment incentives to expand industrialisation into the vast inland, promising
renewed growth in output. Wagesin the interior are also lower than at the coast
(Yang, 1999:10). On the other hand, China's manufactured export composition
already shows increased diversification and a relatively lower significance of
textiles and clothing. Also, as Table 3.2.indicates, China's wages are not the
lowest and it is already facing competition from lower-wage producers such as
India and Indonesia. This suggests that in time, China will also lose its
comparative advantage in textiles. Again there seem to be two types of
responses to the 'Chinese threat'. The first we have already mentioned, i.e.
renewed pressure for protection (and not only in developed countries"). The
second is a more strategic, forward-looking approach, i.e. recognising in China a
huge opportunity". This opportunity entails China as a market for higher value-
added textiles products (such as fashion goodsand technical textiles), setting up
joint ventures for production in China as well as a profitable market for textile
machinery, design and marketing services, etc. Group Itema (Italy) for example,
has committed itself to the creation of a textile district in Shanghai.The initial
investment will amount to €10 million, but the firm wants to establish a
42 India, for example, has also used anti-dumping duties against Chinese imports (Just-style, 6 January 2003)
43 It is worth noting that from 2005 China's customs duties on textiles and clothing will be very close to those
prevailing in the European market and upon accession to the WTO China will have to rescind all non-tariff
barriers to entry, paving the way for greater reciprocity in trade (Robba, 2002).
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presence in the whole pipeline (Textileltaly, 2002). Already in 2001, the Italian
Textile Association (l' Associazione tessile italiana) established offices in China;
one in Shenzhen, not far from Hong Kong, to cater for the needs of the
household textiles sector and the other in Beijing for the apparel textiles sector
(Mazzuca,2001:1).
3.5.4 Consumer tastes and preferences
If we consider that roughly two-thirds of the world's population live in
developing countries where per capita income levels are such that the demand
for commodity type products in the textiles for apparel market is likely to be at
worst steady, there is scope for low-cost producers in developing countries to
grow their textile and clothing industries. However, in the higher end of the
market, Europe, North America and Japan will still substantially hold
comparative advantage in products that offer specialised characteristics, high
performance and quality. In addition, producers in these regions still have the
leading role in innovation, customer service, flexibility, infrastructure,
investment capabilities and the synergy derived from integrated markets such as
the EU (Gatti and Vittori, 2002). Having said that, it should be noted that some
first-tier NICs, such as Taiwan are restructuring and shifting resources to the
higher end of the market. For example, after investing in updated equipment,
Taiwanese producers started selling more sophisticated yarns, also entering the
technical textiles market. Exports of high filament counts and blended textured
yarns are gaining relatively more significant shares of total sales (Textile Trade
News, 2002).
3.5.5 Ecological and social responsibility concerns
Consumershave also become more aware of environmental damage that could
flow from textile production and demand not only good quality products but also
environmentally safe products. In answer, clean production systems, recycling,
ISO14000and eco-labelling have become important means of distinguishing one
firm's products from another and this presents an extra edge in the market for
early compliers. Consumersafety is also a major concern, for example avoiding
textile finishes that may cause allergies. Some developed-country producers
complain that they have to comply with stringent environmental requirements
70
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
(e.g. EUlegislation), yet imported products do not necessarily comply with these
norms and are sold for less (Sala, 2001).
Although ISO 9000 and 14 000 certification had not been as important in
developing countries as in industrialised countries, it is becoming much more so
for firms exporting to developed-country markets.
Social standards (e.g. SA8000) represent an issue that was left unresolved at the
Uruguay Roundof negotiations and that developed countries will certainly want
on the agenda for the Doha round. From the developed country perspective,
adherence to stringent social standards amount to an additional cost to firms,
which they aver firms in developing countries do not have to incur. Developing
countries worry that adoption of uniform WTO rules regarding social standards
will hand the developed countries another potential non-tariff trade barrier.
3.5.6 Technological innovation and diffusion
Whereas technological innovation was the salvation of the textile industry in
industrialised countries, developing countries are at a disadvantage in the sense
that they have many impediments to the acquisition and diffusion of appropriate
technologies in textiles. Some of these problems are investment capabilities,
inappropriate plant size and degree of integration of operations, education and
skills, poor productivity and maintenance of equipment, wasteful use of inputs,
especially energy, and lack of management and marketing skills.
The NICsand some other developing countries, however, have been upgrading
their technology for years, as evidenced by the textile machinery shipments
published by the International Textile Manufacturers' Federation (2001). For
spinning machinery, by far the largest percentage for cotton spinning went to
Asia, with India the largest investor (874 000 units), followed by China (612 000
units), Pakistan (476 000 units), and Bangladesh(394 000 units). Western Europe
increased investment in wool spinning equipment by 84% (over 2000 figures),
with Italy by far the largest investor. Asia's (especially China) investment in wool
spinning machinery grew by 34%.The largest shipments of texturing, weaving
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and knitting machinery also went to Asia, with Western Europe receiving the
second largest.
3.5.7 Product innovation and market diversification
The application of textiles in spheres of life other than apparel (Figure 3.1) has
become an important growth area. Technical textiles have applications in, for
example, home textiles, automotive textiles, new applications of non-wovens,
geo-textiles and engineering, aviation, and medical fields (Planck, 1999:87). In
biomedical engineering, for example, textiles are used in the operation theatre
as protective clothing, patient covering or implants. As implantable materials,
textiles have been used in several fields (seePlanck, 1999:87). Technical textiles
provide an avenue of escape from the decline in the traditional textile sector in
industrialised countries. Very few industrialised countries have managed to
remain competitive in this sector, but the technical textiles sector has been
booming. As little as five years ago, the size of the sector was only about 9.3
billion tonnes (valued at US$60billion). Forecasters in the industry now predict
that it will be worth US$1S0billion (24.4 billion tonnes) by 2005, roughly a
quarter of the global textile market (International Journal of Clothing Science
and Technology, 2002).
3.5.8 Radical innovations in supply and distribution systems
With the world becoming truly more integrated and textiles more
internationalised, the trend is towards more integrated pipelines or supply
chains, incorporating all players from fibre producers to end users. Retailers
have in the last decades become much more powerful and have been applying a
form of 'lean retailing' with the aid of ICT. Retailers require that producers be
able to respond quickly (within days, at worst weeks) to re-orders and slight
design changes. The implication for textile and clothing producers is that more
of the risk e.g. of carrying stock (especially in fashion goods) is shifted back to
them. For firms in developed and developing countries being in an appropriate
supply chain and managing relationships and information flows in the chain
becomesa strategic matter.
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3.5.9 labour: skills, productivity and costs
Aswe have shown in Table 3.2, most industrialised countries have a comparative
disadvantage as far as labour costs are concerned, but they hold, by and large,
the upper-hand in terms of labour productivity. Yet, they are experiencing
shortages of skilled labour to use with their sophisticated technology and in R &
D. Indications are that they will have to invest in drawing a new generation of
labour from their own labour force, or source skilled labour internationally. A
study by the OECD(2002:8) showsthat international migration of skilled workers
is on the increase as international competition for skills intensifies and industries
become more knowledge-intensive.
The downside, at least in the short-term" for developing countries is that they
will experience a 'brain drain' as skilled labour (already a scarce factor) leaves
for greener pastures in developed countries. As developing countries acquire
more advanced technologies they will have to invest more of their limited
resources in education and training to improve productivity and quality.
3.5.10 The trade regime
Textile producers in developed and developing countries fear that textiles and
clothing would once again be a bargaining chip at the DohaRoundof WTOtrade
negotiations, currently under way in Geneva. This fear is of course, fuelled by
experiences in the past:
" The importance of textiles and clothing as a basis for today's newly
industrialising and less industrialised countries, together with their continued,
though much diminished importance in the older industrialised economies, have
made these industries into an international football." (Dicken 1987:222).
The developed countries want opening up of third-country markets, i.e.
reciprocity. The United States, for example, is proposing that all trade
restrictions on manufactured products be eliminated by 2015. This proposal has
44 On the supposition that eventually workers return to the home country with more knowledge and
experience.
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united some developing countries (notably India) and textile producers in
developed countries in their resistance to completely free trade in textiles,
especially given their fear of China, discussedabove.
It is safe to say that the outcome of the Doha Round trade negotiations will, at
least from the developing country point of view, depend crucially on how the
matter of the implementation of the ATC and further liberalisation of textile
trade is handled.
3.5.11 Macroeconomic conditions and uncertainty
Given the slow-down in economic growth in the world's largest economies (the
EUand the US), the stagnation in Japan and the winds of war blowing from the
Bush-administration in the US, the dominant climate is one of uncertainty. This
is reflected in consumer spending decisions and business investment decisions
and will inevitably impact on the textiles and related industries. Expectations of
war also drive up the oil price, an essential ingredient in the synthetic fibre sub-
sector of the global textile industry and an important source of energy for many
textile-producing countries. Recovery of the world economy is now expected to
be delayed until 2004, thus making this year (like 2002) an intermediate year of
preparing for a recovery that might not materialise (Mazzuca, 2002). In the
event of war, the demand for technical textiles, however, would increase
strongly".
3.6. SUMMARY ANDPREVIEW OFCHAPTER 4
The focus of this chapter was on the evolution of the global textile industry. On
the supply-side we found that production continues to shift to newly
industrialising and developing economies (notably those in Asia), while the more
sophisticated and complex parts of the textile pipeline remain in the
industrialised countries. Man-made fibres continue to gain ground on natural
45 It is estimated that as much as 10,000 separate textile and textile-related products are supplied to the US
military. Also, the needs of the military tend to dominate advanced US research and development in fibre and
textile related areas. The size of this market in 2003 is now believed to be three or four times greater than was
indicated by forecasts made prior to September Il 2001 (Just-style, 2003, 7 February).
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fibres, although new improved cotton varieties are being developed that might
partially offset this trend. While the world market in textiles used for apparel
has been relatively stagnant, the technical textiles sub-sector has seen
tremendous growth and its growth potential is very promising. Overall
employment in world textiles has remained fairly stable, but developing
countries have gained in employment, while the textile industries in
industrialised countries continue to shed lower-skilled jobs. They are, at the
same time, experiencing a shortage of skilled workers to use the advanced
technology employed in the industry.
Technological developments have occurred broadly on four fronts, viz. in textile
machinery where the trend is to increase speed and efficiency, incorporating
information and communications technology, the development of new and
hybrid inputs, such as intelligent fibres with novel uses, and innovations in
organisational and management processes. These developments have had an
indelible impact on the way in which firm's operate.
On the demand-side producers are faced with consumers who are more
discerning about quality and environmental concerns and less inclined to opt for
mass-produced items. Satisfying these preferences has led to increased
specialisation and intra-industry trade and major changes in production systems,
e.g. a move towards more flexibility.
Trade patterns in textiles are by and large compatible with a shifting
comparative advantage account, i.e. industrialised countries losing their
comparative advantage in textiles to the NICsand they, in turn, losing theirs to
other developing countries. This processwas, however, not without interference
from governments and other institutions. The textile and garment industries
have been for many years the object of protectionist interests under the MFA,
now incorporated in the ATC, scheduled to expire on 1 January 2005. Although
the trade patterns in textiles are compatible with shifting comparative
advantage, we developed arguments to the effect that such an aggregate
picture could be misleading, disguising the rich diversity, which exists in the
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global textile industry. We thus argue in favour of further analysis, which goes
beyond the aggregate picture.
The rest of the study will thus employ industry-level analysis (Chapters 4 and 5)
as well as firm-level analysis (Chapters 6 and 7) with respect to the South
African textile industry. As we have briefly seen in this chapter, the role of
institutions can be very powerful in steering the development of industry.
Hence, this study also has to consider the role of institutions in the SouthAfrican
textile industry. This is done in Chapter 5. In this chapter we have also seen
images of the modern textile industry (especially as far as technological
developments are concerned) that fit very uneasily into Pavitt's taxonomy
(discussedin Chapter 2). We reconsider textiles in this taxonomy in Chapter 8.
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APPENDIX 3.1
TABLE A.3.1: INTERESTS OF MAJOR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES IN THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND OUTCOMES OF NEGOTIATIONS
(REGARDINGTEXTILES AND CLOTHING)
INITIAL REQUESTS DECLARATION FINALACT FINALAGREEMENT
OF PUNTEDEL PLAN (DUNKEL (1993)
ESTE TEXT 1991)
USA: no Dismantling of Almost Establishment of 4
liberalisation in this MFA and general phases (with
sector integration of consent on quantitative
EC: inclusion of this the sector into the targets) for
sector in GATT with GATT dismantling of integration into
strengthening of MFA in 10 GATT;
safeguard years and of specification of a
regulations; greater the sector's safeguard
market access for integration mechanism for the
exports in LOC into GATT products not yet
markets (especially integrated into
in South East Asia GATT
and Latin America
for high quality
products)
LOCs: reduction of
restrictive
measures through
the dismantling of
the MFA and the
elimination of
bilateral
agreements;
differentiated and
favourable trade
treatment for LOCs
Source: Faini, etal, 1997:109.
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CHAPTER4
THESOUTHAFRICANTEXTILEINDUSTRYIN HISTORICALANDCOMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 3 we have given an overview of the evolution of the global textile
industry in terms of trends in output, employment, technological development,
trade, demand for the industry's products, as well as the changes in the
environment in which the firms in the industry do their business. In this chapter,
we are interested in the evolution of the SouthAfrican textile industry. First, we
tell the story of the South African textile industry's development and explain
how it came about that the industry was caught in an intolerably uncompetitive
situation when trade barriers were reduced in the 1990s. We pay particular
attention to the industry's subsequent attempts at survival and growth.
Secondly, to put this experience in comparative perspective, we study the
experiences of one developed country, Italy and one developing country,
Mauritius. The choice of these two countries is basedon the following grounds:
• The Italian textile and clothing industry was one of the few developed
country industries that had managed, by and large, to remain competitive
in the face of fierce competition and successive changes in the
international trade regime;
• Italy has always been an important trading partner for South Africa and
has gained increased significance in the context of the South Africa-
European Union Free Trade Agreement, especially in terms of market
access, investment and cooperation opportunities 1;
• The Mauritian textile industry's success achieved by means of Export
ProcessingZones (EPZs)promises important lessonsto be learned;
I In 2000 and 2001, Italy was the third largest market for South African exports of textiles and clothing, after
the United States and the United Kingdom. As a source of textiles and clothing imports, Italy ranked ninth in
2000 and eighth in 2001 (Wesgro,2002:69-70).
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• From a regional perspective, SouthAfrica and Mauritius are important role
players in the development of a textile and clothing pipeline in the
Southern African Development Community': and
• Lastly, Mauritius is an important partner for South African textile
producers, who supply textiles to Mauritian clothing manufacturers for
conversion into garments for the American market under the African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
We are especially interested in the restructuring experiences of the textile
industries in our review. In particular, we focus on:
• The reasonsfor the restructuring;
• The role of technology in necessitating or enabling the restructuring;
• The organisational changes(if any) that were necessary;
• The changes in human resource use in the change processes;and
• The strategic behaviour of firms (as precursor to the firm-level analysis in
Chapters 6 and 7).
We mention the role of institutions where applicable, but defer a thorough
coverage of the relevant institutions active in the South African textile industry
to Chapter 5.
4.2 THESOUTHAFRICANTEXTILEINDUSTRYIN HISTORICALCONTEXT
In 1838, the story goes, South African farmers imported 12 rams and 1 ewe from
Turkey, but in an attempt at protecting their own mohair producers, the
exporters sterilised the rams before shipping them to South Africa. The ewe,
however, gave birth to a ram kid during the journey and when she and the kid
were used in cross-breeding with indigenous goats, the South African mohair'
industry was launched ("Support programme", 1993, quoted in Dickerson,
2 In 2000, Mauritius was ranked the seventh most important export destination for South African textiles and
clothing, moving up to sixth position in 2001. Mauritius was not under the top fifteen source countries for
South African imports of textiles and clothing - its markets are mostly in the EU and the US (Wesgro,
2002:69-70).
3 The South African mohair industry now supplies 60% of the world demand for mohair (Viljoen, 2000:11).
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1995:570). Ironically, it would be under heavy protection that the broader South
African textile industry evolved to reach its current state. In the following
section we briefly recount the history of the SouthAfrican textile industry.
Blanket production is the oldest sector of the SouthAfrican textile industry, with
the first blanket factory established in King Williams Town in 1891 (Du Toit,
1978:33). By 1925 the blanket manufacturing sub-sector was firmly established,
but at a high cost: protective duties on imports ranged from 197,5%to 312%.By
1944 sixteen factories provided employment to 3711 people and supplied 90%of
domestic demand for blankets, rugs and sheeting (Du Toit, 1978:33; Steenkamp,
1983:7). The development of the South African textile industry, however, only
really picked up steam after the SecondWorld War. Between 1946and 1952, 30
factories that were not aimed at blanket production were established. Foreign
capital and know-how from the UK, France, the Netherlands, and Italy made a
significant contribution to the growth of the industry. Another important
development was the integration of operations such as spinning and weaving. By
1956 there were 170 factories, employing 35 000 workers (Franzsen and
Reynders, 1960: 150-151). The industry now included apparel, household and
industrial textiles. Government support for this development took two forms:
• financial assistance, provided by the Industrial Development Corporation
(IDC). The latter is a public sector institution whose role at the time also
included setting up textile plants;
• protection. In 1950, the import duties on cotton and cotton-related fabric
were (bar a few exceptions), below 10 per cent. This was changed in 1952
when ad vaLorem duties of 15%on yarns and 25-35%on fabrics were
imposed in an attempt to cope with foreign competition. This was in
addition to duties ranging from 20-30%already introduced on worsted
fabrics a year earlier (Maree, 1995:23).
Throughout the 1950s and 60s, the textile industry, still well protected,
expanded rapidly, encompassing spinning, weaving and finishing of cotton and
wool products, knitting and the production of synthetic fibres (Barker, 1963:
292; Maree, 1995:24). Already by 1963, it was evident that the textile
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industrialists had come to rely too heavily on protection and that the Board of
Trade and Industry quite willingly played into their hands. This was illustrated
quite clearly in the Board's decision to widen the scope of duties to apply to
fabrics not even produced in South Africa. In response to frequent applications
for amendments to tariffs, the Board produced no less than 60 reports dealing
with amendments between 1950 and 1963 alone. In criticism of the Board and
the textile industrialists, Barker (1963: 291-2) expressed himself as follows:
"Once an implied pledge of protection had been given and received,
there was understandably itttle disposition on the part of textile
manufacturers to consider anything that might tend to limit or regulate
the operation of their mms, even temporarily or only tacitly. So the hint
of their concentrating on speciaiïsed output, with no certainty on how
that might accord with future trends, was repugnant, even though at the
time it might have helped in attaining growth and stabWty. In any event
when an industry has been conceived, born and brought up in the
expectation that its well-being wm be ensured by tariffs, it is Ukely to
have a built-in mistrust in its own abWty to compete on any other basis".
This warning was not heeded and we will see later how this behaviour had a
direct bearing on the circumstances the textile manufacturers found themselves
in at the beginning of the 1990s.
By 1981, 80%of local demand for woven and knitted fabrics was supplied by
local production (given the combined effects of tariffs and quantitative import
controls on demand) (Texfed, 2000c: 3). From then onwards, as import
penetration increased (about 40% of local consumption of fabrics in 2000),
output and employment in the industry plummeted. Output declined from R12
147 million in 1981 to R9 200 million in 1985, and R 6 825 million by 1993.
Employment fell to 86 490 in 1993 from its high of 121 370 in 1992 (Texfed,
2000: 3; Maree, 1995: 126). From 1985 to 1993, South Africa was forced to
maintain a surplus on the current account of the balance of payments (because
of its political stance, sanctions, etc). To discourage imports, a surcharge was
levied on various goods, including machinery. This, together with the severe
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depreciation of the Rand from 1985onwards, was a severe impediment to new
investment and technology upgrading in the textile industry (Texfed, 2000: 3).
In 1989, a policy change, aimed at reducing protection and creating an export
orientation, was introduced. This was contained in what became known as the
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) for the industry. The SAP rewarded
exports by offering duty-free imports, based on export volumes, for a period of
five years. This export incentive, with hindsight, turned out to be ill-conceived
and destructive" (Texfed, 2002:3).
By the time SouthAfrica became a member of the WTOin 1995, the industry was
characterised by a complex protective structure, old technology, and an inward-
looking mindset. We consider the restructuring attempts that began in earnest in
1995 in the comparative section.
4.3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
In this section the aim is to compare the process of restructuring and
rejuvenation in the South African textile industry since the 1990s with the
processes taking place in the textile industries of Italy (whose first major
restructuring precedes the South African process) and Mauritius, a developing
country for whom textiles and clothing were crucial in its remarkable growth
performance. But, first we give a brief overview of restructuring and its general
goals.
4.3.1 Restructuring in textiles: a brief overview
The kind of restructuring that has been taking place in the textile industries of
the world, seems to be different from the normal structural change, where
certain industries decline in the course of development and new industries take
their place. This kind of restructuring is far more complex and multi-faceted. On
4 The South African Textile Federation for example, asserts that the SAP allowed the destruction of certain
sectors of the textile and clothing industry, such as jerseys. This process was exacerbated by the growth in
illegal imports (Texfed, 2002:3).
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the one hand, it has been necessitated by changes in the external environment,
e.g. the effects of the Multifibre Arrangement (and the implications of its
demise for developing countries), product and process technologies, the
changing nature of the international market (changing product composition,
organisation and marketing), offshore production by industrial country firms, and
changes in demand patterns. On the other hand, domestic circumstances have
changed and require adjustment on the part of firms in the industry. These
circumstances include changes in government policies, e.g. decreases in
protective tariffs, labour legislation and general macroeconomic policies such as
interest rate and tax policies.
4.3.1.1 Goals to be achieved by means of restructuring
The general goals to be achieved by restructuring include:
• Absorption of new technology
• Increased productivity
• An increase in capacity utilisation
• Changesin the composition of output
• Promoting changes in the organisation of the industry (Meyanathan, 1994:
15).
With this background, we can now consider the experiences of the Italian, South
African and Mauritian textile industries with respect to their industrial
restructuring.
4.3.2 The Italian textile industry
Italy is known as one of the world's leading countries in textiles and clothing. In
1985, Italy made the third largest contribution to world value added in textiles
(8,7%compared to 10,7%for Japan and 15,6%for the United States). By 1993,
Italy with a share of 9,3%, had overtaken Japan (by then contributing 8,1%)while
the USAremained in first position with 18,4%(UNIDO, 1996:42). Today, Italy is
the undisputed world leader as far as production of quality yarn, fabric and
fashion goods is concerned. Even over the last forty years or so, when other
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European countries lost market share in terms of textile output, Italy's output
continued to grow before starting to decline as well, but by less than the other
European producers (Sacchi, 2003:1). In 2001 the textiles and clothing industry
delivered 48 billion Euro in output, exported €29 billion, and generated a trade
surplus of €14, 8 million (Mazzuca, 2002:1). Thus, Italy contributes about 24.5%
to total EU-15 textiles and clothing output and 71%of the sector's exports"
(Euratex, 2002: 5).
The Italian textile industry, as in other countries, has been classified as mature,
but not necessarily declining (Belussi, 1996a: 3). The Italian textile and clothing
industry, as a result of historical developments rather than deliberate planning,
hasevolved as part of a chain of connected acttvittes", which include:
• The production of textile machinery
• Chemical fibre production
• Fashiondesignof new styles and products (Belussi, 1996a:5)
There is a strong regional specialisation, e.g. the district of Como-Lecco is
known for silk, Biella and Pistoia for high quality wool, Prato (in Tuscany) for re-
cycled and carded wool and Vicenza for combed wool. Varese and Bergamoare
known for cotton textiles, while other textile regions include Novara-Verbania,
Padua, Verona, Modena and Brescia. Lombardia and Piemonte are the most
important regions for textile activity (Belussi, 1996a: 5; HermesLab, 2000:33).
4.3.2.1 Restructuring, technological change and industrial organisation
The first restructuring period to be considered is the phase from the 1970s to
the mid-1980s. A number of factors contributed to the need to restructure the
Italian textile industry in this period. The following were the most important
factors at work:
5 Exports as percentage ofEU-15 textiles and clothing output make up 20.7% (Euratex, 2002:5).
6 While textiles and clothing playa very important part in the Italian district context, it is not our purpose
here to give a comprehensive overview of industrial districts. For a thorough coverage of Italian districts, see
for example Bianchi, et ai, 1997; Beccatini, 1989, 1990 and 1991; and Dei Ottati, 2003.
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• The reduction in tariff and non-tariff barriers in terms of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)and the restriction of imports from
developing countries under the Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA).
• Increasing competition from Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) where
textiles became a leading sector in their bid to increase their share of world
trade. At this time developed countries were at a disadvantage because of
higher labour costs and outdated technology.
• Changesin consumer demand', leading to product differentiation, e.g. home
furnishings.
• The use of traditional fibres blended with more sophisticated ones opened up
new possibilities. Synthetic fibres from the chemical industries created a
demand for new process technologies (Antonelli (1998:3-4; King, 1996: 866-
874).
Commentators such as Antonelli, et al, (1992) and Antonelli (1998) have argued
that the organisational structure that evolved in the Italian textile industry
during this period was successful in allowing the absorption of new technology
such as shuttleless looms and open-ended spinning (the details of which we have
discussed in Chapter 3). While the introduction of shuttleless looms and open-
end spinning offered the potential to increase production tremendously
(quantatively illustrated in Chapter 3), the textile industry worldwide suffered a
severe decline during 1973-1990. From 1963 to 1973 worldwide textile
production grew on average by 4,5%annually, but between 1973 and 1990, this
average annual growth rate fell to 1,1%. Employment in textiles experienced a
similar decline. From 1963 to 1973 the average annual growth rate in
employment was 3,2%. During the period 1973-1985 the textile employment in
developed countries, measured in absolute terms, declined by 30%(King, 1996:
868).
What was the situation in Italy? Antonelli (1998:5) records that in the cotton
industry alone between 1960 and 1987, total employment decreased from 167
7 For the woollen textile sector in Prato, for example, changes in consumer lifestyles meant that they now
preferred lighter and easier to care for fabrics rather than the carded wool products of the Prato district. This,
together with the new technologies being diffused, prompted a general industrial restructuring (Dei Ottati,
2003:512).
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432 to 60 842. Yet, production and productivity increased markedly.The increase
in labour productivity was closely related to the rate of increase in new
machinery. By 1987, the rate of purchase of new machinery was highest for
Italy. This period saw the evolution of radical changes in the organisation of the
industry. This was mainly captured in a distinct decline in the number of firms,
vertical disintegration and higher levels of specialisation. In the cotton industry,
the number of firms fell from 701 in 1960to 400 in 1987. In the shakeout, large
plants were less flexible and failed to survive. Smaller firms started to specialise
in spinning, weaving or finishing, becauseof the high cost of investment. The
end result was that the average size of the firms and plants declined and the
industry was dominated by relatively small, flexible, modernised firms. These
firms could also exploit opportunities to learn from suppliers, especially of
textile machinery and by imitating (given the proximity of other producers in the
industrial districts) (Belussi, 1996a and b; Antonelli, 1998). This change in
organisational structure thus enabled the industry to exploit the available
technological innovations successfully. However, in the late 1980sand especially
the 1990s, the environment changed again: new technology entered the scene
and global competition increased.
4.3.2.2 Information technologies and organisational structure in the 1990s
The factors at work in changing the environment in this period include GATT
1994, requiring reduction in the levels of tariff protection and the phasing out of
the MFA, which reduced protection against imports from developing countries
even further. The industry also had to adapt to increased competition in the
unified market of Europe and growing competition from textile producers in the
Newly Industrialised Countries. In the latter part of the 1990sthe accession of
China to the World Trade Organisation became an added concern (as we have
elaborated in Chapter 3).
The early 1990sa recessionary period in the Italian economy. Sometextiles and
clothing firms managed to weather these bad times well, but others were less
prepared for the hard times. Those firms that were well established in niche
markets, offering products consistently in demand, turned in good
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performances. Even through the bad times they maintained the technological
gap in relation to their competitors through their commitment to investment.
When the upturn came in 1994, even those firms in difficulties were able to
improve their performances (ANT, 1995:2). The good recovery of the Italian
textile and clothing industries was helped by a number of favourable factors,
namely a depreciation in the external value of the Lire, favouring exports, a
decrease in the interest rate, favouring new investments, and stability in labour
costs, following an accord with the trade unions (ANT, 1995:33). By the
beginning of the 1990s, the Italian textile industry was characterised by the
presence of a few large firms and a large contingent of small to medium-sized
enterprises. However, there was a large amount of co-operation amongst firms
in the industry, including suppliers of machinery and sub-contractors (Belussi,
1996aand b).
According to Belussi (1996a: 6) the Italian textile and clothing [Were is flexible
and competitive enough to remain internationally competitive. This view is
strongly supported by Michele Tronconi (President of the Association for Textile
Refinement) who emphasises the role of the small, but agile and specialised
enterprises in the textile system, which was built through the interactions of
many actors, large and small (ANT, 1999:1).
4.3.2.3 Strategic choices by Italian firms
4.3.2.3.1 Investment in new technology
As we have explained in Chapter 3, the introduction of the new information
technologtes" in the textile industry represents the possibility of reducing costs,
improving co-ordination of production and marketing and administrative
functions and generally improving efficiency. These technologies, however, have
implications for organisational structures, skills requirements and intermediate
8 First rate technologies designed to enable, from a technical point of view the management of production,
quality, administration and logistics of textiles, are for example the management systems, such as OneWorld,
IT Plant Manager and Proxima (Magni, 2001:3). Benetton has recently chosen SAP Apparel Footwear, a
software package developed by Germany's SAP AG, that will give 1500 Benetton employees visibility across
the entire supply chain, including the firm's worldwide production plants, business facilities and logistics
centres (Bharat Textile News, 2002b: 1).
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inputs. This implies that it may be a longer waiting period before the benefits of
such an investment become evident. The introduction of new technologies in
Italy included automatisation of equipment and process control technologies.
While Antonelli (1998:8) argues that firms need to be larger, more vertically
integrated and run by professional managers to exploit these new technologies
successfully, Belussi (1996a:11) is of the opinion that the development of
networks of co-operation amongst firms in the pipeline would enable smaller
firms to absorb the new technology, too. She further argues that the high level
of machinery renewal in the previous period and the good relationship with
machine suppliers should lead to a more effective process of learning and
diffusion of competencies amongst firms. During this period, the network firm,
for example Benetton, has emerged stronger. This means that the firm basically
hollows out its structure by sub-contracting to various small and medium-sized
producers. The firm then concentrates on brand name maintenance and
promotion as well as quality controls. The international versus local network is
considered in the next section.
4.3.2.3.2 tnternationaiisation versusstrengthening relationships in the district
In addition to the creation of international supply chains and the emergence of
the network firm, Italian firms also started a process of 'internationalisation'.
First, they increased their size by means of mergers and acquisitions, e.g. the
acquisition of Hugo Boss of Germany by Marzotto. Secondly, they moved
production to sub-contractors outside the traditional regions of production in
Italy and finally outside of the country. Outsourcing went mainly to countries in
Eastern Europe, such as Hungary and Poland, as well as North African countries.
Direct investment for production purposeswent to France, Germany, the USA,
Japan and other Asian and EUcountries (Belussi, 1996a13-14). While Italy also
attracted inward investment for textile production, these flows were exceeded
by FDI textile outflows. Inward Foreign Direct Investments (new investments
minus disinvestments) into textiles in Italy between 1997 and 2000 amounted to
US$709.8 million, which was about 2.5% of all FDI inflows. Outward FDI for
textiles over the same period amounted to US$ 1187.5 million, constituting
about three per cent of all FDI outflows during this period. (US Commercial
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Service, 2002:5-6). The latest moves were into countries where access to
markets was one of the primary concerns, such as setting up spinning mills in
Mauritius to benefit from exports under the African Growth and Opportunity Act,
or investing in high quality, high value added production in China, aimed at the
higher income niche in the Chinese market (Sacchi, 2003: 1-3). There is also
criticism of this view, i.e. to try and reserve high value added production for
Italian firms, and leaving the rest to the Chinese firms. An opposing view9
strongly argues in favour of Italian firms taking their strategic management and
productive competencies to China to produce even products for mass
customisation. If history teaches us anything, it is that, just like Italian firms
learned from the previous leaders in textiles, so Chinese firms will also soon
acquire the more sophisticated capabilities which are now the strengths of
Italian textile firms - and they will soon invest in Italian firms in direct
competition with those firms who believed the best strategy is to produce high
value products and leave the standardised ones to China and other developing
countries (Sacchi, 2003:1-3). Should Italian textile producers locate in China,
they will have the advantage of Italian textile machinery producers already
active in the Chinese market. China is now the largest buyer of Italian textile
machinery (about 17%of all textile machinery export shipments from Italy). The
strong relationship between Italian textile producers and machinery producers
will be an added advantage, while the Chinese producers are still on a learning
curve (Bharat Textile News, 2002a:1-2).
Staying in the industrial district and not looking outward for growth prospects
and rejuvenation required different competencies than the ones required for the
processof internationalisation described above. Finding ways to strengthen and
deepen relationships with customers, suppliers and institutions in the region may
be necessary. This is particularly important in mature industrial districts where
rejuvenation by means of new technologies needs the cooperation of all the
roleplayers to succeed. In Prato, for example, the process of adjusting to the
introduction of information and communications technologies was very hard
because of a lack of coordination in the system and the high risk of imitation.
9 This position is held for example, by Poalo Borzatta, director of international consulting group, Ambrosetti,
who has lived in China for many years (Sacchi, 2003: 1).
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The addition of a well designed industrial park reduced the risk of imitation and
professional training and improvements in relations with industry associations
and labour contributed to a recovery in the flexibility and competitiveness of the
firms in the region (UNIDO,2002:1-5).
The second half of the 1990s saw the birth of new industrial districts in the
South of Italy, including some for textiles, e.g. Martina Franca (near Taranto)
and for clothing at Putignano (Dall'ellectronica al tessile, spunta il Sud che
funziona, 1998).
The fact that Italian firms remained competitive during this period testifies to
their ability to survive in a changing environment.
4.3.2.3.3 Diversification of product range and markets
Diversification in products and markets, was one of the strategies that Italian
textile firms introduced with success.Firms in Prato, for example, is diversifying
into a noted fashion system by adding to textile production also knitting,
clothing and accessories. This region is now recognised as leader in terms of
quality and the scope of its operations. The new additions now account for 10
000 employees out of the 45 000 in the region (Nardi, 2001:1).
One of the weak points of the evolution of Italian trade in textiles and clothing
has been the importance of the EUmarket in its export strategy. One analyst,
for example, has argued that this focus on the EUmarket hascaused the Italian
textile and clothing exporters to lose an opportunity to increase its market share
in the USmarket (Mediatexint.com, 2002). Over the last decade, the demand for
fashion goods in the USA has grown significantly, from 25% of total global
imports to 32,5%. In the mean time, Italy's share in the American fashion market
has dropped from 5,77 percent to 4,45 percent (Mediatexint.com, 2002). The
market focus included in the strategies for the future of the industry is
threefold: maintenance of the traditional markets, such as the EU, and the east
of the United States, markets where the penetration of Italian textile products is
relatively low, e.g. the Scandinavian countries, Ireland, the EU candidate
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countries and parts of southern Africa, and finally entirely new markets, such as
the western states of the USAand China (Onida, 2002:9).
4.3.2.3.4 Integrated QuaUty, Environment and Sodat management systems
Quality, the environment and safety are terms that are so often used in relation
to trade and competition that it seems to imply that firms can easily comply
with the demands that these aspects of production place on them. Nothing could
be further from the truth: incorporating quality, environmental and safety
aspects into the production system is a complex, exacting process that
management is expected to achieve with great speed. Yet, such processes are
today indispensable if a firm is to remain competitive in modern textiles. Italian
firms have to comply with both EUand national regulations. The internationally
recognised standards to start with are ISO9001 (version 20001°) for quality, ISO
14000 (for the environment) and SA8000 (for social standards, such as worker
security). The Oeko-tex standard guarantees the absenceof colourants that may
cause allergies and medical textile regulations ensure consumer safety, for
example, preventing allergies and skin irritation by fabrics (Sala, 2001:1).
Environmental management certification also includes EMAS,the EU standard
verifying compliance with the EU requirements (Comunitá europee, 2001: 21-
29). Integrating the three standards at firm-level allows cost reductions,
resulting from the better management of information, documentation and
recording of processes, human resources and equipment, and the regular
evaluation of the efficiency of the system (Bubbio, et al, 2002:1-3). Leading
Italian texttle firms that have already gone through the integration process are
sharing their experiences with other firms stHl in need of integration. There are
at least two instruments for disseminating this information. The first is through
Ente Naztonale Italiano di Unificazione (the Italian National Standards Body),
who has produced a book of guidelines (Le Unee Guida Oualitá, Ambtente.
Sicurezza) for the use of textile firms. The second instrument is the website of
the Italian Textile Association (www.asstex.it) [Bubbio, et al, 2002:3].
10 Version 2000 is an improvement on the previous standard (1994). The new version is much more
innovative, orientated towards management and the process of increasing value-added throughout the firm,
rather than a rigid checklist of specific requirements for quality assurance (Bubbio, et al, 2002: I).
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4.3.2.3.5 Marketing strategies and 'Made in ItaLy' in the 21st century
In Italy, in the light of the reality of a larger EU market" and the increasing
internationalisation of textile production, there has been a concern to maintain
the 'Made in Italy' trade mark, which has been crucial in the export successof
the Italian districts.
The response of textile manufacturers has been diverse. On the one hand, the
reaction has been to define the label of origin even narrower, e.g. 'Made in
Biella', thus giving it a regional specialisation. On the other hand, another
distinction is made on the basisof the product content, for example "Il Marchio
Seri.co', which is the distinguishing mark for silk produced in the Como district.
The mark may be used on products for which at least two stages of the
production process were completed in Italy, but other criteria such as quality
and EUenvironmental regulations will also apply (Nardi, 2001:1-2).
Marketing strategies are embracing the possibilities offered by ICT, including
virtual market places. Textileitaly.com, for example, is an Internet portal for
textiles that Project Automation and the association for Italian textiles have
developed. It is a vertically integrated portal. This means that it is much more
than a website, offering the services of a collection of firms and institutions in
the textile pipeline, including consulting and research organisations. It also
offers the opportunity to share information, conclude business, obtain
information about funding for projects, for example from Italian government or
EU incentives, and learn about 'best practice' strategies from research
disseminated via the portal (Magni, 2001:1-3). The textile producers of Como
have also introduced a virtual market place, 'Market Piace'
(www.textilebusiness.it) to enhance their efforts towards internationalisation of
their silk products. They envisage a system of about 22 000 firms eventually
making use of the market place (Nardi, 2001:1). There are no doubt other
similar efforts in progress, but for our purpose these ones suffice to illustrate
the phenomenon.
Il Suggesting a 'Made in the EU' label.
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4.3.2.4 Recent performance and prospects
The past few years have seen many textile firms in the Italian districts face
increasingly difficult operating conditions. The reasonsare manyfold, but have a
great deal to do with factors that negatively affected the export growth of the
industry. These factors include the aftermath of the events of 11 September
2001 in the United States, the appreciation of the Euro against the currencies of
Italy's most important export destinations and the expectations of war in Iraq, as
well as the actual war and its aftermath (Esportazioni, il cala sfiora l'11 per
cento, 2002:1). Further adding to the reduction in cost competitiveness of the
textile industry is the increase in the cost of labour because of a shortage of
skilled labour in some regions, especially Comoand Biella (Como: ripresa vicina,
rna i giovani fuggono, 2002:1). In the short term, to solve this problem, labour is
attracted from other countries, such as Morocco and Eastern Europe. For a
longer-term solution, the industry is implementing strategies to attract the
younger generation to choose careers in textiles. These strategies include for
example, open days at firms, where members of the community and especially
schools are invited to familiarise them with the modern textile firm. The idea is
to show the younger generation that a career in textiles could be exciting and
rewarding. Other initiatives include modernised education and training
programmes for the textiles and fashion industry (Magni, 2002:1-2).
As far as the international trade regime under the World Trade Organisation is
concerned, the Italian textile producers (through their regional industry
associations) affirm their commitment to the liberalisation of textiles and
clothing trade as agreed at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations. They,
however, argue very strongly for reciprocity, i.e. opening up the markets of
countries outside the EU to their exports. They specifically have in mind the
USA, India and China12. In addition, they emphasise the cost disadvantage that
European textile producers have because they comply with stringent regulations
regarding the protection of the environment, worker rights and security, as well
12 For example, wool fabric imported into the EU attracts a customs duty of 12%; when exported from the
EU to the USA, the duty is 30%, to India it is 40% and 30% when entering China (Il tessile ora bussa all'EU,
2002:1).
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as customers' safety. These are the issues that they would like the EU trade
representatives to addressat the DohaRoundof trade negotiations (Il tessile ora
bussaall'EU, 2002:1-2).
As far as export growth in the medium term is concerned, much will depend on
the economies of the United States and the EU, and Germany, Italy's largest
textile and clothing market, in particular. However, the attempts to diversify
export markets (especially in growing economies) and offer a larger variety of
good quality products, may still serve to improve the export performance of the
textile and clothing complex.
As part of the EU, Italian textile producers potentially benefit from EUinitiatives
to encourage innovation and competitiveness (in addition to national
incentives) 13. These initiatives include various instruments, such as Structural
Funds (used especially in the South of Italy to encourage industrial
development), the e-learning Programme, as well as the Sixth Programme for
R&D.The latter funds certain activities identified as crucial for the survival and
growth of textiles and clothing firms. Two broad themes can be identified:
• Information Society Technology and specifically research that focuses on
the application of ICT to solve environmental problems, e-business, e-
work systemsand e-learning, aswell ascomplex problem solving; and
• Nanotechnologies and nanoscience, multifunctional materials, and new
product and processinnovations (Struttura e obiettivi, 2002:1-2).
The programme further seeks to foster cooperative R&D, excellent management
skills and integration of R&D with other firm-level activities (partecipare con
successo,2002:1-3).
In summary, the picture of the textile industry in Italy is mixed, consisting of
firms, large and small that have already put the difficulties of the recent past
behind them to find a new lease on life. Then there are still those firms very
13 Although some industry commentators consider the national incentives as quite inadequate. One analyst
dubbed them 'bonsai' incentives - the incentives amount to €15 million, for an industry generating €48
billion in output (Mazzuca, 2002: 1).
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much in a muddle, not yet able to find the correct strategies for the challenges
they face. The Italian firms that are struggling, especially in the cotton and
textile finishing subsectors, have been unable to invest sufficiently in
technological renewal and product and market diversification (La minaccia viene
dal Far East, 2002:1-2).
The strengths of the Italian textile industry through the different periods of
adjustment and restructuring seem to have been flexibility, creativity and
innovation, attention to quality, advanced technical performance in fibres, yarns
and fabrics and expertise in stylistic design, communication and marketing.
4.3.3 The South African textile industry
Like their counterparts worldwide, the South African textile firms in the 1990s
faced a changing competitive environment, including changes in consumer
preferences, the emergence of new technology, and the implications of the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) at the Uruguay Round of GAn
negotiations.
The first major domestic change was the South African government's
commitment to trade liberalisation, signalled by its offer to GAn. In terms of
GAn, the duty phase-down on South African textiles and clothing should be
spread over 12 years. In 1995, however, the South African government opted to
accelerate the lowering of the protective tariff walls, aiming to complete the
process by 2002. Duties applicable at the end of the phase- down period are
7,5%on fibres, 15%on yarns, 22%on fabrics, 30%on household textiles, and 40%
on clothing (Table 4.1). Until 1999, when minimum specific duties fell away, the
customs tariff structure was rather complicated, consisting of ad vaLorem rates
aswell as minimum and maximum specific duties (Table 4.1).
To prepare South African textile and clothing industries for the new challenges,
the government, textile and clothing firms and the South African Clothing and
Textile Workers' Union (SACTWU)formed a joint task force to develop a long-
term strategy for the industry. The stakeholders agreed on a restructuring plan
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to achieve international competitiveness within a 10-year time frame, bearing in
mind the need to minimise job lossesin the textile industry and increase jobs in
the clothing industry. The firms in the industry had to accept that they have to
take responsibility for their own future by improving productivity through better
use of resources, especially labour, better work organisation and upgraded
technology. The specific goals to be achieved by the industries were:
• increased value added and utilisation of niche markets;
• minimisation of job lossesbecauseof restructuring;
• employment creation to compensate for job losses as a result of
restructuring; and
• international competitiveness and export orientation (Clofed, 2000: 87).
These objectives were confirmed at the Textiles and Clothing Sector Summit
(Textiles and Clothing Sector Summit document, 2000: 3-4).
The government's idea was to reduce tariff barriers under GATT, while putting
in place supply-side measures to ease the adjustment process for firms. The
details of these measures are discussed in Chapter 5 where we deal with the
institutions who administer them.
4.3.3.1 Strategies, organisational change and structure of the industry
How did firms react to the new competitive environment and how did they fare
in terms of the objectives outlined above?Strategies adopted were diverse, but
not mutually exclusive. Efforts to cut costs and become more efficient included
investment in new technology, relocation, consolidation, shedding of labour,
changes in the product mix, and a focus on exports as long-term imperative, not
as a temporary 'vent-for-surplus.' We now consider the various strategies
employed by the firms in the textile industry.
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TABLE4.1: TEXTILESANDCLOTHINGDUTYPHASE-DOWN(MOSTFAVOURED
NATIONTARIFFS)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Ad valorem (%)
Polyester fibre 17 15 13 11 7.5
Filament yarn 15 15 15 15 15
Spun yarn 24 22 20 18 15
Woven fabric 33 30 27 24 22
Knitted fabric 33 30 27 24 22
Household textiles 43 40 37 34 30
Clothing 66 60 54 48 40
Specific duties cents/kg
Minimum
Spun yarn ttwoven fabric 0.557
Knitted fabric 0.656
Domestic textiles tt 0.590
clothing 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Maximum
3rd schedule rebates Full less 6% Full less 8% Full less 10% Full less 12%
Yarn Full duty Full less 5.5% Full less 11% Fuliless16.5%
Fabric
Source: Textile Federation (1999:5)
4.3.3.1.1 Investment in new technology
In the 1990s, the local textile industry accelerated investment in new
technology. Several studies14 pointed out the age of the capital stock in the
textile industry and emphasisedthe need for rapid investment in new technology
to aid the industry's drive towards greater competitiveness.
A total of US$819.5million was invested in new equipment between 1994 and
1998. Of this, spinning and weaving received the most (US$261.5 million),
followed by auxiliary equipment with US$192.5million, and knitting, US$125.5
million. The total capital expenditure also included US$94.5 million worth of
sewing machines for the clothing sector. A similar breakdown of expenditure is
not available for 1999, but according to Investment South Africa, about US$900
million was invested in textile machinery between 1994 and 1999 (Russell,
2000:3).
14 See for example, RSA (1994) and Maree (1995).
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TABLE 4.2: SELECTEDCAPITAL EXPENDITUREON TEXTILEMACHINERY(US$
MILLIONS)1994-1998
Machinery 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Fibre preparation 8.5 13.0 12.5 8.0 5.5
NonWovens 1.0 10.0 1.5 0.5 1.0
Spinning 21.0 47.0 40.5 31.0 23.5
Weaving 16.0 29.0 19.5 19.5 14.5
Knitting 25.0 28.0 26.0 26.0 20.5
Auxiliary equipment 35.0 46.5 40.0 38.5 32.5
Dyeing ft finishing 16.0 21.0 21.0 15.5 10.5
Subtotal 122.5 194.5 161.0 139.0 108.0
Sewingmachines 22.5 24.0 20.0 16.0 12.0
Total 145.0 218.5 181.0 155.0 120.0
RIS Average 3.6 3.65 4.35 4.65 5.55
Source: DeVoest, 2000: personal communication.
Both the IOCand the Textile Federation maintain that the investment in new
machines has led to job shedding, making the industry more capital intensive
(IOC, 1999:15; Lourens, 1997:1). Employment in the textile industry showed a
dramatic decline since 1991 (Figure 4.1). The work force was reduced from 90
200 in 1991 to 68 147 in 1999. The apparent increase in employment in 1996was
a result of the re-incorporation of statistics for the TBVC states15 into South
African statistics. However, since the decline in employment started already
before the investment in new machinery commenced, all job shedding cannot be
attributed to investment in new capital equipment. While employment
continued to decline after 1999, the number of employees showed a modest
increase (2.5%)in 2002 (Figure 4.1). The increase was registered by the spinning,
weaving and finishing sectors, while other sectors still showed a decline
(Claassens,2003:7).
15 Former homelands under the apartheid system, viz. Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei.
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FIGURE 4.1: EMPLOYMENT IN SOUTHAFRICAN TEXTILES (1991-2002)
Employment in South African textiles(1991-2002)
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Source: Texfed, 2001:13-14; Texfed, 2002:7.
Given the slow growth in the domestic economy and the capital-intensive nature
of textile production, it is not realistic to expect rapid employment growth in
this sector in the short to medium term. As export growth accelerates and
demand for local textiles as inputs into apparel production in the region grows,
employment creation prospects will improve, ceteris paribus. Clothing
production remains labour intensive; thus with increased export growth and
improved training processes, labour absorption in this sector ought to
accelerate.
4.3.3.1.2 Organisation and structure
The number of firms in the South African textile industry showed an increase in
all components of the industry (Table 4.3). The number of firms suggests a
competitive market structure, but as Maree (1995: 37) pointed out, there was
significant concentration in the industry. The largest enterprises in 1985
produced 71%of the output and employed 66%of the workers in the industry
(Maree, 1995: 37).
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The South African textile industry of the early 1990s further displayed two
related characteristics that hampered their efforts to become competitive,
namely a conglomerate structure and an enormously complex and diversified
scope of production. Appendix 4.1 documents the complex technology routes in
South African textiles in the 1990s. The conglomerate structure meant that
textile firms were part of groups of companies whose core businesswas not
textiles. The secondcharacteristic evolved becauseof the focus on the domestic
market and the desire to provide for every need in that market, resulting in
short production runs and under-utilisation of capacity in some areas. This
pushed production costs up and reduced the ability of SouthAfrican producers to
face foreign competition effectively (Texfed, 2002:2-3).
TABLE 4.3: NUMBER OF SOUTH AFRICAN TEXTILE MANUFACTURERS
1985 1993
Spinning, weaving and finishing 141 152
Knitting mills 123 191
Other textiles 441 466
TOTAL 705 809. 10Source. CSS/StatsSA
The last decade was characterised by significant turbulence in the textile and
clothing industries, including exit from and entry into the industry, but also
mergers of textile and clothing firms. There is some uncertainty over the number
of firms remaining in the industry though it has surely declined severely. De
Voest, a well-known consultant in the textile industry, however, is of the opinion
that there has been a net increase in enterprises between 1997 and 1999, at
least in the textile pipeline (Table 4.4) (Houseand Williams, 2000:26). Although
these newcomers are generally perceived as "small backyard operators", these
figures also include familiar namessuch as Levi Straussin clothing and Cordustex
in textiles. For textiles alone, de Voest (2000)17estimated that there were a
total of 528 textile firms left, with the largest number (194) in Kwazulu-Natal,
followed by equal numbers (117) in the Western Cape and Gauteng. The Eastern
Cape comes in a distant fourth with 53 enterprises, while the numbers in the
16 Information received by fax from Helena Claassens, Textile Federation, 1999.
17 De Voest's estimates differ from the official statistics provided by Statistics South Africa, for various
reasons, such as incomplete official statistics (industry sample not updated), rapid changes in the industry,
large numbers of'decentralised' (unregistered) producers, etc (De Voest, personal communication, January
2000).
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Free State (16), North West Province (10), Limpopo (9), Mpumalanga (8) and the
Northern Cape (4) are relatively small.
In clothing and to a lesser extent in textiles, there has been a move towards
relocation. Some firms moved away from the urban areas where wages are
determined under the regulations of South African labour laws, to rural areas
where a more flexible labour regime prevails. In the decentralised areas, wages
are often as low as 50%of the BargainingCouncil wages, and very few firms pay
any other benefits (Natal Clothing Manufacturers' Association 2000).18At the
time of the survey, there was much talk about moving operations acrossnational
borders. A high profile example at the time, was the much-publicised move of
Waverley Blankets, one of South Africa's oldest textile firms, to Botswana. The
main reasons cited for the move were high labour costs, crime, dumping of
products from Turkey and China, and low disposable income of South African
consumers. The Waverley management predicted that more firms will follow
(Jenvey, 2000a). The strong incentives offered by neighbouring countries were
described as a magnet attracting South African firms to move their factories
(Jafta and Jeetah, 2001:10). To date the Waverley Blankets relocation has not
taken place, neither has any evidence of other textile firms relocating to
neigbouring countries come to light.
The year 2000 has also seen the closure of well-known names in textiles, such as
Mooiriver Textiles, Coastal, and De Nim.19The latter two had invested in new
equipment before their closure, implying that idle capacity is available and
could be brought into operation quickly should demand conditions improve. For
the spinning and weaving sub-sector, the industry is characterised by much
vertical integration, while the cotton and polycotton subsection tends towards
non-integration (IOC, 1999:40). Although many changes have taken place, the
number of owners in the cotton and polycotton subsection has increased slightly,
while this is not so for other yarns. The number of plants has decreased in the
1990s, with the market share of the four large cotton firms declining to 50%in
1997/1998 from a high of 85% in 1984/85. In December 2000, Seardel, South
18 Fact sheet on comparative cost structures between urban and decentralised areas provided by Len Smart
during an interview at the Natal Clothing Manufacturers' Association, Durban, 16 November 2000.
19 A total of six textile firms and about 40 clothing firms closed their doors in 2000 (Brink 2001:2).
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Africa's largest clothing manufacturer merged with Frame, the largest textile
firm. Seardel intends to invest between R 300 million and R400 million in new
. technology at Frame over the next four years. The stock market liked this
transaction: Seardel's share price rose from 120c to 275c before settling at 240c
(Sigonyela, 2001: 9). Since textiles and clothing are sectors with low profit
margins they were not favoured much by investors or bankers in the past.
Viewed optimistically, the market reaction to the Seardel-Framemerger can be
interpreted as an indication that improvements in competitiveness and a higher
export profile may change the reluctance of bankers and investors to lend to or
invest in textiles and clothing.
TABLE4.4: NEWCOMERSTO THETEXTILEPIPELINE(1997-1999) (NUMBEROF
ENTITIES)
Time Textiles OtherZ Total Retail Total Liquidations Net
period and manufacturing w/sale ' gains
clothing'
1997 333 117 450 463 913 201 712
1998 319 131 450 505 955 178 777
Jan-
June
1999 126 51 177 148 325 106 219
1 fibre, non-wovens, weaving, knitting, & CMT(apparel, householdand industrial)
2 leather, footwear, furniture manufacturers.
3 clothing, home furnishings. Excludesfootwear and furniture stores.
Source: HouseandWilliams (2000: 26)
4.3.3.1.3 Rationalisation, soeciaïisotion and product differentiation
Since the opening up of new export markets, some textile firms in South Africa
have implemented strategies to overcome the complexity of the production
processes illustrated in Appendix 4.1 (and, of course, to become more
competitive). These strategies have entailed, amongst other things,
rationalisation of product lines, specialisation and product differentiation. Some
firms have rationalised their product lines, moving away from producing a wide
range of standardised products, to fewer product lines, but with improved
styling, quality, and delivery times (Roberts and Thoburn, 2002: 35).
Specialisation was basedon inputs, e.g. from natural and manufactured fibres to
one of the two, on process, e.g. from warp and weft knitting to weft only, and
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by product range, e.g. narrowing the range, but seeking to increase volumes in
the remaining products (Gibbon, 2002:23). For some firms greater specialisation
also meant moving away from apparel textiles, for example to household and
technical textiles. Evidently, technical fibres and fabric tended to generate
higher margins, more consistent demand, longer production runs and less
finishing work and inventories (Gibbon, 2002:23). Product differentiation to
supply market segmentswith particular needs has also become a viable strategy
for some firms. These include for example, wool and mohair for jackets and
suiting, crease-resistant fabrics for trousers, underwear fabrics and twills and
polycotton. Suppliers of up-market upholstery and household textiles have also
seen their market share improve (Robertsand Thoburn, 2002:43).
4.3.3.2 Performance of South African textile industry
During this period of restructuring, output performance was varied: the index of
physical volume of production reveals that there has been a decline in real
output in the textile industry (Table 4.5). The industry has, for the most part,
performed worse than the manufacturing sector as a whole. Annual growth rates
in the physical volume of production (Table 4.5) indicate that fluctuations in
performance have been much more pronounced for textiles and clothing than for
manufacturing as a whole. Whereas textiles and manufacturing as a whole have
seen a recovery since 1999, the clothing sector was still in decline both in 2000
and 2001. Preliminary figures for 2002 (Claassens, 2003a:7) show an
improvement for both textiles (10.6%up over 2001) and clothing (silghtly over 10
percent, compared to 2001).
For the whole period, capacity utilisation in clothing was better than in textiles
(Table 4.6). During 1995, capacity utilisation was slightly better in textiles than
in manufacturing as a whole. For 1999, both textiles and clothing showeda slight
improvement in capacity utilisation, above that of the manufacturing sector as a
whole. Since 2000 capacity utilisation in textiles has been increasing, reaching
82% in 2002 (Claassens, 2003a:7). The reasons given for capacity under-
utilisation in the past were sluggishdomestic demand becauseof poor economic
growth and low disposable income, as well as import competition (Jafta and
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Jeetah, 2001:6). With the opening of larger markets and the relatively large size
of orders for the American market in particular, capacity utilisation ought to
increase further.
TABLE 4.5: INDEX OF PHYSICAL VOLUME OF PRODUCTION (1995-2001)
1995=100 (percentage change in brackets)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Manufacturing 100.0 103.4 103.9 101.2 102.2 106.0 109.4
(3.4) (0.5) (-2.6) (0.98) (3.7) (3.2)
Total textiles 100.0 98.2 101.5 91.4 91.2 93.5 94.8
(-1.8) (3.36) (-9.95) (-0,21) (2.52) (1.39)
Total clothing 100.0 101.6 94.1 87.3 88.7 82.7 78.8
(1.6) (-7.38) (-7.22) (1.6) (-6.76) (-4.71)
Sources:Texfed (2000c:17and 2002:11); Claassens(2000a:5and 2003b:7).
TABLE4.6: UTILISATIONOF PRODUCTIONCAPACITY(1991-2001)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Manufacturing 79.9 83.2 81.3 81.1 80.1 80.4 79.5 81.0
Textiles 78.2 84.3 80.2 80.6 79.0 83.6 80.0 81.0
Clothing 88.3 91.9 87.4 86.0 83.8 87.0 86.3 86.0
Sources:Texfed (2000c:17and 2002:11); Claassens(2000a:5 and 2003b:7).
4.3.3.3 Trade: performance and prospects
South African imports have always exceeded exports, but at times the gap has
narrowed somewhat. Imports of textiles increased steadily in the 1990s (Figure
4.2). However, in 1999, imports declined to R4 023 million (down from R4 276
million in 1998). During the first half of 2000, textile imports have grown at an
accelerated pace, while average unit prices have shown a declining trend in both
US dollar and Rand terms. This trend was clearly illustrated in the case of
knitted pile fabrics, other knitted fabrics, woven towelling, polycotton, and
acrylic fabrics. For example, imports of knitted fabrics increased by 59% in
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volume, while average unit price decreased by 24% (Claassens, 2000a: 5).
Management and organised labour in the industry maintain that the biggest
threat to the industry remains illegal imports. It has been alleged that illegal
imports amount to asmuch as 50%of textile imports (IOC,1999: 23).
Although there has been an upward movement in the value of exports, this rise
has not been nearly enough to offset the decline in demand in the local market
and the loss of market share to foreign competition. That import volumes are
growing while prices are falling underscores the need for the industry to rapidly
increase competitiveness and exports. In 1999, exports amounted to 26.78%of
total sales in the industry, leaving much room for growth (Texfed, 2000a: 5).
Between January and May 2000, growth areas in SA textile exports were man-
made staple fibres (49%)20,cotton fabric (33%)and made-up textiles (82%). In
industrial textiles export growth came from coated fabrics (230%), tyre cord
fabric (68%), braids and trimmings (37%), and narrow wovens (36%) (Viljoen,
2000: 9). Since 2000 both imports and exports of textiles show a sharp upward
trend, with imports reaching R6.9 billion in 2002 (up 33.5%over 2001). The
depreciation of the Rand and the implementation of various trade agreements
(notably with the EU, SADCand the AGOA)contributed to a surge in exports,
reaching R4.5 billion in 2002. The biggest growth area was in household textiles,
which saw a 61%increase in exports between 2001 and 2002 (Claassens,2003:7).
Exporting has now become a priority for the South African clothing and textile
industries. Although South Africa is a latecomer to the regional integration game
(with the exception of the Southern African Customs Union, discussed below),
she is fast becoming an integral part of several regional trade initiatives.
Amongst other things, these initiatives offer new market accessopportunities for
SouthAfrican firms.
South Africa is a member of the Southern African Development Community
(SADC)and the Southern African CustomsUnion (SACU).On the 1st of September
20 Percentage growth compared to comparable period in previous year.
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2000, a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)amongst 11 of the SADCcountries came into
effect.21
FIGURE4.2: SOUTHAFRICANTEXTILE IMPORTSANDEXPORTS(1992-2002)
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Source: Texfed (2000, 2002), Claassens(2003:7).
The SADCFTA is to be more than just a mechanism for trade. It has the
objective of creating the conditions for increased investment, leading to higher
value-added in production and the diversification of the region's economies. For
textiles and clothing, there is the potential to develop an efficient pipeline from
farms to ports, but industrialists and trade unions in South Africa worry that the
SADC free trade agreement will facilitate trans-shipment of Asian goods,
exacerbating the existing import pressures." Under the SADCTrade Protocol,
SACUwill allow certain textile and clothing imports originating in Malawi,
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia duty-free accessto the SACUmarket under a
one-stage-transformation rule of origin - within quotas - until 2005 (the MMTZ
agreement). South Africa's tariff phase-down offer to the other members of
21 The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, and the Seychelles are not part of the agreement, yet.
22 Malawian exports of textiles and clothing to South Africa grew rapidly from 1996 to 1998. In 1998, after
complaints by firms and the clothing and textile workers union, a joint task team from the Department of
Trade and Industry and Customs went to Malawi to investigate the situation. Their handling of the matter did
not endear them to industrialists in Malawi or South Africa. As one South African industrialist put it: "they
were intent to show that South Africa rules the roost in Africa". However, while their behaviour had negative
repercussions for relations between the two countries, this incident highlighted problems with cross-border
customs control in the context of the SADC trade protocol and South Africa's bilateral agreements (Jafta and
Jeetah, 2001: 8).
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SADC is asymmetrical in the sense that South Africa is lowering tariffs faster
than the rest (Table 4.7). By 2004, all ad valorem, duties, with the exception of
a 5%duty on fabrics, will be removed.
TABLE 4.7: SOUTH AFRICA'S AD VALOREM DUTIES (%) FOR SADC TEXTILE
IMPORTS
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Fibres 10 7 4 0 0 0 0 0
Yarns 13 10 7 4 0 0 0 0
Fabrics 18 15 12 9 5 0 0 0
Source: RSA,Government Gazzette, 1998.
The South African duties on SADCtextiles are lower than the MFN rates (Table
4.1), but this is on the condition that two stages of the production process take
place in SADC(i.e. the two-stage transformation rule).
The SACUconsists of a common trade system for South Africa, Lesotho, Namibia,
Swaziland, and Botswana. The system is administered by South Africa. There are
no tariff barriers between member countries, but a common external tariff
policy exists on imports from countries outside SACU. The SACUagreement has
been under review and a deal has recently been accepted between South Africa
and the other mernbers.P All the SACU members are part of SADC (Texfed,
2000b: 6).
South Africa was granted limited membership of the Lomé Convention, but under
the Cotonou agreement (signed between the African, Caribbean and Pacific
(ACP) countries and the European Union (EU)), South Africa has full membership.
Under this deal until January 2008, ACP exporters would enjoy duty-free access
for exports to the EU market of all goods deemed to originate from ACP
countries. Of particular interest to Southern Africa are new provisions that
elaborate on the extent to which South African raw materials and intermediate
products can be used under commutation provisions by the neighbouring ACP
23 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. The most important changes are a new revenue-sharing
formula and an institutional framework that would give the BLNS countries a much bigger say in the running
of the union's affairs.
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countries without losing originating status (Regional integration key to ACP-EU
Pact, 2000).
After almost five years of negotiations, South Africa and the EUfinally reached
an agreement" for a Free Trade Area. This agreement holds several benefits for
the South African economy, ranging from increased accessfor exports to the EU
market, to the potential relocation of industries to South Africa to benefit from
reduced barriers to entry into export markets. With respect to textile and
clothing exports, the EUoffer amounts to EUtariffs on South African exports to
be reduced to zero over six years. South Africa will reduce its tariffs to half of
the MFNtariffs over eight years. In contrast to AGOA,which requires three-stage
transformation, the EU-SAagreement allows two-stage transformation, so that,
for garment exports, yarns can be imported from outside the region, but fabric
must originate in South Africa, other members of the Cotonou agreement or the
EU(Coughlin, et al, 2001: 76).
SouthAfrica has been granted Generalised Systemof Preferences (GSP)status by
a number of developed countries, including the United States of America (USA),
the European Union (EU), Japan, Canada, and Norway. This status allows South
African exports of predetermined products preferential access to developed
country markets by means of reduced import tariffs. The preferential access
varies amongst countries in terms of the extent of tariff cuts and product
coverage. The USA,for example, excluded textiles, clothing, leather goods, and
watches from this system.
The recent opening up of the United States' market under the African Growth
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is viewed as the best opportunity yet for South
African firms to increase their exports. This latest addition to the export market
opportunities aims to expand trade and investment between the USAand Sub-
SaharanAfrica (SSA)and to replace aid with trade. The act became effective on
the 1 October 2000 and will remain in effect until 30 September 2008. AGOA
provides various opportunities like the preferential treatment of certain textiles
24This is a trade, development and cooperation agreement, which provides for tariff liberalisation on 95% of
South African exports to the EU over ten years, while duties on 86% of EU exports to SA will be removed
over 12 years.
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and apparel, the extension of the GSPfor Africa, the US-AfricaEconomic Forum,
other potential free trade agreements, and the US President's Partnership
Initiative. AGOAoffers duty and quota-free treatment for clothing produced in
eligible SSAcountries. Of the 48 SSAstates listed in the Act, 42 are considered
to be LDCs(least developed countries), defined by the World Bank as having a
per capita Gross National Product under US$1,500. For the first four years of
AGOA LDCsare allowed to source their fabrics anywhere in the world. The
remaining six countries - Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and
South Africa - are required to source their fabric in Africa or the US,a condition
which will apply to all 48 countries after the initial phase. Nineteen SSA
countries are currently eligible for textile and apparel benefits and several
others have applied for eligibility (USTR,2003:1).
African apparel exports from eligible SSA countries, if made from African
(regional) fabrics and yarns, would be subject to a cap based on the volume of
1.5% to 3.5%of total US apparel imports over the eight year period (Russell,
2000:2; Texfed, 200025).This is considered the most significant potential boost
to the textile and clothing industries in the region. The USA'sapparel imports
amount to about US$60billion per annum, of which 1%comes from Sub-Saharan
Africa (Claassens,2000).26This presents new opportunities not only for South
African apparel producers but also for yarn and fabric producers to increase
their production for apparel producers in South Africa and the SADCregion. It
also offers the potential for strengthening regional interindustry linkages in that
South African producers will have to source more raw materials, yarn and fabric
from producers in the region in order for its final goods to be eligible for export
to the United States.
In August 2002, the United States extended the Trade Act to enhance the
benefits under AGOA.This extension, dubbed AGOA II, allows duty and quota-
free treatment of knit-to-shape apparel, doubled the quantitative limit on
apparel produced in Sub-SaharanAfrica from fabric originating in the region and
25 Fax from Textile Federation to their members, 6 October 2000.
26 Letter by Helena Claassens to members of the South African Textile Federation, 2000.
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granted lesser developed country benefits to Namibia and Botswana (USTR,
2003:1).
Both the United States and SADCat the time of the inception of AGOA,made up
relatively small portions of South Africa's trade portfolio: 60%of textile and
clothing imports came from Far Eastern countries such as China, India, Hong
Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, and South Korea in 199927 (Clofed, 2000: 81). The
second most important region is the EU (22%), of which the top five source
countries were Germany, the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Thirteen
per cent of imports came from SADC,where the most important exporters are
Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique. Five per cent (R 272 million) of
imports came from the USA,up 15%over 1998. The biggest proportion of exports
(41%) went to the EU, where the UK, Italy, France, Germany, and the
Netherlands were the most significant recipients. Eighteen per cent (R 654.7
million) of textile and clothing exports went to the USAin 1999, up 30%over
1998. In 2000 SouthAfrica was the second largest Sub-Saharansupplier of textile
products to the USA, after Mauritius, providing 23%of total USAimports from
that region (MUSBA,2000:5). Ten per cent of exports went to SADC,where the
most important markets were Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mauritius, Mozambique, and
Malawi. Exports to Zimbabwe will probably decline due to that country's
economic difficulties; and exports of textiles to Mauritius will likely increase due
to joint efforts amongst South African and Mauritian firms to supply apparel to
the United States.
The latest development in trade relations between Southern Africa and the
Unites States is the start of negotiations towards the establishment of a free
trade agreement between the USand the Southern African CustomsUnion. The
negotiations, which opened in June this year, will focus on issuessuch as market
access, investment, services and intellectual property rights. The target date
for completion of the negotiations is December2004 (USTR,2003:71).
27 We use the 1999 figures here to show the situation before the implementation of AGOA (2000).
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The opening up of more export markets for South African textiles and clothing
offer the local producers both opportunities and challenges, but the following
caveats warrant attention:
• In the short-to medium term, Sub-SaharanAfrican exports will at best
replace someAsian exports to the USmarket; in the light of the slowdown
in the American economy significant growth in demand for apparel is not
expected.
• Competitors in Asia and Mexico are not taking the implications of AGOA
lying down. Asian firms are investing in the Caribbean Basin to export to
the United States, while Mexican firms, realising that their comparative
advantage based on cheap labour is fading, are investing rapidly in new
technology to improve quality and the speed of delivery. Both types of
firms still have a proximity advantage over Southern African exporters
(Speer, 2000).
• Lastly, the window of opportunity for Southern African firms to export into
the US duty-free and quota-free, is smaller than usually perceived: the
termination of quotas under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in
2005will take away the quota-free advantage now enjoyable under AGOA.
The concerns listed above underline the fact that time is of the essence for
SouthAfrican firms to do all that is necessaryto gain market share rapidly in the
USmarket.
In assessingthe current status of the textile and clothing sectors, generalisations
are difficult to make because of the diversity that prevails in the industry. A
survey conducted for SADC(Jafta and Jeetah, 2001) revealed well-managed,
competitive exporters, but also found laggards, struggling to adjust to rapidly
changing circumstances. Despite 'pockets of competitiveness' in the industry,
much remains to be done to make the more difficult adjustments, i.e., learning
to use technology better, improving worker and management skills, improving
productivity, quality, reliability and delivery times and to establish and maintain
good supplier and customer networks. The latest developments include
increased activity in input sectors, additional investment in textile production
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capacity and improved expertise in marketing strategies, as well as a
comprehensive strategic plan for the industry. Starting with inputs, the cotton
producers in South Africa have stepped up capacity to supply increased demand
from African manufacturers aiming to export under AGOA(USTR,2003:25). South
Africa saw an increase of 45%in its total AGOAexports, from US$923million in
2001 to 1.3 billion in 2002, which is equivalent to 32%of total South African
exports to the US. Exports of textiles and apparel nearly tripled from US$33
million in 2001 to 88 million during 2002 (USTR,2003:112). South African textile
firms have invested in additional capacity to benefit from AGOAand foreign
investors have been attracted to the textiles and apparel sector for the same
reason (USTR,2002:124). Regional integration has also benefitted in that South
African imports of cotton from other SouthernAfrican countries (suchas Zambia)
have increased and exports of textiles to Mauritius are also growing. South
African firms have also invested in the textile industries of neighbouring
countries, such as Swaziland, Lesotho and Mozambique (USTR,2002:125).
With AGOA's focus on finished products, such as apparel, it is imperative that
the textiles and garment industries work together to achieve the full benefit
from the agreement. However, therein lies a potential hurdle. The relationship
between these two industries has not always been smooth, especially as far as
the local textile industry meeting the demands of the clothing manufacturers is
concerned. Complaints about the ability of the textile industry to consistently
deliver quality yarns and fabric at competitive prices is a refrain that has been
heard with disconcerting regularity over the decades [See for example, SABS
(1976), RSA(1994), Maree (1995), Jafta and Jeetah (2001) and Gibbon (2000)].
The industry has come a long way, however. Whereas the problems of quality
control in the 1970swere linked to the lack of generally agreed upon standards
and specifications (SABS, 1976: 4), the latter day problems are more
intermittent and blamed on a lack of organised quality circles and the attitude
of workers towards quality (Jafta and Jeetah, 2001:40). We address further
developments regarding quality issuesin the next section.
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4.3.3.4 Marketing, standards and the regional pipeline
Adapting to the changing demands of the markets, especially the export
markets, has required increased attention to quality and environmental
concerns. The first was addressedby introducing integrated quality management
systemsand getting ISO9000 certification. Although the latter is more relevant
in the EUmarket than in the USmarket (American buyers often have their own
quality specifications to which local producers must comply), it is still beneficial
to be certified, because of the spinoffs from the process (Jafta and Jeetah,
2001:44). In the processof becoming ISO9000 certified the firm has to improve,
document, and make consistent its internal processes, which contributes to its
competitiveness. The certification is also testimony of a firm's good
management, businesssophistication, and reliability, which could give it a foot
in the door with risk-averse buyers new to SouthAfrica and the region.
One of the potential detrimental effects of rapid growth in textile production, is
the impact that it may have on the environment. Lesotho, for example, has been
one of the Sub-SaharanAfrican countries that has benefitted most from AGOA28•
Environmental pollution created by footloose investors, however, could
jeopardise Lesotho's chances of continuing to reap these beneftts'", Global
textiles and indeed South African firms have shown that textile production and
environmental sustainability are not conflicting goals. Through the processof ISO
14 000 certification and other cleaner production initiatives, SouthAfrican firms
have managed to reduce costs and safeguard the environment. Several projects
to reduce water, energy and chemical use in factories were introduced in South
Africa in recent years. While we report on the institutions driving this process in
Chapter 5, it is worthwhile noting here that the savings on only one of these
projects (water re-use) amounted to about R6million per year (Cleaner Textile
Production Bulletin, 2003:4).
28 Approximately 10000 new jobs were created and US$ 100 million in new investment attracted. About 38
factories produce textiles in Lesotho, mainly denim for export. The new factories are mostly of Asian origin
(Taiwan and Singapore) (Gibbs and Gibbs, 2003:2-3).
29 The biggest pollution problem is the disposal of untreated waste water from the textile production
processes in open streams, threatening the livelihood of downstream users (Gibbs and Gibbs, 2003:2-3).
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Changingtheir perspective from focusing on the needs of the local market under
protection to compete in the global market place was a tough and expensive
learning experience for South African firms. The export marketing methods and
channels used include export agencies, international sourcing agencies, direct
sales, trade fairs, and exhibitions, though most avoid international marketing
middlemen and agents. Doing so avoids unnecessary commissions and enables
the firms to have better and more timely communication with their clients.
To improve marketing efforts and skills of South African exporters, several
initiatives are currently being implemented, apart from trade missionsarranged
under the auspices of the Department of Trade and Industry. The Joint Export
Action Group is an instrument of the South African Textile Industry Export
Council to help members, including smaller operators to develop export
capabilities. Several Web-based initiatives seek to improve dissemination by
providing an on-line marketplace for suppliers and buyers. Texweb and TIMSSA
are two websites developed by the CSIRand the Department of Trade and
Industry. Texweb provides company and product listings and trade enquiries,
while TIMSSAoffers analyses of production, demand and trade in the SADC
textile pipeline. Private-sector initiatives such as
http://textiles.tradespan.co.za and www.apparelhq.com provide similar
services. Orders from American buyers can be so large that no single South
African firm has sufficient capacity to fill it. Innovative solutions will have to be
found so as not to lose out on these new opportunities. The trading housemodel,
such as Global Traders (www.globaltraders-sa.com) developed by Gelvenor
Textiles (South Africa), provides the opportunity for local companies to
overcome capacity problems. Trading housesare able to match capabilities of
local producers so that orders can be filled jointly. They also investigate the
market and place businesswhere appropriate. Such a facility is very useful for
novice exporters who have little idea where to begin. Similar efforts include a
collaborative export industry portal (www.sa-exporter.com). which match
international buyers with reputable South African exporters. This is not a
dedicated textile industry portal, but includes all exporters across mdustnes"
30 A novel feature is the multilingual translator, which English, French, German, Portuguese, Italian and
Spanish speakers (Textiles Unlimited, 2002c:16).
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(Textiles Unlimited, 2002c:16). The export help desk at the Department of Trade
and Industry's Website (www.dti.gov.za/export) also provides assistance and
information to prospective exporters. In the survey by Jafta and Jeetah (2001),
respondents suggested similar initiatives. Apparently, the existence of such
services is not well publicised in the industry; hence the providers need to
market their services more widely.
The South African textile industry has thus faced a multitude of challenges over
the last decade or so, and has responded by employing various strategies from
technology and skills upgrades, restructuring and rattenalising product mixes to
shifting into exports. While there is a core of leading firms that are competitive,
some firms are still en route to achieving competitiveness. In general the
impression is that the industry is now leaner, and better equipped to face the
competition and use the new market opportunities.
4.3.4 THE MAURITIAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY
In the early 1960s, James Meade, Nobel Prize winner for Economics predicted
that Mauritius stood a good chance of being a failure. This judgement was based
on the country's dependence on sugar, its rapid population growth, openness to
terms of trade shocks and potential for ethnic tensions (Subramanian, 2001 :22).
Over the past few decades Mauritius has attracted much attention from
researchers and policy makers because it has, contrary to predictions, developed
from a monocrop, agriculture-based economy to a multi-industry, diversified
economy. The textiles and clothing industries played a crucial role in this
transformation. Our interest here is to outline the salient features of this
success story and then to consider the prospects for the Mauritian textile and
clothing industries in the light of regional developments and the newly opening
export markets.
4.3.4.1 Factors contributing to success in the past
The growth of the textiles and clothing industry in Mauritius was phenomenal, as
reflected in its contribution to GDP, employment and exports. The contribution
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of textiles and clothing to GDPincreased from 25%in 1970 to 33%in 1995, while
employment grew from 9%in 1970 to 35%in 1995. By 1985 the exports of sugar
paled in comparison to the exports coming from the Export Processing Zone
(EPZ). By 1993 EPZexports accounted for 70%of total exports. Textiles and
clothing exports, in turn, made up 78%of EPZexports and 53%of total exports
(DPRU,2002: 3-4). The clothing industry has always been more significant than
the textile industry in size31 and export earnings, aswell asemployment, but the
textile industry is likely to start catching up, given the renewed investment
opportunities in the light of new trade agreements.
The factors contributing to the earlier success of textiles and clothing in
Mauritius were of an endogenous as well as an exogenous nature. The
endogenousfactors can be grouped into two broad categories, namely domestic
investment and domestic policies. We start with investment.
4.3.4.1.1 Domestic investment
Differently from their counterparts in other African countries, the Mauritian
government largely re-invested the proceeds from sugar exports in Mauritius.
The creation of the Export ProcessingZonesencouraged local entrepreneurs to
invest in contrast to the experiences of other countries where the EPZsrelied
heavily on foreign investment. Where local businesses did enter into joint
ventures, these joint ventures between local and foreign investors and strong
linkages between Mauritian and foreign firms contributed to the transfer of
technology and building of the capabilities that made Mauritian firms
internationally competitive.
4.3.4.1.2 Domestic policies
The government's investments in the education and training system led to the
creation of a well educated, bilingual labour force. Proficiency in French gave
31 In 1999 there were about 270 clothing establishments (employing 77 000 people) compared to 48 textile
enterprises with 6 000 employees (DPRU, 2001 :2).
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them an advantage in exporting to France, while English was an advantage in
their dealingswith the UKand other English-speakingnations.
Mauritius further offered very attractive incentives such as low corporate tax
and the option to repatriate funds freely." Investment in good infrastructure
and excellent communication facilities with the outside world benefitted the
business sector, especially in the EPZ.A crucial contribution was made by the
creation of public and private-sector support institutions such as the Mauritius
Export Development and Investment Authority (MEDIA),Mauritius Export Proces-
sing Zone Authority (MEPZA), Export Processing Zone Development Authority
(EPZDA), Industrial and Vocational Training Board (IVTB), and the Small and
Medium Industries Development Organisation (SMIDO) (Jeetah and Coughlin,
2001:5; DPRU,2001:3-4).
4.3.4.1.3 The exogenousfactors
Several factors ensured market access for the Export ProcessingZones. These
factors included historical ties to some of the industrialised countries, such as
France and the UK because of the country's colonial heritage and language
affinity. Mauritius also enjoyed preferential access under trade agreements,
such as the duty-free and quota-free access to the European market, which it
obtained through the LoméConvention.
The favourable export environment was complemented by a number of economic
and political factors. There was, firstly, considerable investment in the early
1970s by industrialists from Hong Kong, who were relocating because of
uncertainties about the future of the British colony upon reversion to China.
32 The EPZ regime in Mauritius offers special provisions for investors. Both EPZ and non-EPZ enterprises
pay 15% corporate tax (as opposed to 25% normal corporate tax); and all manufacturing firms now pay zero
tariffs on raw materials and production equipment. In addition, EPZ firms do not pay sales tax on raw
materials, equipment and spare parts and are also exempt from taxes on dividends and capital gains. Spare
parts purchased after the establishment of the enterprise are exempt from customs duties and sales tax subject
to approval by the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and International Trade. Firms in the EPZ sector also
enjoy a 60% remission of customs duties on buses of 15 to 25 seats used for transporting workers, and a 50%
exemption on registration charges for land purchases. Relief on personal income tax for two expatriate staff
are allowed. All foreign investors are allowed to repatriate profits, dividends and capital freely (Jeetah and
Coughlin, 2001: 11; USAtrade, 2002:5). Contrary to the situation in many other countries, the Mauritian EPZ
is not a geographically limited concept: firms with EPZ certificates may operate anywhere on the island
(USAtrade, 2002:5).
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Falling oil prices and the depreciation of the USdollar after a period of being
overvalued (1983-84) reduced the country's debt servicing costs and eased the
pressure on foreign exchange reserves. A combination of other exchange rate
movements was influential in encouraging Taiwanese businessesto relocate to
Mauritius. The Taiwanese dollar appreciated against Europeancurrencies, which
reduced the competitiveness of Taiwanese exports. In the mean time, the
European currencies appreciated against the Mauritian rupee, making it
attractive to import from Mauritius (OPRU,2001:4).
Thus, a mix of domestic and external factors contributed to the earlier successes
of the textiles and clothing industries in Mauritius. Since the 1990s, however,
the firms in these industries face new domestic and global challenges, as well as
opportunities.
4.3.4.2 New challenges and opportunities
Like SouthAfrica and Italy, Mauritius also faces competition from cheaper textile
imports. By 2005 its preferential access to the EUand other European markets
will be eroded, not least because of the completion of the last phase of the
Agreement on Textiles and Clothing by end of December 2004. In regional
context, textiles from producers in the Common Market for East and Southern
Africa (COMESA)already enter duty-free and under the commitments Mauritius
made to SADC,duties are being reduced gradually. A further challenge is posed
by the decline in fertility and the aging of the population, which reduces the
domestic pool of labour, and raiseswages (USAtrade, 2002:3). Firms are further
confronted with rising input costs, such as electricity (Bharat Textile News,
2001:1-2).
In response to these challenges, Mauritius has adopted several strategies, based
on the government's vision quoted below:
"MauriOus will have to continue to innovate in higher value-added products
where competition is based more on timely delivery and flexibility to supply
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small volume orders and quality rather than price. The successof tnts strategy
depends on the capabj[jty of our [irms to adapt qu;ckly to changes ;n demand
and [asnion, to exploit: niche markets by prov;d;ng quality products of
interrationat standards and to honour delivery schedules." (Statement by
Mauritian government quoted in From down to upmarket, 2003:1).
For textiles and clothing the following strategies are of significance:
• Relocation of production, for example to lower wage countries such as
Madagascarand other African countries;
• Many of the larger companies are now focusing on high value-added
production, emphasising quality and diversifying into new and more
sophisticated markets, with substantial investment in Mauritian brand
names;
• Improvement in quality", education and management standards;
• Technology upgrades;"
• Projects to increase productivity;
• Development of closer ties with customers;
• Establishment of group selling organisations, who market Mauritian
products jointly;
• Joint government and industry studies to plan future directions;
• Searching for complementary industries, such as IT, enhancing the ability
of Mauritian firms to reap the benefits of e-commerce (The Mauritian
Clothing and Textile Industry, 2000:7);
• Integration into the southern African textiles and clothing pipeline to
benefit from market accessopportunities such asAGOA.
A limitation on the ability of Mauritius to benefit from AGOAwas a lack of
spinning capacity (especially for cotton) in the country (Jeetah and Coughlin,
2001:5). An immediate solution was to import fabric for apparel from South
33 The Mauritian Standards Bureau is responsible for certification of companies who comply with the
requirements for the ISO 9000 series on quality. Environmental certification (ISO 14000) is only just taking
off (USAtrade, 2002: 5).
34 The capital to labour ratio in large textile firms in the EPZ has doubled between 1985 and 1998 (USAtrade,
2002:14).
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Africa, also eligible for AGOAbenefits. A longer term solution was to attract
investment into new capacity in the textile industry. This has been happening
since the introduction of AGOA.Vertical integration of textile production in the
SSA has been enhanced by the investment of over US$ 100 million in new
spinning mills in Mauritius. This investment was financed by Chinese, Indian and
Mauritian firms (USTR,2003:24). The Mauritian Board of Investors also approved
proposals for additional plants to be erected for Italian and Indian investors
(USTR,2003:102). Mauritian-based companies have also invested in textiles in
Madagascar,Mozambique and Lesotho, and are considering further investments
in Senegal, Namibia and Uganda (USTR,2002:111). AGOAalso prompted several
USand Asian retailers to open regional buying offices in Mauritius (USTR,2003:
24).
The value of textiles and apparel exports from Mauritius to the USincreased by
eight per cent in 2001, seeing a significant slowdown after the 11th of September
(USTR,2002:111). Total duty-free exports from Mauritius to the USunder AGOA
amounted to US$114million, which make up 41%of total Mauritian exports to
the US. The United States constitutes the largest market for Mauritian apparel
exports (USTR,2003:102).
The Mauritian textile industry thus seems poised to grow out of its relatively
small size to become an important supplier in the regional textile and clothing
pipeline. The underlying supposition is, of course, that the strategies that are in
place are implemented successfully.
4.4 SUMMARYANDPREVIEWOFCHAPTER5
By the beginning of the 1990s it was clear to all concerned that a new
development path for the South African textile industry was urgently needed;
the old ways of protection and focus on the domestic market would no longer
suffice in the new competitive environment. In this chapter we have
concentrated on the restructuring efforts of the textile industries in South
Africa, Italy and Mauritius. Our comparisons have revealed diversity as well as
similarities. The firms in these three countries face similar challenges, differing
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only in degree of severity. However, while South Africa and Mauritius have the
advantage of preferential access to export markets, Italian firms do not have
similar options and face harsher competition in their own market and abroad.
Hence, this is the time for them to employ their strong capabilities to find a new
lease on life outside their traditional markets.
For Mauritius and Italy there seem to be two trains of thought, i.e. to try and
remain competitive in the large volume market by relocating production, and to
create and exploit niche markets, by focusing on quality, design and excellent
delivery performance. These routes are not excluded from the path that the
SouthAfrican textile firms have taken, but in addition the leading firms in South
Africa have started a processof specialisation ('narrow and deep'), which enable
them to improve efficiencies and profit margins. Some Italian firms,
furthermore, have succesfully diversified products and markets. The attitude of
the leading Italian firms, building on their innovative capacity, high level of
plant modernisation, flexibility in organisational structure and a wide-spread
entrepreneurial spirit, strongly contradicts the view that textiles is a traditional,
mature industry, best left to the developing countries.
For all three countries, there is some similarity in the specific strategies
employed, e.g. investment in new technology, upgrading of skills, re-
organisation of work processes, integrating vertically across the supply chain,
renewed focus on quality and delivery performance and customer service.
However, in terms of environmental concerns Mauritius and to a lesser extent
South Africa, lag behind Italy. Further, with respect to worker rights35 and
customer safety, South Africa and Mauritius have not yet begun the certification
process.
A study commissioned by SADC(Coughlin, et al, 2001) recommended a policy
regime similar to that which prevailed in Mauritius for the SouthAfrican textiles
and clothing industries, much to the chagrin of the South African Textile
Federation. The Textile Federation believes that such an approach would benefit
3S Although both South Africa and Mauritius have very worker-friendly labour laws, the issue here is about
social standards in trade.
121
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
only the clothing industry, who would be able to source fabric at world prices
(Mauritian model unsuitable for SA textiles federation, 2002:1-2). While the
textile industry representatives may want to spend their time trying to prevent
increased competition, it seems quite certain that trade liberalisation
(multilateral, bilateral and in regional context) will continue. Firms thus have to
adapt to these circumstances quickly.
Several observers in the industry have emphasised that survival in the modern
textile industry requires creativity, passion and the ability to offer something
which distinguishes a leading firm from the rest. For Italian firms this means
consolidating their strong points, applying them in new settings and continuing
to innovate in terms of products, processesand services. For South African and
Mauritian firms this might mean developing, for example, interesting fabrics,
with an African flair, which might give them an edge in the USand EUmarkets.
In this chapter we have made sporadic references to some institutions that are
involved in the textile industry. Both Chapter 3 and this chapter gave us a
tentative appreciation of the importance of institutions in the change processes
that firms undergo. To explore this theme further, we consider the institutions
that are active in the South African textile industry in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ROLE OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN TEXTILE INDUSTRY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
In chapter 4 we have studied the evolution of the South African textile industry
since its inception until the early 1990s,before the implementation of the GATI
agreement. In the context of the subsequent restructuring processesin textiles,
we have also compared the South African textile industry to the experiences of
the Italian and Mauritian textile industries.
Our analysis in Chapter 3 and 4 pointed to the important role that institutions
play in influencing firms, and eventually contributing to the dynamics of the
industry.
In this chapter, we are interested in the role that various institutions play in the
South African textile industry. We concentrate on the services that these
institutions offer the firms in the textile industry, especially related to
technology. In Chapter 5 we do not deal extensively with training institutions,
but we integrate them into Chapter 6 (becauseit fits better into the structure of
that chapter). This chapter servesas background to Chapter 6 where we enquire
from firms about the significance that these institutions hold for them.
5.2 INSTITUTIONS AND RESTRUCTURING
Meyanathan (1994: 14-15) lists four areas where firms may need institutional
support:
• Funding for R&D, with a focus on applying foreign technologies to local
needs
• Export marketing strategies
• Creating a flexible and technically-skilled labour force with appropriate
management capability
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• Forging strategic alliances with global companies.
In addition, Lall, et al, (1994:175), found that firms in developing countries need
information on a whole range of technology-related issues. Examples include
information on appropriate technology, where and how to negotiate the best
technology transfer deal, as well as information on training and organisation of
production processes.Several institutions, such as public sector agencies aswell
as industry associations, may assist in this regard.
5.3 SELECTEDINSTITUTIONS
The successof government's policies and industry's strategies depends on the
ability to implement them. Effective institutions are necessary to provide the
capacity for implementation. Several institutions are active in the textile
industry, be it as policy formulators or implementers. Here we examine the role
of the most relevant institutions.
5.3.1 Department of Trade and Industry
The Department of Trade and Industry is the most important player in
formulating and implementing trade and industrial policy. It offers and
administers a range of incentives to promote investment and exports. The
package offers incentives to help South African industries, emerging from a
protected past, to adjust to the new competition.
The primary instrument of assistance tailored for the clothing and textile
industries is the Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCS),which was meant to be
a temporary' kick-start to enhance export competitiveness by offering duty
certificates to qualifying exporters.
IFrowned upon by the WTO, this scheme was due to end on 31 March 1998 (DTI, 1997: Il; Havenga, 1996:
7). However, the Minister of Trade and Industry extended it to March 2000 to give the industry more time to
restructure (Erwin extends export initiative, 1997: 3), and then extended it again to 2005. After this period of
'extension, the duty-credit scheme will be scrapped.
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TABLE 5.1: BENEFITSFOR APPROVEDEXPORTS:DUTY CREDITCERTIFICATE
SCHEME(PERCENTAGES)
Cat. 1999/2000 2000/1 & 2001/2 200213 & 2004/5
2003/4
c hh f y c hh f y c hh f Y c hh f y
A 25 17.5 12.5 8 20 15 10 6 15 12 8 5
B 25 17.5 12.5 8 25 17.5 12.5 8 20 15 10 6 15 12 8 5
C 35 23 17 12 30 20 15 10 25 17.5 12.5 8
0 35 23 17 12 30 20 15 10 25 17.5 12.5 8
Note: c = clotMng; hh = household textiles; f = fabrics, y = yarn; Cat.= category.
Source: Claassens(2001)2; Texfed (2001:3).
When local factories export products covered by the scheme, they earn a credit
usable to cover import duties normally payable on textile and clothing products.
To be eligible, each applicant must participate in and achieve targets set by the
Productivity Performance Monitoring Schemeand spend a specified percentage
of its annual wage bill on training. When the DCCSwas extended in 2000, four
categories, with different export, productivity performance and training
imperatives were created. Benefits are related to the different categories (Table
5.1). Category A is aimed at small, micro and medium enterprises, as well as
first-time entrants (who have a choice of category A, B and C). Category B is
meant for registered exporters who export less than 15%of total annual sales,
while category C applies to participants who export 15%or more of their total
annual sales. Category D aims to encourage collaboration in filling big export
orders and offers DCCbenefits to manufacturers who have secured a large order,
which they will complete in partnership with another producer. Participants in
categories A, B, and C must all spend 10%of the value of the DCC in the
following export year on training, and achieve export growth of 10%per annum
(measured in US$). Category D participants do not have to fulfil any additional
requirements beyond the year for which they receive the DCCbenefit. The value
of DCCbenefits increases as participants export more (Table 5.1). Exporters in
category C, for example, receive a larger benefit than exporters in categories A
and B. In sum, the scheme rewards export, productivity and skills development
performance, aswell as collaboration to complete large orders (Texfed, 2001: 3;
DTI, 2003: 9-15).
2 E-mail from Helena Claassens, Textile Federation, 6 December 2000.
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The scheme was successful in stimulating exports. The value of textile and
clothing exports generated under this scheme increased from 30,2%of all textile
and clothing exports in 1995 to 37,8% in 1997 (IOC, 1999: 41). Ironically, the
scheme has also helped to increase penetration of the local market by allowing
duty-free imports of clothing (Flaherty and Salinger, 1998:3). During 1999,
R80319000 worth of clothing was imported under this scheme, while fabric and
yarn imports amounted to R 317 711 000 and R 109 023 000, respectively.!
Between 1999 and 2000, clothing imports under the scheme grew by 61%,
accelerating by 103,7%in 2001. Fabric imports in contrast, declined by 11,05%in
2000, but increased by 51,5%in 2001. Imports of yarn under the DCCSshowed a
steady increase of 53,8%and 49,2%in 2000 and 2001 respectively (Texfed, 2003:
15).
Respondents in the industry have also alleged corruption involving the
embezzlement of Duty Credit Certificates. Though the certificates were non-
negotiable, commentators in the industry asserted in the interviews that 'high-
sea trading' in these certificates is known to occur. Asa result, people who have
never exported use the certificates to import duty free. Since the completion of
the survey, however, the DTI has reviewed the rules regulating the sale of Duty
Credit Certificates. A DCCmay now be sold in full or in part to 'any company,
close corporation, partnership, or sole proprietor that is a registered importer'.
The buyer may not sell the certificate unless approved by the Board on Tariffs
and Trade (DTI, 2003: 24).
Of concern for the further usefulness of this scheme in the improvement of
competitiveness in textiles and clothing, is the finding that the aspects of
manufacturing performance and human resources development have been
neglected in implementing the scheme. An assessmentof the progress audits in
beneficiary firms by the Industrial Restructuring Project (University of Natal)
found that the audit reports did not capture essential information on operational
3 The duty-credit certificates are usually valid for 12 months (not a calendar year), but since the certificates
are often issued very late, its validity is then extended for six months. Since the export period is 1 April to 31
March, certificates for exports in the period 1 April 1999 to 31 March 2000 are valid from 1 April 2000 to 31
March 2001 or, if extended, to 30 September 2001. Because it is not a calendar year, it is difficult to compare
with the normal import and export statistics (Fax from Helena Claassens, 23 February 2001).
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performance of the firms, e.g., measuressuch as inventories, quality (reworks,
defects, scraps and customer returns), delivery reliability and labour
participation. Closer inspection of the scheme's requirements revealed that they
did not compel beneficiaries to reassesstheir strategic operations, especially
regarding supply-chain management (Reid, 199ge: 19-21). Ways to improve
competitiveness that go beyond once-off cost-cutting exercises, such as
retrenchments or closure of plants, require deeper thinking to be applied to
work organisation, the appropriate use of labour and technology, and
supplier/customer relationships. Competitiveness here is not based on price
only, but on quality, reliability, and delivery performance. This is an area in
which some South African textile and clothing firms still fall short. Beneficiaries
surveyed by Reid (199ge: 18) did not see the DCCS'impact on their quality or
other performance, e.g., inventory levels and production lead times. It is thus
imperative that the scheme's components regarding productivity performance
monitoring and human resource development be given priority in the future.
During 1994/95, the National Economic Development and labour Council
(NEDLAC)4commissioned a study to determine the best strategy for attracting
foreign investment into South Africa. The consultants recommended a small but
efficient national investment-promotion agency to be established as an
independent authority (Havenga, 1996:28). During February 1997, Investment
South Africa was launched to coordinate and promote investment activities and
establish an Investment Data Baseas well as an Investor ResourceCentre. In a
recent restructuring exercise at the Department of Trade and Industry,
Investment South Africa was reincorporated under the department and is now
known as Trade and Investment South Africa, responsible for trade and
investment promotion (Investment SouthAfrica, 2000).
Investment incentives under the auspices of the Department of Trade and
Industry include various initiatives. The Support Programme for Industrial
Innovation is designed to promote technology development in manufacturing
industries in South Africa through support for innovation of competitive products
and processes. Assistance takes the form of a grant of 50%of the actual direct
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cost incurred in the pre-competitive development activity, reaching a maximum
of one million Rands per project. The programme is open to all private
manufacturing enterprises (Investment SouthAfrica, 2000).
The Technology and Human Resources for Industry Programme is aimed at
enhancing the competitiveness of South African industry by developing
appropriately skilled people and technology. It further encourages long-term
strategic partnerships between industry, research and educational institutions
and government. The programme is open to research groups in the natural
sciences, engineering, and technology within educational institutions in
collaboration with any private company or consortium of companies.
Government and the private sector contribute to finance research by the
academic partners if that involves the training of students. For every R1that the
private sector spendson this programme, the Department of Trade and Industry
contributes R1 (RSA,1997:14).
A related initiative is the Sectoral Partnership Fund, which supports sub-sector
partnerships to prepare technical and marketing programmes to improve the
competitiveness and productivity of the firms. Such partnerships will typically
include strategies to:
• improve organisation of the workplace;
• upgrade the quality of equipment;
• strengthen design capability; and
• develop initiatives to enhance product quality.
Financing for these programmes comes from the DTI's Sector Partnership Fund
on a cost-sharing basis, i.e. the fund covers 65% and 35% is carried by the
relevant firms. There is a cumulative ceiling of R 1.5 million per partnership
(Havenga, 1996:51; RSA,2000b: 272).
The Small/Medium Enterprise Development Programme consists of four
elements:
4 The council consists of labour, government, and business representatives. It is a forum where all policy
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• an establishment grant payable for three years, calculated at 10.5%of
qualifying assets;
• a profit or output incentive, calculated at 25% of profit before tax,
payable for an additional one year;
• an additional two years' profit or output incentive, provided the
entrepreneur can meet or exceed the human resource remuneration to
value added ratio of 55%measured in the fourth financial year; and
• a foreign investment grant to companies investing in new machinery and
equipment to establish new projects in SouthAfrica.
The Competitiveness Fund was created to encourage South African firms to be
competitive, both as exporters and in defence of their local markets. The
facility is available to all South African private firms of all sizes. Funds are
allocated on a first-come-first-serve basis; and firms must submit a realtstic plan
for the development of their business. The fund supports the introduction of
technical and marketing know-how and expertise in firms. The scheme insists on
a 50%contribution by the firm itself. Grants are paid on a reimbursement basis.
Market access for South African products into foreign countries has improved;
and the onus is now on local firms to improve competitiveness and find suitable
markets for their products. To aid in this process, the government hasan Export
Marketing and Investment Assistance Scheme in place. This scheme complies
fully with WTO regulations; and the Department of Trade and Industry has
recently expanded this programme as part of its comprehensive supply-side
measures. The scheme consists of eight parts, namely, primary export market
research, outward selling trade missions, inward buying trade missions,
exhibition assistance, assistance to specific industrial sectors, outward and
inward investment missions, and foreign direct investment research. The scheme
provides partial financial assistance to all exporters for the above purposes, but
has a specific bias towards micro, small, and medium enterprises (RSA,2000c:
1).
recommendations are negotiated before proposed legislation is presented to parliament.
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South Africa's version of export processing zones is called an industrial
development zone and is currently only in its early implementation phase. The
idea is to create a competitive and efficient 'one-stop' environment for
production for export. The zone offers the usual incentives encompassed in an
export-processing zone," with the major exception that labour regulations will
be the same in the zone as in the rest of the economy. An industrial
development zone may be privately or publicly owned and managed or be a
partnership between government and the private sector.6
The proposed legislation to create such zones was presented to parliament in
December 2000 despite doubts by business and organised labour about the
feasibility of investing in these zones, since neighbouring states offer more
attractive incentives. Trade unions also fear that the zones will add more to the
work load of customs officials who already have their hands full, thus providing
more access points for illegal imports. It is also feared that only existing firms
will relocate to these zones, thus transferring instead of creating jobs (Ludski,
2000: 1).
Research on the success of export processing zones worldwide casts serious
doubts on the feasibility of establishing additional geographical zones. When the
initial zones were established, they were a novel few. Today investors are spoilt
for choice; and local governments must offer exceptional incentives in the hope
of attracting new investment." This often happens at the expense of the larger
domestic economy. A newer approach is not to expect firms to move to a
specified area, but to allocate 'zone status' to firms in their existing locations
(Madani, 1999:64-65).
5 Producers in industrial development zones will get duty-free imports of inputs and raw materials and be
exempt from VAT on supplies procured in South Africa. However, any fmished goods they sell in South
Africa will be deemed imports.
6 The first industrial development zone to be established in South Africa will be around the development of
the deep-water port at Coega, 20 kilometres from Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape. So far the initiative
amounts to government driven investment in infrastructure in the belief that 'if we built it, they [private
investors] will come' (Schmidt and de Jager, 2001 :3).
7 In 1996, there were already 500 zones located in 73 countries (Madani, 1999:5).
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5.3.2 Industrial Development Corporation
The Industrial Development Corporation (IOC), a state-owned institution created
to provide finance with the aim of promoting sustainable economic growth via
industrial development, has a long history with the textile industry. It was the
IOC, for example, who was responsible for establishing the first factory to
produce worsted woollen piece goods in 1946. During 1946/47 the IOCtogether
with a British firm started the Good Hope Textile factory for cotton textiles in
KingWilliams Town (Franzsenand Reynders,1960:274-276).
Today the IOCoffers diverse financial assistance to clothing and textile firms.
The IOC makes general-purpose factory buildings available for leasing in
decentralised areas." The normal lease period is for four years with an option to
renew. Rentals are competitive and rental subsidies are available from the
Decentralisation Board (Clofed, 2000: 114). Finance under the multi-shift
scheme offers industrialists a chance to expand operations with an additional
eight-hour shift. The Venture Capital Scheme is aimed at stimulating the
development of new products by existing firms or the establishment of new
ventures for products with good growth potential. The Economic Empowerment
Scheme assistsentrepreneurs from the historically disadvantaged communities.
Manufacturing businessesusually require owners to fund at least 33%to 40%of
the total investment to ensure long-term viability. The scheme provides for a
reduced contribution by firms while the IOC provides a larger than normal
contribution. Normal finance is available to small and medium-sized
industrialists and has been designed to assist them in the early growth phase.
The IDC's import finance scheme provides credit and guarantee facilities for
the importation of capital goods and services to enable industrialists to utilise
capital for more productive purposesand to increase their borrowing powers and
cash flow. The IOChas targeted the textile and clothing sectors in SADCas one
of its most important areas for investment over the next few years. One regional
project already on stream is a large cotton growing and ginning project in the
8 This measure is aimed at encouraging new ventures in decentralised areas such as Atlantis, East London,
Berlin, Bloemfontein, Bronkhorstspruit, George, Richards Bay, Newcastle, Pietermaritzburg, and
Queenstown (Clofed, 2000: 114).
132
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
northern province of Cabo Delgado in Mozambique. This will double
Mozambique's current cotton production and contribute to developing a
significant cotton pipeline in the SADCregion. The IDCallocated R180million in
funding to textile and clothing ventures in the SADCregion between July 2000
and June 2001.9 It also predicts that the banking sector will be more favourably
disposed towards these industries in the light of new growth prospects (Lace,
2000).
5.3.3 Textile Division of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
Textek (now the Centre for Fibres, Textiles, and Clothing at the Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research) sees itself as the industry's technology
partner and aims to promote the growth and global competitiveness of the
textile pipeline. It pursues this objective by keeping abreast of technological
developments globally and by acquiring or developing technologies. Textek
serves the textiles and clothing sectors of Southern Africa. Its clients include
producers, processors, manufacturers, end-users, the public sector, non-
government agencies, and their funding agencies.
The division specialises in the acquisition and dissemination of information
relevant to its areas of operation, e.g., technologies, plant and animal fibre
development, small business development, and training needs and trends.
Textek also provides on-line industry information as well as industry-wide
studies. Together with the Department of Trade and Industry, Textek has
developed two new websites aimed at providing a textile information hub in
southern Africa, namely www.texweb.org and www.timssa.co.za, the details of
which were discussedin Chapter 4.
The division's most important task concerns technology. In this regard, Textek is
involved in the development of advanced technologies such as natural-fibre R &
D and beneficiation, textile machines and instruments, breathable lamination
9 The IDC already is involved in Botswana textiles and Mueda Cotton in Mozambique. Further investment
depends on opportunities and feasibility (Interview with David Holloway, senior account manager for
textiles, clothing, leather and footwear at IDC, Johannesburg, 14 November 2000).
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technology." and wet and dry processingtechnologies for yarn and fibre. Textek
also develops and adapts technologies for use in the informal sector. For
example, since enterprises in the informal sector often have a problem with
accessto electricity, Textek developed a pedal-powered weaving loom.
Textek is active in a variety of networks, locally and internationally. Such
involvement revolves primarily around development and transfer of technology,
training and small businesspromotion. Examples in South Africa include its links
to the South African Bureau of Standards, the Agricultural ResearchCouncil, the
Fibre Boards, and the Black Management Forum. International links include its
associate membership in the EuropeanTextile Technology Transfer Network, the
British Technology group, and the DanishTechnological Institute. Through these
networks, Textek acquires information and technology and establishes useful
contacts on behalf of its clients.
Textek also offers consultation services regarding needs identification and model
development for the establishment of community enterprises. Some examples
include the Community Self-employment Centre in Port Elizabeth and the
Manufacturing Advisory Centres.
5.3.4 Industrial Institutions
The Textile Federation and the Clothing Federation are the main representative
bodies for the textile and clothing industries. Both federations participate fully
in policy debates and platforms such as the Textiles and Clothing Sector Summit.
Their contributions include inputs on exports, marketing, industrial relations,
trade policy, education, training, technology, and productivity. The industry
associations disseminate information to their members, government, trade
unions, and other parties.
The Textile Federation has recently amended its constitution to extend
membership to suppliers in the pipeline. The reason behind this move was to
10 Textek developed an advanced technology of laminating microporouslhydrophile membranes onto textile
fabrics producing a waterproof but breathable fabric. The fabric is impermeable to blood and body fluids and
has many medical applications (Interview at Textek, Port Elizabeth, April 1999).
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strengthen its support base and to create a forum for discussion with other
sectors in the textile pipeline (Open invitation to all Textile Machinery Agents
and Chemical and Dyestuff Suppliers, 2003:13). The Clothing Federation (Clofed)
in a bid to broaden its horizons has changed its name to Clotrade to reflect its
commitment to export growth in the industry. It now aims at much closer
cooperation with the export councils (Bharat Textile News, 2002:1-2). The South
African Textile Industry Export Council and the South African Clothing Industry
Export Council were created as part of the strategy to promote exports. Though
private sector driven, the councils work closely with government agencies and
the SouthAfrican Clothing and Textile Workers Union.
5.3.5 South African Bureau of Standards
The South African Bureau of Standards (SABS)offers a variety of services to the
clothing and textiles sectors. These services include preparing buyer
specifications, analysis and testing services, as well as training. In addition, the
SABSoperates a product accreditation scheme under which manufacturers may
use the SABScertification mark on their products. This mark indicates to the
purchaser that the article bought has been manufactured to comply with the
relevant standard specification under conditions complying with an appropriate
quality system. The SABSalso operates a Listing Scheme introduced to assess
manufacturers' quality systems. Companies achieve listing status by complying
with all the elements of the Code of Practice for 'Quality Systems' (SABSISO
9002), which is equivalent to the International Standards Organisation's 9000
series. The SABSis also responsible for the ISO14000series certification.
A consignment inspection service for local and imported goods is offered
anywhere in South Africa and in certain southern African countries. Textiles are
examined for their appearance and suitability for use and are tested for
performance parameters from the relevant specifications. Clothing is similarly
tested for compliance with the requirements of appropriate specifications
(Clofed, 2000: 116).
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With this expertise, the SABSbelieves" it is well placed to assist prospective
exporters to ensure compliance with the quality and rules of origin requirements
under AGOAas well as the SA-EUagreement. Apart from promoting quality in
the industry, the bureau can contribute by:
• doing inspections in South African factories against buyer specifications
on behalf of American buyers, obviating the need for American inspectors
to travel here regularly; 12 and
• assistingCustomsand Excise in enforcing the rules of origin requirements
at SouthAfrican ports of entry.
Some respondents in this study, however, suggest that the SABSis still seen by
many prospective clients as merely the organisation that tests consignments for
government procurement (which it did under the previous government). The
organisation has been restructured and has become partially commercialised but
will have to embark on a campaign to promote the new image that it wishes to
establish. The SABSwill also have to make a concerted effort to convince
members of the textile industry and their customers of the expertise that they
believe they can offer.
5.3.6 South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU)
The South African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU)faced an uphill
battle for recognition in the adversarial atmosphere prevailing in the South
African labour market during the 1980s13. While the union was initially dead set
against liberalisation of the textile and clothing industry, it has gradually
accepted the need for restructuring. SACTWUparticipated in the activities of
the Swart Commission, tasked with developing a long-term survival plan for the
textile and clothing industries. It was also instrumental in bringing to fruition the
Textiles and Clothing Sector summit in 2000, from which emerged the beginnings
11 Interview at the Textile, Clothing and Leather Division of the SABS, 24 November 2000.
12The bureau already does inspections on behalf of a large American firm and is in the process of developing
further agreements. The bureau is aligning South African standards to SADC and international standards,
allowing local exporters to design and test their products here, in compliance with world standards (Interview
at South African Bureau of Standards, 13 November 2000).
13 Details are recounted in the firm-level case studies in Chapter 7.
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of an industry survival plan (Textiles and Clothing Sector Summit Document,
2000). The trade union has a very firm commitment to skills development in the
industry. The union believes that worker morale and commitment would
increase if they knew that there was a possibility of career development for
them, i.e. that a blue collar job is not the end of the line, but the beginning
(Maree, 1995:125and Textiles and Clothing Sector Summit Document, 2000).
In a major commitment to education and training, the SACTWUlaunched an RB
million education trust in 1997. This enables the children of textile workers to
attend universities, technikons, and colleges. Some observers believe that this
marked an important shift from the union's struggle modus operand; to being a
responsible partner in the development of the industry (Argus Correspondent,
1997:1).
5.3.7 Cleaner Production Institutions
Apart from the ISO 14000 certification by the SABS, at least three other
initiatives aimed at cleaner textile production are worth mentioning. Out of
these initiatives arose institutions that could play a major role in the South
African textile industry in future.
The first initiative is the Cleaner Textile Production Project, supported by the
Danish Co-operation for Environment and Development (DANCED).The project
was launched in South Africa in July 2000 and aims to reduce the negative
environmental impact of the cotton-growing sector. The approach is
preventative, rather than focusing on end of pipe treatment of waste. The
project covers cotton growing and all stages of textile manufacturing (Textiles
Unlimited, 2001a: 12). The Cleaner Production options include saving water,
electricity, chemical inputs, and effluent discharge. An important component is
the transfer of knowledge for local capacity building, and to create awarenessof
environmental problems and the possibilities for solving them through Cleaner
Production (before legislation compels firms to do so).
137
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Out of this initiative grew the creation of the Textile Knowledge/Linkage Centre,
which will support the textile, clothing, and retail pipeline with a wide range of
Cleaner Production services. The efforts of this project are now being combined
with another Cleaner Production initiative-the National Cleaner Production
Centre (NCPC)14,supported by UNIDO.The joint operation will last three years,
where after it will be reviewed. Care will be taken that the two centres co-
ordinate their activities to best serve the needs of the industry (Cleaner Textile
Production Project SA,2003:12-13).
The third initiative is the Waste Minimisation Club Project at the University of
Natal, Durban. Waste Minimisation Clubs are groups of industries cooperating to
reduce their environmental impact, and in so doing improving the efficiency of
their businesses. A good example is the Hammersdale Club, established in
Kwazulu-Natal in 1998. Initially, it was aimed at textile firms only, but
eventually all the firms in the area elected to participate, including a chemical
manufacturer and a chicken abattoir (CommonGoal, 2000: 1-2). One of the most
important contributions of the project is waste minimisation training. During
2001 and 2002, 20 organisations and 45 individuals benefited from participation
in training. The total savings reported by the participants amounted to about
R8.3 million per year. The biggest saving was on chemicals (40%), followed by
water (20%) and energy (18%). The rest came from input materials, consumables
and solid waste (Companies benefit from training in waste minimisation, 2003:
6).
This pro-active approach to environmental concerns could stand South African
textile firms in good stead versus their competitors from other developing
countries - so far only the richest developed countries, especially in Europe
have really extensively incorporated Cleaner Production into their industrial
production systems (Danes share cleaner production techniques with Southern
Africa, 2002).
14 This was a commitment signed at the Summit on Sustainable Development in September 2002 (Cleaner
Textile Production Project SA, 2003:12-13).
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5.4 ASSESSMENTOF INSTITUTIONS
So far in this chapter we have considered the services offered by the various
institutions that are operating in the South African textile industry. Several of
the institutions are responsible for implementing incentives financed by public
money. It is evident that sufficient incentives are in place to cater for the needs
of textile and clothing firms looking to acquire new technology and improve
work organisation, quality, and skills; the question arises why these incentives
are not used much by their intended beneficiaries. One explanation is that the
removal of protective barriers and the implementation of the measures to help
firms adjust did not take place in tandem. The latter lagged behind the former.
This is partially attributed to lack of capacity in government institutions
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 1999: 731). Almost every government institution has gone
through restructuring" in the last five years or so, leading to a lack of continuity
and coherence in policy formulation and implementation. Institutions also
suffered a high turnover of staff, which our interviewees believed slows
collaborative work in the industry while new appointees learn the ropes. A need
for better training and motivation of government officials in trade and
investment promotion agencies as well as officials dealing with the
implementation of incentives was also articulated. Industry commentators also
mentioned the fragmented nature of the implementation process, i.e., the large
number of institutions that a business has to involve to access the incentives
offered. This calls for better coordination amongst institutions and concerted
efforts to educate the intended beneficiaries about the services and incentives
available, for example, the benefits offered by the performance-monitoring
schemeof the duty-credit certificate programme.
Government's incentive schemes have not been sustainable and consistent; and
capacity problems have impeded their smooth tmplementatton." In addition,
15 The continuous restructuring at the DTI drew fierce criticism from trade unions, which cited many
problems in service delivery (Waduia, 2000: 1-2).
16 For example, the General Export Incentive Scheme was supposed to run until the end of 1997, but, by June
1997, government informed industry participants that it would end in July due to a lack of funds. The
government's tax holiday scheme for new investors announced in 1996 was discontinued in September 1999.
The Minister of Finance prefers to lower all taxes as an incentive rather than granting specific exemptions
that complicate the tax structure (RSA, 2000: 267). However, President Mbeki, in his interview with the
Financial Times on 26 November 2000, hinted at new tax breaks to be introduced by the Department of
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firms say that they would rather have less variety and more certainty regarding
investment and trade promotion incentives.
5.5 SUMMARYAND PREVIEWOF CHAPTER 6
In this chapter we have considered the role of the various institutions that are
active in the South African textile industry. These institutions range from
government departments and bodies, such as the Department of Trade and
Industry, the Industrial Development Corporation and the South African Bureau
of Standards, to industry associations, and non-governmental initiatives. The
incentives and services on offer include both general (also available to other
sectors) and sector-specific assistance. On the whole, it seems that sufficient
assistance is in place, but that intended beneficiaries do not take up these offers
on a significant scale. In this chapter we have highlighted some reasons for the
scant use of incentives and services. In short, it comes down to the need to build
better competencies, especially in government institutions, better marketing of
services, better coordination of operations amongst institutions and taking care
to provide consistent and sustainable incentives. Otherwise, policy initiatives
intended to help firms add to the uncertainty in their competitive environment
and raise their transactions costs, e.g. by having to consult a large number of
institutions to benefit from incentives.
In Chapter 6 we explore the issues around the links between firms and
institutions further. We move on to firm-level analysis and focus on the process
of acquisition and implementation of new technology in South African textile
firms. We also consider the consequencesof this process and enquire about the
significance of these institutions from the firms' point of view.
Trade and Industry. These conflicting messages create unnecessary uncertainty for businesses and undermine
the credibility of government's incentive schemes.
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CHAPTER 6
NEW TECHNOLOGY, ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE, AND FIRM LEVEL
PERFORMANCE
6.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 2, we have defined firms as "behavioural entities, characterised by
specific competences, largely embodied in their routines, and evolving over
time, partly as the outcome of their internal learning and partly as a response
to environmental changes." (Dosiand Malerba, 1996: 4).
In Chapter 3 we have shown that the regional or national differences observed in
the global textile industry can in part be explained by the behavioural choices of
firms in these countries. When looking closely at these 'choices', the role of
firm-level strategies, routines (old and new), learning capabilities and responses
to the changing environment (to name but a few), enter prominently into the
discussion.While we have maintained an industry-level perspective in Chapters 4
and 5, this chapter is firmly focused on firm-level analysis. Our purpose in this
chapter is to gain a richer and deeper insight into the strategic and other
decision processes in South African textile firms in the context of a rapidly
changing competitive environment." Of particular interest is the decision to
invest in new technology, the process of acquisition and implementation, the
implication for other strategies, organisational processes, routines and
competences at all levels of the firm. The impact on its relationship with
suppliers, customers and other institutions in the pipeline and in broader
context, is also considered. We proceed as follows. To investigate these research
interests, we have to ask a series of questions in a few broad categories:
• Given that the firms invested in new technology, we are asking: how
much?Why?How?What was the nature of the new technology?What did
it offer and what did it require in order to be used successfully?
• What was the outcome of the strategy to invest in new technology for
the firms in the sample?
I This environment includes various government policy changes, rapidly changing macroeconomic
conditions, increasing legal and illegal textile imports and changing customer demands.
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• How can this outcome be explained?
• Can distinct categories of firms be discerned, which will inform further
research in the form of case histories?
In Section 6.2 we report on the research methodology employed. Section 6.3
describes the general characteristics of the respondents. From 6.4 onwards we
proceed as follows. For every broad section of the questionnaire we first discuss
our expectations, based on the theoretical and empirical literature. This is
followed by a presentation and discussionof the results of this research project.
6.2 RESEARCHMETHODOLOGY
The means to seek the answers to the questions raised above were primarily a
postal questionnaire survey, factory visits and interviews with role players in
various institutions in the industry. The latter included interviews with clients of
the textile firms. Secondarysourcesof information were also consulted.
6.2.1 The sample
The initial part of the study was done by means of a postal questionnaire
(including a self-addressed, stamped envelope) sent out to 273 textile firms in
South Africa.2 The sample was purely a convenience sample in the sensethat no
attempt at random sampling could be made, since the primary requirement was
that the firm should have invested in new technology in the period under review
- 1994 to 1999. The year 1994was chosen because it is the last year before the
scaling down of protective import tariffs in terms of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT agreement took effect (September 1995). The year 1999 is significant
simply because it is the latest year for which data was expected to be available.
The list of firms for the study was compiled after a series of interviews
conducted with role players in the industry (the results of these interviews are
discussedseparately in a section on the role of institutions in the industry). The
list was put together from a list of firms (including members and non-members)
provided by the South African Textile Federation, a directory of textile firms
2 The questionnaire survey was done between February and April 2000.
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(Kompass) and suggestions by a consultant who is very well acquainted with
conditions in the industry. The second part of the empirical study entailed
factory visits and interviews at eight textile firms.' Six clothing firms were also
visited. The interviews lasted for two hours (on average) and were followed by
factory visits, allowing opportunities for further questions and discussion.
Interviews were conducted with senior management, including the managing
director, financial director, marketing manager, production manager, and at
some firms, the human resources manager. The fieldwork for this part of the
study was done during November 2000. The information gained from the
interviews and factory visits are used here to supplement the questionnaire
survey data.
6.2.2 The questionnaire
The questionnaire includes 34 structured questions, spread over four sections
(seeAppendix 6.1).
The first section of the questionnaire (Section A) covers general attributes of the
firms. Section B focuseson the new technology, more particularly, the nature of
the new technology, the reasonsfor acquiring new technology and the processof
sourcing and implementing the technology. Section C is devoted to
organisational matters, including the effect of the new technology on work
process organisation, the use of human resources, training, as well as internal
and external networks. Section Ddeals with the results of the new technology in
terms of the firms' original objectives and certain performance criteria.
6.2.3 Response
During discussionswith industry experts, such as the Textile Federation, it was
learned that the response rates for questionnaire surveys are notoriously low. It
has been established by prior researchers that one is indeed fortunate to obtain
3 The factory visits were made possible as part of a larger study on the Textile and Garment industries in Il
of the member countries of the Southern African Development Community.
Permission to use raw data from the interviews was obtained from Mr. L A Darga, Project Leader,
Straconsult, Mauritius.
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a 20%response rate to a postal survey in the South African textile industry. This
was confirmed in the current study, which did not obtain the hoped-for response
rate of 20%.
TABLE6.1: QUESTIONNAIRESURVEYRESPONSES
Return to Not in Not prepared Not
sender textiles to give Completed accounted Total
(post box anymore confidential for
closed) information
38 21 12 20 182 273
Thirty-eight envelopes were returned unopened, while 21 respondents wrote or
telephoned to inform us that they were no longer in textiles. Twelve firms were
not prepared to give the required information at all (Table 6.1). During the
follow-up period, some firms indicated that they have not received the
questionnaire, in which case it was faxed to the specific person that we have
communicated with. After two and a half months of pursuit, twenty completed
and usable questionnaires were received.
Although the response rate was not adequate to allow for any statistical
inferences to be drawn, the process has been useful in several regards. The
completed questionnaires, as well as our experience in the follow-up telephone
conversations, allow us to:
• Use the information gained from the questionnaires to select the firms
for further in depth analysis by meansof case studies;
• Identify patterns that might be further investigated by linking the
questionnaire content to the interviews with industry institutions and
insights gained from other sources;
• Identify research questions that fall outside the scope of this thesis, but
nevertheless need to be investigated further.
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6.3 GENERALCHARACTERISTICSOF RESPONDENTS
6.3.1 Age structure
The youngest firm to respond has only been in existence for one year while the
oldest was already in businessfor 53 years. The average age of the respondents
was 27 years, but there were four firms older than 50 years, someof which have
changed ownership over the years. Only five firms were younger than 10years.
6.3.2 Size distribution
Firm size in terms of employment (1999) ranged from only seven employees to
600, while the largest proportion of firms (45%)employed between 101 and 250
employees (Figure 6.1). Only 5%of firms fell in the very small category, i.e. with
less than 10 employees. Turnover (1999) ranged from R2million to R244million,
while the average turnover amounted to R68, 28 million. The largest proportion
of firms (35%) had an annual turnover between R11 million and R50 million,
while the next largest category (25%)was the firms with a turnover between R51
million and R100million per annum (Figure 6.2). Two firms did not specify their
turnover.
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FIGURE 6.1: SIZEOF FIRMS IN SAMPLE BY EMPLOYMENT (N=20)
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FIGURE 6.2: SIZEOF FIRMS IN SAMPLE BY TURNOVER 1999 (N=18)
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6.3.3 Export orientation, regional location, and ownership structure
Fourteen of the respondents were exporters in 1999, while 5 did not export at
all and one omitted the information. Sevenof the respondents had no exports in
1994, so they must have started their exporting activities since then. Although
the number of exporters has doubled between 1994 and 1999, most exporters
export only a very small percentage of their turnover (Table 6.2). However, two
exporters exported very large percentages of their exports (71 and 77%
respectively). These are fairly large firms in terms of annual turnover and
employment.
TABLE6.2: EXPORTSASPERCENTAGEOFTURNOVER(Number of firms)
Category 1994 1999
Lessthan 10% 3 6
10-19% 1 1
20-29% 1 4
30%and more 2 3
Total exporters 7 14
The respondents are located in the four provinces of SouthAfrica that are known
for their textile production activities. Three respondents are from Gauteng,
South Africa's richest province in terms of GrossGeographic Product. Six firms
from the Western Cape, South Africa's second richest province responded to the
questionnaire. Eight responsescame from Kwazulu-Natal province, while three
firms from the EasternCape responded.
As far as ownership structure is concerned, half of the respondents are purely
South African firms. Three firms have indicated that South African and Italian
interests jointly own them, while 5 firms share their ownership with German and
South African investors. South Africans and Americans jointly own the other two
respondent firms (Table A6.1. in Appendix 6.2).
6.4 NEWTECHNOLOGY
The primary focus of this study is the implementation of new technology in a
mature industry, i.e. the South African textile industry. Implementation in its
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general usage means to 'carry a contract, decision, policy or plan into effect'
(Pocket Oxford Dictionary, 1983:432).With respect to new technology this would
conceivably include 'the acquisition of new equipment together with
consumables; the undertaking of associated construction work - increasing floor
loading, installing or upgrading services; the design of new or improved
products, the development of new services; equipment installation,
consultation, training, cost control, pilot production and testing, advertising,
commissioning and handover.' (Rhodes& Wield, 1994:x). From a processanalysis
perspective, however, it is necessaryto firstly pay attention to how the decision
or policy being implemented came into being. It is possible that errors or
omissionsduring this decision making stage could cause and compound problems
in the implementation (in the narrow sense) stage. For example, if crucial
players in the active implementation process were left out of the decision
making process it may be hard to win their commitment later. Secondly, it is
also possible that it might become evident after the active implementation stage
that adaptations to the technology or organisational process could yield further
benefits. Broadening the focus of implementation to include a 'before, during
and after' perspective thus allows for a more continuous and dynamic learning
which could be useful in future projects. In this study, the questionnaire sought
to include these aspectsand the casestudies will continue this line of thinking.
6.4.1 The nature of the new technology
In Chapter 3 we have seen how the market for textiles and clothing has become
ever more fragmented, with diverse preferences on the demand side requiring
individually styled and differentiated products at affordable prices. This, and
other factors, such as increased labour costs in developed countries, have put
pressure on firms to become more flexible in production, i.e. to switch from
reliance on mostly high-volume, standardised products and processes to a
mixture of one-off, batch and high-volume production for different market
segments. The introduction of a number of enabling technologies and
organisational changeshas had a remarkable effect on how firms go about their
business in manufacturing in general, and in textiles in particular. Computer
hardware and software developments are central to these changes. The next
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section and Figure 6.3 are intended to show the role of these technologies from
design to production, marketing and distribution of products.
6.4.1.1 Unk;ng all spheres of manutacturing: From CAD to CAM to CIM
Computer aided design (CAD)involves the use of computer hardware and design
software to model new textile ideas in 2 or 3 dimensional images on the
computer screen. It enables firms to transmit designs to clients, to receive
feedback and to compress a number of the original design processes.Computer
aided manufacturing (CAM) involves the use of computer systems to control
manufacturing equipment, making it easier and quicker to produce cost-
effective one-off, batch produced and high-volume textile products. Computer
integrated manufacturing (CIM) systems integrate the use of all the different
functions of computers, including CAD/CAM,to enable fast, efficient and cost-
effective textile manufacturing. CIM enables concurrent design and
manufacturing, making use of Information and Communications technology and
product data management systems, including Electronic data interchange (EDI)
and electronic point of sale (EPOS)data transmission (Cresswell, 1998:14-19).
As can be seen from Figure 6.3, information flows between the various design,
production and marketing stations of the firm, but also between the firm and
suppliers aswell as clients.
The transmission of more accurate and timely information through the whole
organisation helps to alleviate one element of bounded rationality discussed in
Chapter 2, i.e. the lack of sufficient information to make "optimal" decisions.
However, this still leaves the second element, the ability of the information
recipient to internalise this information and turn it into useful knowledge,
unresolved. The latter depends on a host of factors, for example the extant
knowledge and experience of the recipient of the information, the learning
routines and culture of the organisation, etc. The question of learning
capabilities is taken up again in the section on training.
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Management and industrial organisational literature and practice have spawned
a bewildering plethora of strategic concepts relating to these technologies, for
example Total Quality Management (TQM), Quick Response (QR), Just in time
(JIT) production and Continuous Improvement (Cl). For our purposes we will deal
with these concepts only in as far as they are relevant to technological and
organisational change in textiles.
FIGURE 6.3: COMPUTER INTEGRATED MANUFACTURING IN A TEXTILE
FIRM - A SIMPLE ILLUSTRATION
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6.4.1.2 Benefits expected from CIM technologies
According to Kaplinsky (1982, cited in Senker, 1984) it is impossible for users to
calculate the exact benefits likely to arise from the use of CAD(or CAM/CIMfor
that matter), because the available benefits depend on the organisational
context in which it is applied; and since gaining the full benefits depends to a
large extent on reorganisation, it is impossible to forecast the future efficiency
of a yet-to-be organised process (Rhodesand Wield, 1994:339). Nevertheless,
from studies of systemsalready implemented, a list of potential benefits can be
identified (Bessantand Haywood, 1988).
Expected benefits include economies of scope, deriving from the ability of firms
to produce a wider range of products more efficiently as well as economies of
time. The latter derives from improvements in delivery times and the advantage
of receiving real time information from the market, allowing changes in designs
to be made or production of products that sell well to be increased. This is
particularly important in the seasonal and fashion end of the textiles and
clothing market. Having better information on customers' needs, allows for a
reduction in working capital tied up in stocks of raw material, work in progress
and finished goods. Further advantages include improvements in quality, better
machine utilisation, a reduction in rejects and reworks, increased levels of
productivity and competitiveness. Noneof these advantages, however, will arise
automatically upon purchaseof the relevant hardware and software.
6.4.2 Investment in new technology by sample firms: how much, why and
how?
Firms were asked to indicate how much they have invested in new technology
during the period 1994 - 1999. The sub-sectors for investment included Fibre
preparation, Non-wovens, Spinning, Weaving, Knitting, Auxiliary Equipment and
DyeingAnd Finishing. Table 6.3 indicates the breakdown of investment spending
in these sub-sectors.
One respondent did not supply the amounts invested in new technology. From
the table it can be seen that the largest share of the investment went to Dyeing
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and Finishing, closely followed by Weaving and Spinning. The total amount
invested for the 19 respondents add up to R123.9 million. Total capital
investment in the South African textile industry between 1994 and 1998 was
estimated to be R4billion (DeVoest, 2000: personal interview).
Respondentswere asked to indicate whether their investment in new technology
incorporated one or more of CAD, CAM, CNC and CIM. The purpose of this
question was to identify a generic group of technologies that would make
comparison possible. These technologies are usually (partially or wholly)
embodied in textile machinery supplied under different brand names.
Respondentswere also asked to indicate on a 5 point Likert scale to what extent
they were using the above mentioned technologies (1=not at all, 2=slightly,
3=moderately, 4=significantly and 5=fully).
TABLE 6.3: SUMOF INVESTMENTIN NEWTECHNOLOGYBY SAMPLEFIRMS:
1994-1999 (Millions of Rand)
Type of Machinery Millions of Rand
Fibre preparation
Non-woven
Spinning
Weaving
Knitting
Auxiliary Equipment
Dyeing and Finishing
TOTAL
17,6
16,3
53,5
59,5
18
12,5
62,5
123,9
Of the different technology components, CADwas on average most extensively
used, followed by CAM and CIM. However, as the relatively high standard
deviations indicate, there was large variation amongst firms (Table 6.4). In fact,
there were firms that had invested in these technologies and did not use them
even moderately, while others utilised them fully.
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TABLE 6.4: EXTENT OF USEOF TECHNOLOGY
Technology Mean Standard Median Mode Number of
Deviation responses
CAD 2.94 1.58 3 1 12
CAM 2.75 1.61 3 1 10
CIM 2.62 1.54 2.5 1 10
CNC 2.43 1.63 2 1 8
Note: 1=not at all, 2=slightly, 3=moderately, 4=significantly and 5=fully.
Respondentswere asked to rate their reasonsfor investing in new technology in
terms of their importance to the firm. A five point Likert scale was used, where
1=insignificant and 5=crucial.
FIGURE 6.4: REASONSFOR INVESTMENT IN NEW TECHNOLOGy4
reduce delivery times maintain market share
become more competitive
To become more competitive was the most important reason for investment in
new technology (Figure 6.4). Competitiveness has become an ubiquitous term,
used in reference to nations, sectors, as well as individual firms. Following
Salinger, et al (1999:11) we define competitiveness as tt what ...firms enjoy when
they understand how to combine the process of efficient resource
transformation with strategic thinking on product design, firm organisation, firm
linkages to suppliers and customers, inventory management, marketing, etc."
This relatively high level of importance attached to becoming competitive is in
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contrast with the findings of the Innovation Survey for South Africa (1996),
where improving quality and reducing delivery times were rated more important
than becoming more competitive.
To improve quality was rated slightly more important than finding new markets,
maintaining market share and reducing costs. It is interesting to note in this
regard that one of the best-known advantages of the technologies under
discussion is its contribution to reduce delivery times. Yet, respondents had
given it a relatively low priority as a reason for the investment in new
technology. Respondingto competitors was rated the least important. Although
import competition is regularly cited (for example, in our interviews or in the
press) as a severe threat to local textile firms, this was not seen as a compelling
reason for investment in new technology.
It would seem then that the priorities of the respondents more or less conform
to the priorities of the 'new competition' identified in the literature: quality,
time, costs, but not to the flexibility priority [Seefor example, Best (1990)].
6.4.2.1 The process of technology acquisition
We have indicated earlier in this chapter that it is imperative that all the role
players that are necessary to make the implementation process a success, be
involved from the beginning. For this reason, the respondentswere requested to
indicate who was significant (on a 5 point Likert scale, where 1=insignificant and
5=crucial) in:
• the decision to acquire the new technology
• sourcing of the new technology
• implementing the new technology
• providing information about the new technology
In the decision to acquire the new technology, the General Manager/ Managing
Director, the Board of Directors, the Marketing Manager, and the Production
4 Average rating for each reason shown by darker line.
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Manager were identified as the most important role players (Table 6.5). This
confirms two observations from the literature, namely:
1. that top management, specifically the Board of directors, be intimately
involved in the process,and
2. that there be closer co-operation and co-ordination between the
marketing and production functions.
However, the requirement for successful implementation, i.e. that all role
players be involved from the beginning, is not satisfied. With the exception of
consultants (who are usually an external partner), the role players rated least
important, all relate to labour (Table 6.5).
Trade union representatives, workers in general and work place forums were all
rated below two (slightly significant). Note that the standard deviation is
relatively low, suggesting general agreement in this field. It must be borne in
mind that textiles is a highly unionised industry in South Africa and labour
relations law prescribes that management should collaborate with workers when
deciding on investment in new technology. Labour legislation in SouthAfrica also
requires firms to establish work place forums, consisting of worker (not
necessarily trade union members) and management representatives. The main
purpose of work place forums is to facilitate communication and consultation
and to involve workers in day-to-day management issues. This has never been a
popular intttattve'' and this view is supported by the rating given to work place
forums (Table 6.5). Five firms omitted the information, which probably means
that work place forums are not yet in place in those firms.
Since these technologies may fundamentally affect or alter the work process,
the nature of work and the use of labour, one would have expected the Human
ResourcesManager to be an important role player in the decision to acquire
these technologies. However, the results indicate just the opposite: the HR
manager was rated the least important (1.31 on average). One explanation
5 Employers believe it dilutes management's decision-making prerogative and Cosatu, the trade union
Federation fears that it would weaken their power base (Mittner, 1998: 39).
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might be that if the technology were of such a complex technical nature that
the HR Managers might not reasonably be expected to have a detailed
knowledge of the new technology, they would not be closely involved with the
decision process to acquire it. For example, in the aviation industry the HR
Managerdoes not require an in depth knowledge of avionics. However, this does
not tally with the notion that the use of ICT requires an integrated, systemic
approach to all management functions in order to reap the best results. In fact
the results on the significance of both labour in general and the HRManager,
contrast sharply with the perspectives underlying modern management
practices, where
"Employee involvement is becoming an intrinsic part of the way
organisations are functioning, primarily for the benefits to be accrued
from employees' inputs to process inputs and design." (Drew, 1998: 457,
emphasisadded), and
"Global competitiveness, and technological development require the
creation of new knowledge which is communicated to employees and
which leads to continuous innovation. Traditional approaches to Human
Resource Development are insufficient to meet the changing needs of the
contemporary organisation." (Horwitz, 1999: 188).
The very low level of importance assigned to labour and the HRmanager does,
however, not come as a surprise in South African industry. Several other studies
of South African manufacturing industries, including textiles, have found that
management in most firms has an antiquated rnindset as far as labour is
concerned (Kaplinsky and Morris, 1999; Salinger et ai, 1999; Reid, 1999a, 1999b
and 1999c). This phenomenon is further discussed in the section on
organisational change.
One firm reported that their foreign shareholders in Italy were very significant in
the decision processto acquire the new technology.
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TABLE 6.5: IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS ROLE PLAYERS IN DECISION TO ACQUIRE
NEW TECHNOLOGY
Average Standard
evaluation of Deviation
importance
Number of
respondents
Board of Directors
General Manager/MD
Marketing Director
Production Manager
Finance Director
Other"
Trade Union Representative
Workers in general
Consultants
Work place forums
HumanResourcesManager
4.12
4.10
3.67
3.55
3.47
2.5
1.67
1.58
1.57
1.53
1.31
1.16
1.04
1.28
1.05
1.02
2.12
0.90
0.71
1.01
0.64
0.70
17
19
18
20
19
2
18
17
14
15
16
*There were only two responsesincluding other, i.e. shareholders in Italy and IT
Manager.
In sourcing the new technology, the Managing Director (12), the Production
Manager (9) and the General Manager (6), were the most important role players.
Others included the Production Engineer (3), the Technical Manager (2), the
shareholders in Italy (1) and the IT Manager (1) (Table 6.6).
Responsible for the implementation process were the Production Engineer (9),
the Production Manager (9), the General Manager and the technology supplier
(6). For three firms consultants were also important and for 1 firm the designer
had an important role to play in the implementation process (Table 6.6). By
combining the results of the previous three questions, an attempt can be made
to establish whether there has been consistency and continuity in terms of the
persons driving the implementation process. The Managing Director/General
Manager and Production Manager/Engineer seem to be the crucial players in the
process. This was confirmed during interviews and factory visits.
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TABLE 6.6: RESPONSIBILITYFOR SOURCINGAND IMPLEMENTATIONOF NEW
TECHNOLOGY(FREQUENCY)
Sourcing Implementation
Managingdirector
Production manager
General manager
Production engineer
Other
Technology supplier
Consultants
12
9
6
4
46
10
6
9
17
8
3
In supplying information about the new technology, the management (17
crucial/very significant), and the suppliers of the new technology (16
crucial/very significant), were the most important contributors. One firm
received very significant information from its shareholders in Italy and another
garnered crucial information from international technical fairs (Table 6.7).
It has been documented" that customers, such as the clothing sector down
stream may work with textile firms in supplying information on textile
technology that may best fulfil a particular need. One example is a CADsystem
that is compatible with that of the clothing manufacturer. However, in this
study customers were rated on average as of only slight importance (less than 3,
Table 6.7).
The demonstration effect of competitors having invested in new technology
(perhaps reported in the local press) may provide information on new
technology. Alternatively, in a technology network alliance, firms that would
ordinarily be competitors, may co-operate to acquire information on new
technology, thus reducing the transaction costs each has to shoulder. In this
study, however, competitors were viewed as less than slightly significant (Table
6.7).
6 Technical Manager (2 firms), IT Manager and shareholder.
7 Designer (1 firm).
8 See for example various issues of Textile World.
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TABLE 6.7: SOURCESOF INFORMATIONON NEWTECHNOLOGYIN ORDEROF
IMPORTANCE
Sources Average
rating
Standard
Deviation
Number of
responses
Other* 4.5
4.17
4.05
2.29
1.94
1.68
1.68
1.62
1.2
0.70
0.98
0.99
1.04
0.97
1.01
1.25
1.20
0.41
2
18
20
17
17
16
17
16
16
Management
Suppliers of Textile machinery
Customers
Competitors
Industry associations
Consultants
Workers
Government Institutions
Note: 1=insignificant; 2=slightly significant; 3=moderately significant; 4=very
significant; 5=crucial.
*Shareholder in Italy (rated very significant) and technical international trade
fairs (rated crucial).
In Chapter 5, we discussed several institutions that are involved in the South
African textile industry. These include government institutions, such as the
Industrial Development Corporation and the Textile Division of the Council for
Scientific and Industrial Research.We also looked at the contributions offered by
industry associations, such as the Textile Federation. In the firm-level analysis,
we are interested to know how much of these services on offer, are actually
used by firms in the industry. One of the services on offer from government
institutions and industry associations is the dissemination of information. As
sources of information on new technology to the firms who completed the
questionnaire, however, both government and industry institutions fared poorly
(Table 6.7). In the section on external networks we consider why the services
these institutions offer are so parsimoniously used.
Changemanagement consultants seem to be an important part of the technology
implementation process in other sectors and countries. However, amongst our
respondents, they were not significant either in the decision to invest in new
technology or as a source of information about new technology, and only
important to three firms in the implementation process (Tables 6.5 and 6.7). A
similar lack of significance of the services provided by consultants was found by
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Kaplinsky and Morris (1999) in a study of the textile, clothing and automobile
sectors in Kwazulu-Natal.
6.4.2.2 Methods of technology transfer and possibWties for learning
The firms were asked to report the methods of technology transfer used. The
main purpose of the question was to establish what opportunities for learning
came with technology acquisition. A secondary objective was to link a particular
method of transfer with the competencies and complementary assetsrequired to
implement the technology in terms of the technology transfer agreement. Once
it was established which methods of transfer had been used, these questions
could be followed up in face-to-face interviews at the firm. Four firms reported
that they had acquired the new technology through licensing, while four others
acquired it by means of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Joint ventures
accounted for 6 other firms and 7 received their technology in 'turn key
projects'. Two respondents participated in a technology network alliance, while
two firms wished their own inputs to be recognised. One firm boldly stated, "We
looked at overseasmarket and copied". It must be noted that anyone firm may
have used more than one method of transfer; hence the total will not add up to
twenty. It was expected that better learning opportunities are offered by FDI,
technology alliances and own input in the development of the technology."
6.5 LEARNING NEW COMPETENCIES, BUILDING NEW ROUTINES AND
SWITCHING TRAJECTORIES?
The introduction of information and computer-based technologies in
manufacturing has required different management competencies from those
required under the previous, mechanised, mass production system. Whereas
management functions in the past involved distinct and autonomous
departments, the new CIMsystems bring together these discrete functions, e.g.
expecting design and production to work together very closely, and marketing to
be involved right from the beginning of the innovation process. This requires a
9 Although FDI does not guarantee better technology access or knowledge transfer. Reid (l999b: 13) for
example, reports that new Chinese investment in Kwazulu-Natal was characterised by rather outdated
technology, low value added and appalling labour relations.
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'systemic' approach, where effective internal co-ordination becomes crucial. It
has happened before that a lack of co-ordination has lead to the acquisition of
CADsystems that were incompatible with the Computer Numerically Controlled
machines used for quality control (Bessantand Haywood, 1988). It also requires
that senior management be seriously involved in the decision to acquire the
technology and that they have sufficient knowledge to judge the costs (including
organisational changes required) and benefits for the firm. It is also imperative
that decision makers understand clearly how this new technology will fit into
their strategic objectives and how it will serve their needs in this regard.
These new technologies are often introduced in conjunction with new
management techniques such asQuick Response,TQMor JIT production. Viewing
all of this together, it is evident that a rethink on skills and the nature of
organisational learning becomes necessary. If direct labour is viewed as a cost to
be contained or reduced, their numbers will likely be reduced. However, this
still leaves the decision about how to utilise the remaining workers, e.g.
retraining for more flexible deployment, carrying out maintenance, gathering
shop floor data, etc. In design, the introduction of CAD has meant that
draughtsmen now had to learn to use computer systems and to understand the
technicalities of design more thoroughly, thus acquiring new skills and increased
power in the work place.
There remains also the consideration of the availability of skills, right through
from the management level to the shop floor. This is, of course, influenced by
the labour market in general and the immediate environment in which the firm
is located.
In some instances, the implementation of these technologies has shown that
involving labour in the decision making process about the new technology,
generates better co-operation and commitment to the change process. In all
instances, better communication skills have been required to ensure that
accurate information is transmitted and understanding of processesis promoted.
This includes the cultivation of internal and external networks to exchange
information. The former would for example entail worker teams, motivational
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groups or the work place forums, consisting of management and labour
representatives, instituted by law in South Africa. External networks would
include formal or informal networks with clients and suppliers, but also with
other institutions such as government agencies, standards generating bodies,
industry associations, training institutions and consultants. Finally, the actual
physical organisation of work processesmight have to change, involving different
utilisation of floor space, for example, cluster or cellular set-up for production
rather than assembly line configurations to allow more flexibility.
For South African textile firms, of course, such organisational change must be
viewed in the context of the import protection regime that prevailed for most of
its existence. Competencies and routines that were developed under such a
regime, may not serve them best under a regime of trade liberalisation and
fierce competition. For example, one of a firm's strategic competencies under
the protective regime was to lobby the Board on Tariffs and Trade for further
tariff protection. In the current climate, this is not a winning strategy. Firms
thus need to get off from the Import Substitution Industrialisation (151) trajectory
and engage with the new competitive pressures, i.e. whereas under protection
they were competing on restricted market criteria, mostly price and product
availability, such a form of supply-pushed production is no longer appropriate
under the new competition where firms have to adapt to customer demands.
One of the competencies they therefore have to learn is to "hear" their
customers and to orientate production to demand-side imperatives (Kaplinsky
and Morris, 1999:720)
6.5.1 Organisation, skills development and networks
We have discussed in Chapter 4 the rationale for and the broad objectives of
restructuring in the South African textile industry. It emerged, amongst other
things, that the investment in new technology was central to the process of
restructuring for many South African textile firms. In question C1, firms were
asked to indicate whether their investment in new technology was part of a
restructuring process. For the five brand new firms, established in the 1990s,
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this question was, of course not relevant. Of the rest, 11 said that their
investment in new technology was part of a restructuring process.
In question C2, respondents were requested to report on changes required by
the implementation of the new technology.
FIGURE 6.6. CHANGES REQUIRED BY NEW TECHNOLOGY
reorganisation
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Percentage of respondents
The majority of firms (85%) reported that the new technology required a
reorganisation of work processes, while 75% required training and retraining.
Fifty per cent of firms had to orchestrate changesin the division of labour, while
30%acquired additional production units. As far as employment is concerned,
30% reported that they had to reduce employment, while 25%were able to
increase employment and 40%required no change in employment (Figure 6.6.).
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FIGURE 6.7. CHANGESIN EMPLOYMENT (1994-1999)
5% 5%
EI reduced employment
• increased employment
[Jnewfirm
[Jstable
• no response
35%
The changes in employment in Figure 6.6. refer to those caused specifically by
the investment in new technology. Figure 6.7. illustrates the changes in
employment derived from the employment figures provided by the firms in
section A. Note that a bigger percentage (35%)had increased employment and
further that 35%instead of 30, had reduced employment. Thus, not all changes
in employment are attributed to the investment in new technology. (This is in
agreement with the observations made for the textile industry as a whole in
Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3.1.1.).
6.5.2 Sub-contracting
Only 10%of firms reported that one of the organisational changescaused by the
new technology was sub-contracting. However, from the specific questions on
sub-contracting, it emerged that firms were already in sub-contracting
relationships before the implementation of the new technology.
Sub-contracting is a controversial issue, internationally and in South Africa. It
has a negative connotation in the sense that it may be viewed as an avenue for
exploitation by not adhering to acceptable standards regarding working
conditions and wages. The most criticised version of sub-contracting is the
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phenomenon of 'sweat shops'. In South Africa, organised labour turned out to be
ambivalent on the issue. During negotiations between the government, industry
and labour regarding South Africa's offer on the liberalisation of textiles to
GATT, the unions included a provision that, in the case of retrenchments,
following liberalisation, firms should seek to assist former workers in setting up
there own manufacturing units. The supposition was that the retrenching firms
should also be available asmarkets for the output of the new firms, through sub-
contracting relationships. However, the Confederation of South African trade
unions (COSATU)is also very critical of sub-contracting relationships in the
clothing sector, for example.
In the questionnaire firms were asked
1. Whether they sub-contracted from large firms or from small and medium
sized enterprises (SMMEs)and whether the suppliers were owned by
former employees,
2. Whether the sub-contracting relationship was long term (in existence for
more than five years), or intermittent and whether they saw potential
for a longer term relationship to develop,
3. If they were themselves suppliers in a sub-contracting relationship,
whether they supplied to large firms or SMMEs,were in a long-term
relationship or saw potential for a long-term relationship.
Of the nine firms that were sub-contracting, three sub-contracted from large
firms, two from small firms and four reported that former employees owned
their suppliers under sub-contract. Two firms had sub-contracting relationships
in existence for more than five years and four said that they saw potential for a
longer-term relationship. One firm in Kwazulu-Natal said that they sub-
contracted from a workshop for disabled people.
Of those firms who were suppliers in a sub-contracting relationship, five said
that they supply to large firms and four to SMMEs.Sevenalready had long-term
relationships, while another two saw the potential for a longer-term
relationship. From factory visits it emerged that the majority of these sub-
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contracting relationships were not very tight, i.e. not in the sense that
relationships in an Italian industrial district are normally described (See for
example UNIDO(2000) on relationships in Italian textile districts). Reid (1999b:
10) also reports that sub-contracting relationships in textile firms in Kwazulu-
Natal were not very intimate: "None of the respondents had retationsntps that
were other than informal witt: their sub-contractors. "
This lack of co-operation is unfortunate in the light of the larger markets
opening up for South African textile and clothing firms. For example, under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act (2000), clothing firms enjoy preferential
access to the American market. American orders are normally far in excess of
the volumes that South African exporters are used to providing. Hence, clothing
manufacturers in the Southern African Development Community worry that
South African textile manufacturers will not be able to supply sufficient
quantities of fabric on time."?
6.5.3 Skills requirement, training and retraining
We have seen that the implementation of modern ICT in manufacturing requires
different skills than in the previous age of massproduction. The respondents to
the questionnaire identified lack of worker skills as a significant obstacle to the
successful implementation and utilisation of the new technology.
6.5.3.1 Past legacies, today's challenges
In South Africa any discussionon education or training has to take into account
the legacy of the discriminatory policies applied during the Apartheid era. This is
illustrated very vividly in the fact that 19%of the population over 20 years had
no schooling, according to the 1996 national census. As is to be expected, these
figures also have a racial bias: almost a quarter of Africans over 20 years of age
have no education, compared to 10%of coloureds, 7% for Indians and 1%for
Whites (South African Institute of Race Relations, 1999:110). This has serious
10 Interview with Jack Kipling, South African Clothing Industry Export Council, 20 November 2000.
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implications for the pool of workers that textile firms can draw their employees
from.
Given South Africa's history of racial discrimination, the new government has
introduced legislation to redress the inequality. Examples of these types of
legislation include the Employment Equity Bill (1996), requiring Affirmative
Action in the work place for previously disadvantaged groups, i.e. blacks, women
and disabled persons, the Labour Relations Act (1995), the Labour Relations
Amendment Act (1998) and the BasicConditions of Employment Act (1997). This
means that the firms have to prepare their work force for the implementation
and use of new technology in the context of the pressures regarding the
management of diversity and the legacy of adversarial industrial relations under
Apartheid. By and large, textile workers are drawn from the black
cornmumttes." Middle management is mostly white South African and senior
management often comes from abroad or has been trained abroad. It has been
argued that white middle management may feel threatened by the new labour
legislation on top of the restructuring process, which already threatens their job
security. Hence, they may be less than enthusiastic about worker participation
and skills development (Kaplinsky and Morris, 1999).
6.5.3.2 An overhaul of education and training policies
In 1990, a Textile Industry Training Board survey of training needs concluded
that there was a serious lack of skills in the South African textile industry right
through from management to the shop floor. As far as management is
concerned, the survey found that senior management in South African textile
firms were relatively old and of an expatriate nature. The crucial problem was
that there seemed to be a scarcity of younger managers ready and capable to fill
the gap when the current managers needed to retire (Maree, 1995). In an
interview with the Textile Division of the CSIRin April 1999, this concern was
still raised. In this same interview and in an interview at the Industrial
Development Corporation in March 1999, the concern was voiced that South
African textile firms spent relatively little on upgrading the skills of their work
Il In South African terms, black inclusive means African, 'Coloured' and Asian.
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force and when economic conditions become hard, the training budget is one of
the first to be reduced. However, as part of the restructuring process, firms in
the industry, together with the Textile Industry Training Board had reconsidered
their training needs and had started putting mechanisms in place to sharpen
their training facilities. The latter had involved upgrading of in-house training
facilities at firm level, too. During the 1990s, firms spent on average about R1
million per year on training (Industrial Development Corporation, 1999).
Just when the firms had their plans on-line for skills development, the
government introduced the Skills Development Act, which compels all firms to
contribute a certain percentage of payroll to the Skills Development Fund.12 The
idea was to get more broad based training, rather than only in the relatively
larger firms. Also, the new system is to replace the apprenticeship system,
which has fallen out of favour". This is evidenced by the dismal enrolment and
graduation figures. From 1994-1996, no apprenticeship contracts in textiles were
completed, while this number was 9 in 1997 and 10 in 1998. There were 30, 48,
56, 60 and 75 apprenticeship contracts in operation during 1994, 1995, 1996,
1997 and 1998 respectively (SAIRR:1999: 135).
In short, the new systemworks as follows:
With the restructuring of the South African education and training system, the
National Qualifications Framework was adopted. This makes provision for the
establishment of the South African Qualifications Authority to oversee the
quality of output from the education and training system. Under this system, all
sectors in the economy are grouped under different Sector Education and
Training Authorities set up by the Minister of labour in terms of the Skills
12 Under the Skills Development Levies Act of 1999, a levy-grant system was introduced, which requires
each employer to pay 1% of payroll to fund skills development. The South African Revenue service collects
the skills levies. Twenty per cent of this revenue is paid into the National Skills Development Fund for
training of the unemployed; the rest is paid to the sector authority for disbursement. Firms who already train
their employees are entitled to reimbursement of expenses. There is no restriction on training at foreign
institutions (Jafta & Jeetah, 2001:26).
13 Existing textile and clothing apprenticeship contracts will remain in place under the sector authority. New
applicants for apprenticeships will be managed and quality assured by the sector authority. The
apprenticeship system will remain in operation until a date to be determined by the minister, at which time all
apprenticeships will become learnerships. A learnership is a structured learning programme that includes
practical work experience and leads to an occupation-related qualification registered at the National
Qualifications Authority. Such qualifications will thus be portable nationally.
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Development Act. There is one sector authority for textiles, clothing, leather,
and footwear. The sector authority has to register courses to be accredited by
the qualifications authority. Industry representatives participate in the
development of training courses for the industry through the relevant Standards
Generating Body. All providers of training services must register and be
accredited by the qualifications authority. The Textile Industry Training Board
will now be phasedout, while the Clothing Industry Training Boardwill remain as
a training provider. 14
However, the overhaul of the education and training system for the whole
country caused major disruptions and required time intensive participation in
committees by firm management and worker representatives. The industry is
divided about the merits of this new system. Somewould have preferred the old
system, while others enthusiastically participate in the new system (Jafta 8:
Jeetah, 2001: 26).
6.5.3.3 Trainïng and retraining ;n sample firms
The firms participating in the current surveywere requested to indicate whether
they have had to train or retrain because of the introduction of the new
technology and how much they spent on training and retraining between 1994
and 1999. They further had to indicate who was trained and by whom and
whether the training was technology-specific or general.
In total R10 655 000 was spent on training (six firms did not give the
information). For retraining an amount of R2.8 million was spent between 1994
and 1999. It must, however, be kept in mind that in-house training for which
costing was not provided took place in several firms. These figures thus
underestimate the training effort. It would, in any case be a serious omission to
concentrate only on the quantitative aspect of training. Important questions
need to be asked about the establishment of training needs at firm level, which
criteria are used to select people for training, e.g. are there particular
14 Interview with David Bowen, director of SETA for textiles, clothing, leather, and footwear, 17 November
2000
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attributes that personsshould have to make them eligible for training, etc. Also,
how are training outcomes evaluated, which measures or mechanismsare used
to determine how and to what extent the transfer of knowledge and skills has
taken place?How are all of these aspects communicated to trainees and training
organisations?
Of our respondents, 14 reported that training was done by the technology
supplier, while the same number reported training done by an internal training
unit. Four firms had training done by consultants, three by a specialist training
firm, two by a South African technikon and one by the Textile Industry Training
Board. No-one had training done by a South African University. One firm sent
their trainees abroad for training. Fifteen firms reported technology specific
training and five general training. In answer to the question who received
technology specific training, nine firms reported that supervisors were trained,
eight that machine operators were trained and ten that technicians were
trained. Another six had middle management trained, three had lower
management trained and one firm sent their designer overseas to be trained. Of
those who said that they had received general training, five firms reported
supervisors were trained, six had machine operators trained, four middle
management, five lower management, and one technician.
Factory visits revealed well-equipped training facilities at leading firms, but, as
we report in chapter 5, for the industry as a whole the picture is not as rosy.
Also, other efforts by government to improve skills development had met with
scant successin industry. A good example is the Duty Credit Certificate Scheme,
discussed in Chapter 5. To take advantage of this measure, each applicant must
participate in and achieve targets set by the Productivity Performance
Monitoring Scheme and spend an amount equal to at least 4%of their annual
wage bill on training. Reid (1999b and 1999d) found that the participants in the
scheme were not very successful in achieving the expectations with respect to
labour development. They also viewed labour market reforms as having had a
negative impact in that:
• labour costs increased
• human resourcesmanagement systemsbecame costly and complicated
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• it resulted in lower rates of employment creation
• it reduced confidence in the industry, and
• it led to an uncooperative work force. (Reid, 1999b: 12).
These sentiments were echoed by interviews in November 2000. One respondent
asserted:
rt Sure, we contribute to the SkWsDevelopment Fund - it is funded by less job
creation." (my emphasis).
However, in both the current study and Reid's surveys, a small majority was
positive about labour development. A small percentage of firms in this survey
viewed labour as an indispensable asset to the firm, while some participants in
Reid's survey believed that a properly structured industrial relations regime
would help to minimise industrial and racial conflict in the industry (Reid,
1999b: 13).
One aspect that bedevils the decision to invest in skills development for firms is
the incidence of HIV/AIDS, especially in Kwazulu-Natal. Visits to factories in
Kwazulu-Natal revealed that some workers have been on paid sick leave for
more than six months. Management has no idea when or if the workers will
return. BecauseHIV/AIDSis not a notifiable disease in South Africa, management
is not allowed to enquire into the cause of the illness. This increases uncertainty
for the firm. Firms now also spend money on AIDSawareness training. Apart
from the obvious lossof skills when people die, there is also the added and more
frequent problem of absenteeism because workers have to attend more and
more funerals.
6.5.4 Internal networks
In order to establish an integrated manufacturing system, improved internal co-
ordination will be required. This suggestsan enormous balancing act, connecting
all aspects of the operation and finding mechanisms to communicate strategic
objectives and plans to all 'players'. The organisational structures that have
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developed over the past few decades have included various forms of
'management team efforts'. In the current survey, the respondents were
requested to rate the following as mechanisms for internal co-ordination in their
firms on a 5 point Likert scale, where 1=insignificant and 5=crucial:
• Worker teams
• Work place forums
• Management meetings
• Board meetings
• Motivational groups
Once again, worker related mechanisms did not fare very well. Worker teams
and work place forums were rated on average less than moderately significant
(Table 6.8). Management meetings and board meetings were considered most
important mechanisms, followed by motivational groups, which were not quite
accorded a 3 (moderately significant).
TABLE 6.8. MECHANISMS FOR INTERNAL COORDINATION IN ORDER OF
IMPORTANCE
Mechanism Average rating Standard
deviation
Number of
responses
Management meetings
Board meetings
Motivational groups
Worker teams
Work place forums
3.83
3.37
2.93
2.83
2.77
0.85
1.45
1.09
1.20
1.06
18
16
15
18
17
Note: 1=insignificant, 2=slightly
5=crucial
significant, 3=moderately significant, 4=very significant,
This outcome is similar to the results of a series of surveys in the textile sector
in Kwazulu-Natal and the Western Cape, done by the Industrial Restructuring
Project at the University of Natal: 15
'The inclusion of labour in the managerial and planning process was also
found to be poorly implemented. Essentially, no respondent had thus far
attempted to pursue this goal seriously. The only respondent who claimed
IS Reported in Reid, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, and 1999d.
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to engage workers in this manner seems to have restricted the exchange
to imploring workers to improve productivity levels." (Reid, 1999b: 9).
At least in the current study there were a few firms who have successfully
incorporated worker participation.
6.5.5 External networks
6.5.5.1 Tight versus dispersed networks
The idea that a firm is not an autonomous unit, acting independently from its
environment, but rather forms part of a broader interactive network, is very
prominent today. It is, however, not a brand new idea. In the work of Alfred
Marshall at the turn of the 19th century, a great amount of attention is paid to
the notion of an industrial district (e.g. in Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham and
Sheffield in England). In the 1980s, the work of Piore and Sabel (1984), amongst
others, renewed the interest in industrial districts, with particular reference to
the so-called Third Italy. In the context of a district, the firm's network is
localised and firmly embedded in its geographical location (thus, 'tight' in the
spatial sense). This network may include suppliers of raw materials, energy and
machinery, local government structures, education and training institutions, sub-
contracting relationships and industry associations. At the other end of the
spectrum is the so-called 'network firm' (admirably documented in the case of
Benetton by Fiorenza Belussi, 1987 and 1992, and Belussi and Festa, 1990). This
firm's network is geographically dispersed and enabled by modern-day
information and communications technologies. This network would probably
include suppliers of raw materials, intermediate inputs and textile machinery on
several different continents, but also close relationships with international
industry associations, distribution channels, sources of market intelligence and
many more.
Most firms would probably have a combination of localised and dispersed
network relationships. Curzio and Fortis (2000: 176) argue in the context of
Italian industrial districts that in future 'the actual local networks wit! tend to
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transform themselves into speciaitsed nodes, service centres for the long-
distance transnationai (European and global) networks, creating room for an
extended and intensïtïed division of labour wh;ch does not d;m;nish the local
context, but increases its value by means of different forms of specialisation
and global Unks' (translated from the original Italian). The authors thus foresee
a mutually beneficial integration of localised and dispersed networks.
As far as South African textile firms are concerned, there are no real industrial
districts in the senseof the Third Italy. Although there is geographical proximity,
firms tend to play their cards close to their chests. There seemsto be a tradition
of mistrust dating back to the nature of competition for the domestic market
under the protective regime and the added isolation of the sanctions era
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 1999: 730). It is, however, conceivable that South African
textile firms have built up relationships that could be called networks with
various role players, such as customers, suppliers and industry associations over
time.
To establish the nature and dimensions of the external networks of the South
African textile firms, they were asked to rate the importance of their
relationships with the following before, during and after the implementation
process:
• suppliers of raw materials
• suppliers of textile machinery
• local customers
• foreign customers
• the Textile Division of the CSIR
• the Textile Federation
• the Industrial Development Corporation
• Universities
• Technikons
• Consultants
• Textile Industry Training Board
• Others.
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The idea was to gain a sense of how the dynamics of these network relationships
have changed over the period of acquisition and implementation of the new
technology. For example, which players were more important before, during and
after the implementation process?
TABLE 6.9: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE BEFORE DURING AND AFTER
IMPLEMENTATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGy16
Before During After
Technology suppliers 12 14 13
Local customers 9 12 13
Rawmaterial suppliers 9 12 11
Foreign customers 4 7 7
Industrial Development Corporation 2 3 1
Consultants 2 2 1
Universities and Technikons 1 1 1
Textek 1 1 1
Textile Industry Training Board 0 0 1
Texfed 0 0 0
It would be reasonable to expect that suppliers of textile machinery would be
crucial in the whole process. If a prior relationship with the suppliers did not
exist, it might be logical that such a relationship will develop during the
implementation process and remain important after implementation. Indeed,
technology suppliers have been rated the most important for the whole process
(Table 6.9).
Suppliers of raw materials may include the suppliers of natural fibres, such as
cotton, as well as the suppliers of manufactured fibres, packaging materials,
dyes, chemicals, etc.
Because the nature of the technology is such that it enables integrated supply
chain management, it would be necessary to involve suppliers of raw materials
as well as customers in the process in order to set up a compatible system of
exchange.
16 The frequency of being rated crucial or very significant.
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The motto of the management techniques (e.g. TQM) that are meant to be used
in conjunction with the technologies under discussion purports to put the
customer first. From the textile firm's point of view, this would mean that the
customer, e.g. clothing firms, be a very important part of the process of the
implementation of new technology. After all, they will be using the products
resulting from the use of the new technology. Studies by Maree (1995), Altman
(1995) and the Swart Commission on Textiles and Clothing (1994) have all
reported on the weak links and lack of co-operation amongst members of the
textile pipeline, especially between textile manufacturers, the clothing sector
and local retailers. Becausesome firms focus on the local market and others are
export orientated, we have made a distinction between firms' relationships with
local and foreign customers.
In this study, in contrast to the lack of co-operation with customers cited above,
respondents have rated local customers as the second most important role
players, while raw material suppliers came in third. Both have become more
significant during the implementation process, while local customers gained
even more importance and raw material suppliers became slightly less important
after the implementation (Table 6.9). Foreign customers were also rated
relatively important, becoming more so during and after the implementation
process. This could, for example, be the case of exporters to the US,where it is
the custom to work with suppliers in developing countries to ensure American
standards in production.
The rest of Table 6.9 underscores the weak links to other institutions, including
the industry association, Texfed. Kaplinsky and Morris (1999:731) contend that
these institutions have not successfully made the switch from an Import
Substitution Industrialisation (151) trajectory to an outward-oriented one and
have therefore not yet learned the competencies necessary to assist textile
firms in their quest for competitiveness in the new competitive environment.
Our interviews also revealed that firms are sometimes not aware of the services
offered by these institutions, have a low opinion of the abilities of the
institutions, or consider them irrelevant to their needs.
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In maintaining generally weak links with customers and several government,
industry and higher educational institutions, South African textile firms lose out
on many opportunities for learning, e.g. by interacting.
6.6 THERESULTSOFTHE NEWTECHNOLOGY
In question D1, on the impact of the new technology, the respondents were
asked to indicate to what extent their expectations expressed in question B5
(see questionnaire in Appendix 6.1) were met. The Likert scale used in this
question had 1=not at all, 2=slightly, 3=moderately satisfied, 4=significantly
satisfied and 5=completely satisfied.
FIGURE6.8: RELATIVE IMPORTANCEOF REASONSFOR INVESTINGIN NEW
TECHNOLOGYANDSATISFACTIONRATINGS
--+-
become more competitive
reduce delivery times
Satisfaction
maintain market share --Importance
Note: 1=insignificant/not at all, 2=slightly significant/slightly satisfied,
3=moderately significant/satisfied, 4=very significant/significantly satisfied,
5=crucial/ completely satisfied.
As far as reducing costs, reducing delivery times, and maintaining markets are
concerned, expectations were exactly matched, whereas for responding to
competitors, expectations were even exceeded (Figure 6.8). The only
performance gaps that remain are for becoming more competitive, finding new
markets and improving quality. Although the performance gaps are relatively
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small, it is possible that the firms' perception of their performance and that of
their clients may differ. Kaplinsky and Morris (1999), for example, found that
there was a vast unfavourable difference between the firms' perception of how
well they 'heard' and responded to their customers and the opinion of the
customers. Although in this questionnaire survey customers were not asked to
rate the performance of textile firms, it emerged from interviews with clothing
firms that quality, delivery times, consistency and price were bones of
contention." In fact, as table 6.10 indicates, performance for the sample firms
was quite mixed.
To give more specific content to the results of the implementation of the new
technology, firms were asked in question D2 to give details of the changes in
several output measuresof performance. In case the quantitative details were
too confidential or not available, firms were given an opportunity in question D3
to indicate whether their performance with respect to the same measures
covered in D2, has increased, decreased or remained unchanged between 1994
and 1999.
If the expected efficiencies promised by the ICTtechnologies applied in textiles,
the performance measuresare expected to change as follows:
• The number of stock turns per year are expected to increase, while stock
of raw materials (measured in weeks of input), work in progress (weeks
of production) and finished goods (weeks of output) are all expected to
decrease as better and timelier information make large stock piles
superfluous.
• Throughput time is expected to decrease while the value added time
should increase. Rejects and reworks as a percentage of output are
expected to decrease.
17 Peter Gibbon (2002) documented the same complaint in an extensive study of clothing manufacturing in
South Africa.
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• As for deliveries, it is expected that the percentage of deliveries on time
will increase, while the percentage of late deliveries will decline. The
latter is divided into two measures: percentage of deliveries that is less
than two weeks late and the percentage that is more than two weeks
late.
Four firms did not answer question D2 and D3. Only three firms were willing to
give actual figures in response to question D2. Of these, one firm had made
exemplary progressunder new management:
• The number of stock turns increased from 2.5 in 1994 to six in 1999,
while the stock of raw materials declined from 40 weeks to four weeks
and that for finished goods halved from three weeks of output to 1.5
weeks. The work in progress figure for 1994 was not available, but for
1999 it was three weeks of production. Throughput time declined from
six to two weeks. The percentage of rejects as a percentage of output,
increased from 2 to 3 per cent. This is probably a temporary problem
while workers learn to use the new technology. The number of reworks
declined from 6 per cent of output to 5 per cent.
• In the percentage of deliveries on time, the firm has not made any
improvements - it was 85 per cent in 1994 and in 1999. This is an area
that needs to be improved, since it falls below the international norm of
90%deliveries on time. Also, clients in the United States demand on time
delivery performance of 95%or better (Jafta 8: Jeetah, 2001:41). The
percentage of deliveries more than two weeks late, declined from 5 per
cent to 3 per cent.
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TABLE 6.10: CHANGES IN OUTPUT PERFORMANCE (1994-1999)
Performance measure Increased Decreased Unchanged
Stock turns per year
Stock: raw materials (weeksof input)
Work in progress (weeksof production)
Finished goods (weeksof output)
Throughput time
Value added time
Rejects (% of output)
Reworks (% of output)
Deliveries (% on time)
Late> 2 weeks
Late < 2 weeks
11
6
1
3
3
8
2
1
10
1
2
2
6
8
8
10
2
9
9
1
9
4
1
5
5
3
2
3
4
4
4
2
2
Firms seem to have fared best in reducing stock holdings and increasing the
percentage of deliveries on time, but the picture is mixed.
FIGURE 6.9: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MARKETS IN SAMPLE FIRMS
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The domestic market is still by far the most important destination of textile
output, rated crucial or very significant by 70%of firms. Europe and Australia are
the next most important markets for the firms in this survey. However, during
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the firm interviews, much enthusiasm was displayed about growing exports into
the USmarket under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)and into
the EU market under the South Africa-European Union Free Trade Agreement.
Several firms already had orders to supply fabric to clothing manufacturers
exporting to the US.This included clothing firms in Mauritius, who would source
fabric from SouthAfrica in order to produce garments for export to the US.
Finally, in question 05, firms were requested to indicate whether their economic
performance has improved, deteriorated or remained stable since the
implementation of the new technology. Two firms did not answer this question.
Thirteen firms indicated that their economic performance has improved, three
that it remained stable and two that they have seen their economic performance
deteriorate. One of these added by way of explanation: " tt's a poor market - no
profits".
6.7 FORGINGAHEAD, MUDDLING THROUGH AND LAGGING BEHIND
There is much diversity in the outcome of the process of investing in new
technology in the surveyed firms. We are, however, able to discern certain
patterns basedon the following criteria:
• firm behaviour in the process of acquiring and implementing the new
technology
• the firms' useof resourcesand attitude towards labour
• the firms' responseto the changing skills requirement
• the firms' response to the organisational changes required to best use
the new technology
• the factors driving the firms' quest for competitiveness
• the firms' useof external networks
• the firms' performance indicators
• the firms' export orientation.
On this basis we are able to identify three categories of firms, namely leading
firms, moderate adapters and laggards, the characteristics of which are
summarised in Table 6.12. It is important to keep in mind that not all the
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characteristics of a category need to apply to a single firm; we are constructing
composite profiles of groups of firms. Firms are classified as leading, moderate
adapters and laggards, measured against the 'ideal type' profiles, which are
constructed based on the criteria for successdistilled from the literature and
this survey. The purpose is to identify the combination of factors associatedwith
successunder the conditions prevailing in the competitive environment of South
African textile firms during the period under constderatton."
6. 7.1 The technology: impediments to successful implementation
Leading firms that had invested in new technology, had participated closely in
the design and implementation of the new technology. In fact two firms had
contributed their own input into the technology development process, while
others were able to develop new products, such as improved denim fabric and
sophisticated breathable laminated materials for sportswear.
Moderate adapters and laggards, however, have not seen significant results from
their investment in new technology. What could possibly have been the
obstacles to successful implementation of the new technology? Table 6.11
summarisesthe problems with the implementation as rated by the respondents.
TABLE 6.11 : DIFFICULTIESIN IMPLEMENTINGNEWTECHNOLOGYIN ORDEROF
IMPORTANCE
Difficulties Average rating Standard Number of
deviation responses
Other 4.00 1
Skills levels of workers 3.89 0.87 19
Integration with older 3.26 1.24 19
technologies
Modification of original 2.78 1.35 19
technology
Internal co-ordination 2.58 1.30 20
Industrial relations 2.17 1.29 19
Insufficient demand for 1.94 1.10 18
products
Note: 1=insignificant, 2=slightly significant, 3=moderately significant, 4=very significant,
5=crucial
18The purpose is thus NOT to construct a taxonomy offinns that should hold for all firms and all times.
19Thetime frame allowed for the implementation was too short
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6.7.1.1 Underestimating implementation time frame
When a technology is relatively new to the implementing organisation and it
does not have accumulated knowledge from previous implementation processes,
it is possible that management may underestimate the time and effort it will
take before the process yields the desired results. One firm had indeed rated
this problem as one of the most important obstacles to the successful
implementation of its new technology.
6.7.1.2 Lack of skills
With respect to the labour market, the implementation of the new technology
may be hampered by the lack of skills at different levels of the organisation. In
this survey, firms rated the skills levels of workers as an important impediment
to maximising the gains from the new technology. This lament was also voiced
during interviews, where low quality performance (such as high reject rates) was
attributed to poor workmanship becauseof a lack of skills. Concerns about the
skills of management were also expressed in interviews.
6.7.1.3 Problems integrating new with older technologies
Technically, the reorganisation of work processes to implement the new
technology might require the integration of older technologies with the new.
The new embodied technology invariably allows much speedier production,
which might lead to bottlenecks where several processes, e.g. spinning,
weaving, dyeing and finishing are involved. This problem was rated as fairly
serious and its impact was illustrated on factory visits. For example, in one
factory, drawing in of yarn is still done by hand, while high-speed machines do
the processesbefore and after this activity. However, this firm is still agonising
over the possibility that 15 workers will lose their jobs if a fast machine is
bought to do the drawing in.
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6.7.1.4 Modification of original technology
An old lament with respect to the transfer of imported technology is that the
technology needs to be adapted to suit the context in which it is to be used. We
have seen in Chapter 3 that by and large the textile technology developed in
industrialised countries has the effect of reducing labour input. This is a
pronounced problem for developing countries where unemployment is a serious
problem and skills and education levels are generally low. Given the peculiar
position of the SouthAfrican textile industry in terms of the characteristics that
define the industry in developed and developing countries (SeeChapter 3), it is
of interest to determine whether this is a problem pertaining to the South
African textile firms as well. The firms in this survey gave this concern a
relatively low rating (2.7), but this is not to say that it is not a problem for some
firms (the standard deviation is 1.35)20.
6.7.1.5 Internal co-ordination and industrial relations
These two factors were not given a serious rating as obstacle to successful
implementation. Yet, leading firms were able to develop worker participation
schemesand enjoy excellent relations with their workers. These firms were also
able to increase employment.
Moderate adapters, however, have only tentatively started worker participation
schemes,where, for example, they useworkers in quality circles. They have also
had to retrench some people. Laggardsdo not encourage worker participation,
have poor worker relations and still view workers as a cost to be minimised.
They have also retrenched workers in a cost reduction effort.
6.7.1.6 Insufficient demand for the products produced with the new
technology
Apart from the uncertainty, which comes with the introduction of new products,
firms may lack the market intelligence to estimate the demand for the products
20 Two firms considered it crucial, while three more rated it as very significant,
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they produce with the new technology. This may impede the production of
sufficient quantities to reap the full benefits promised by the new technology. In
the current survey, this was rated the least of the concerns of the firms (1.94),
with a standard deviation of 1.10, which does not indicate very much variation
amongst responses(Table 6.11).
6.7.2 Organisational changes and skills development
Leading firms have to a large extent completed the organisational changes
necessary to best use the new technology. They are certified for quality (ISO9
000) and environmental (ISO 14 000) standards and are committed to skills
development practices such asmulti-skilling and continuous learning.
Moderate adapters have made incremental changes to work organisation and
have spent money on technology-specific as well as general training for
personnel from the shop floor to middle management.
Laggardshave made only superficial changesto work organisation and have done
technology specific training, in most cases relying on the technology supplier to
do the training. They have very weak links to training institutions.
6.7.3 Export orientation
Leading firms are more often than not exporters who compete in the global
market on quality, reliability, consistency and short lead times, rather than
price. They have established strong relationships in the supply chain and
participate in the work of industry associations and the Sectoral Education and
Training Authority. Overall, their economic performance has improved.
Moderate adapters are beginning to export, learning how difficult and costly it
can be to break into the international market. They have, as yet, rather fragile
links to external networks and compete on the basis of a mixture of quality,
good delivery performance and price. Their economic performance has remained
stable.
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Laggardsstill long for the days of high import protection levels. As Reid (1999a:
15) puts it:
"The majority of the sampled industrialists indicated that they would
rather revert back to the previous industrial policy regime and assumea
net inward position."
They are sceptical about external networks, compete primarily on price, and
focus on the local market. Someof them have seen their economic performance
deteriorate.
6.8 SUMMARYANDPREVIEWOFCHAPTER7
In summary, although all firms in the survey had invested in new technology, not
all of them had been successful in reaping the promised benefits. From our
analysis, two broad problem areas emerge, i.e. the firms' behaviour with
respect to labour and the apparent mismatch between the nature and
requirements of the new technology and the organisational structure of
management and production. Thus, strategies that worked well combined
investment in new technology with human capital upgrades and organisational
change, which favoured participation of labour in the implementation process.
The latter was particularly important where investment in new technology was
part of a restructuring process (as is to be expected in a mature industry trying
to rejuvenate itself). Added to this was the expansion of perspectives from
focusing on the domestic market to seizing export opportunities. This was,
however, not an easy path to negotiate, especially with unstable exchange
rates, rising interest rates, and slowing economic growth in our trading partners.
Having constructed three categories of firms, an important question arises, i.e.
under which conditions will it be possible for a firm to move acrosscategories?
To investigate this further, we present in Chapter 7 case histories of three firms:
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1. Frame Textiles, which is almost as old as the textile industry in South
Africa, currently the largest and leading firm. But, this was not always
the case: in the early 1990s,this firm was in great difficulty. In financial
year 1990, for example, the firm made a lossof R320million. How then,
was the firm turned around?
2. Glodina, partially foreign owned, at the time of the postal questionnaire
survey a moderately successful adapter. The firm is, however, currently
in a profitability crunch, and being taken over by a German investor who
is known for his tendency to buy struggling firms to either turn them
around to profitability or sell them off piece meal. How did Glodina end
up in this position?
3. The Coastal group, who at the time of the survey was still one of the
textile firms with the most promise, attracting foreign investment and
buying state of the art equipment. By November 2000, when the factory
visits were done, Coastal had closed its doors. Why?What had happened
to extinguish this promising firm?
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TABLE 6.12: CHARACTERISTICSOF COMPOSITE FIRMS
CHARACTERISTIC LEADINGFIRMS MODERATE LAGGARDS
APADTERS
TECHNOLOGY Invested in new Invested in NT Invested in NT
technology Use CIM Not using NT fully
Participate in moderately
design of NT
Virtually reap full
benefits of NT
LABOUR Worker Worker Poor worker
participation participation relations
Increased slightly significant Workers a cost to
employment Retrenched be minimised
workers
Moderate use of
worker teams for
internal
coordination
TRAINING Technology Technology Technology
specific, specific and specific
General and multi- general Weak links with
skilling training
Continuous institutions
learning
ORGANISATIONALCHANGE Adaptation of work Incremental Superficial work
organisation changes in work process change
Quality (ISO 9 000) organisation
Environmental
standards (15014
000)
COMPETITIVENESSDRIVERS Quality, reliability, Mixture of quality, Price
consistency and delivery times, but
delivery times price still very
rather than price important
EXTERNALNETWORKS Supply chain Relatively weak Sceptical about
management links with external networks
Industry association networks
PERFORMANCE Economic Economic Economic
INDICATORS performance performance performance
improved remained stable deteriorated
Managed to reduce
stock holdings and
improve delivery
times, but quality
measures and
throughput times
lagging
EXPORTORIENTATION Export large Focused on local Focus on domestic
percentage of market but market
output starting to export
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APPENDIX 6.1.
QUESTIONNAIRE
INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY IN SOUTH AFRICAN TEXTILE FIRMS
SECTION A - FIRM PARTICULARS
[IJ [IJ
YYYY MM DD
A2 Ownership: Please select using X in the relevant box(es):
South Africa
Foreign (please specify) .
Both (please specify foreign ownership) .
Private company
Public company
Listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
Subsidiary of larger firm
Al When was the firm established?
A3 Size (Please supply the following figures):
A3a Turnover per annum: (in millions of Rands) 1994 R
I I I I I I(If less than RIm, please use comma, e.g. RO,5m) 1999 R
A3b Employment 31/12/1994 I I I I I I31/12/1999
A3c Exports (in millions of Rands) 1994 R
I I I I I I(If less than RIm, please use comma, e.g. RO,5m) 1999 R
SECTION B - NEW TECHNOLOGY
Bl a Did your firm invest in new production technology in the period 1994-1999?
Yes D No D
If NO, please answer question Bl b. If YES, please proceed to question B2.
Bib Reasons for not investing in new technology: Please rate the following reasons in
terms of their importance to your firm:
. . ti 2 lizhtl . 'ti 3 d I . 'ti 4 . "ti 5 . II=msigm ïcant; = s IgJ tty sigru icant; = mo erately sigm icant; = very srgm icant; = crucIa .
1 2 3 4 5
The cost of new technology
Economic uncertainty
Political uncertainty
High interest rate
The value of the Rand
The attitude of workers
The cost of labour
Other
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If "other", please specify ..
B2 Please indicate the value of investment in new production technology (1994-1999):
(in millions of Rands) (If less than RIm, please use comma, e.g, RO,5m)
Fibre preparation R I I I I I INon Wovens R
Spinning R
I I I I I IWeaving R
Knitting R
I I I I I IAuxiliary Equipment R
Dyeing/Finishing R
I I I I I ITotal R
B3 Please indicate whether the new technology incorporates the following by placing
an X in the relevant box (es)?'
Computer Aided Design (CAD) ~
Computer Numerically Controlled Machines (CNC)
Computer Aided Manufacturing (CAM)
Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM)
B4 Please indicate to what extent your firm currently utilises the following aspects of
the new technology:
1 II 2 u h 1 3 d I 4 iznif I 5 full= not at a ; = s rgr tty; = mo erately; = Slgru: icantly; = ly
1 2 3 4 5
Computer Aided Design (CAD)
Computer Numerically Controlled Machines
Computer Aided Manufacturing
Computer Integrated Manufacturing
B5 Reasons for acquisition of new technology. Please rate the following reasons in
terms of importance:
1 . . "ti 2 lizhtl . ti 3 d . ti 4 . "ti 5 . I=msigm icant; = sugi tty sigm icant; = mo erately sigm icant; = very_sign: icant; = crucIa .
1 2 3 4 5
Become more competitive
Reduce costs
Maintain market share
Find new markets
Improve quality
Reduce delivery times
Respond to competitors
Other
21 Definitions are given at the end of the questionnaire.
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If "other", please specify .
B6 Please indicate the importance of the following in the decision to acquire new
technology:
l=i . 'ti 2 lizhtl . 'ti 3 d . 'ti 4 . 'ti 5 '1msigm icant; = sig] tJy sigru icant; = mo erately sigm icant; = very slgm icant; = crucIa .
1 2 3 4 5
Production Manager
General Manager
Finance Director
Marketing Director
Trade Union representative
Workers in general
Work place forums
Human Resources Manager
Board of Directors
Consultants
Other
If "other", please specify .
B7 Who was responsible for sourcing new technology? Please select relevant box(es)
using X:
Managing Director
Production engineer
Production manager
General manager
Other
If "other", please specify .
B8 Who was responsible for the implementation of the new technology? Please select
relevant box( es) using X:
Technology supplier
Production engineer
General manager
Production manager
Consultants
Other
If "other", please specify .
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B9 Sources of information on new technology. Please rate the following in terms of
their importance as sources of information on new technology for your firm:
1 . . "ti 2 lizhtl . "ti 3 d . "ti 4 . ti . I=mstgm icant; = s IgJ tty sigru ïcant; = mo erately sigm icant; = very sigm icant; 5= crucIa .
1 2 3 4 5
Suppliers of textile machinery
Customers
Competitors
Workers
Management
Government institutions
Industry associations
Consultants
Other
If "other", please specify .
BIO Methods of Technology Transfer: please select the methods used by your firm:
Licensing
Foreign direct investment
Joint ventures
Turn key projects
Technology network alliances
Other
If "other", please specify .
BIl Difficulties in implementing New Technologies. Please rate the following in terms
of their importance as hurdles in the implementation process:
. . "ti u hl' "ti 3 d . ti 4 . "ti 5 . I1=msigm icant; 2= s igl tty sigm cant; = mo erately sigm ïcant; = very sigm icant; = crucIa .
1 2 3 4 5
Integration with older technologies
Skill levels of workers
Industrial relations
Insufficient demand for products
Internal co-ordination
Modification of original technology
Other
If "other", please specify ..
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SECTION C - ORGANISATION
YES D NO D
Did implementation of the New Technology form part of a restructuring process for
your firm:
Cl
C2 Did implementation of the New Technology require one or more of the following?
(Please select by placing an X in the relevant box(es)):
Reorganisation of work processes on the factory floor
Reduction in employment
Increase in employment
No change in employment
Closure of one or more of firm's production units
Acquiring additional production units
Training
Retraining
Sub-contracting
Changes in division of labour
Other
If "other", please specify ..
C3 Are sub-contracting firms:
Large firms
SMME's
Owned by former employees
Other
If "other", please specify .
C4 Are sub-contracting relationships:
Long-term (in existence for> 5 years)
Intermittent (on-and-off)
Potentially longer-term
C5 If your firm is a supplier in a sub-contracting relationship, do you
Supply to large firms
Supply to SMME's
Have a long-term relationship with client
See potential for a long-term relationship
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C6 If implementation of new technology required training or retraining, was training
done by (use X to select):
Technology supplier
Internal training unit
Industry training board
South African Technikon
South African University
Specialist training firms
Consultants
Other
If "other", please specify .
C7 Was training:
Technology specific
General
Both
CS Please indicate whether the following received technology specific and/or general
training by placing an X in the relevant box(es):
Technology specific General
Supervisors
Machine operators
Middle management
Lower management
Technicians
Other
If "other", please specify .
C9 Please indicate expenditure on training for the period 1994 -1999 in the following
categories:
Training R
Retraining (to learn different skills for redeployment)
Total R
R[g
C10 Networks: Internal- Please indicate the importance of the following as mechanisms
for internal co-ordination in your firm:
I . . "ti 2 lizhtl . "ti 3 d I . "ti 4 . "ti t 5 . I=msignr icant; = s IgJ tly sigm cant; = mo eratety sigm ïcant; = very sigm ican ; = crucIa .
1 2 3 4 5
Worker teams
Work place forums
Management meetings
Board meetings
Motivational groups
Other
If "other", please specify .
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CII Networks: Extemal- Please rate the importance of your firm's relationship with the
following BEFORE, DURING and AFTER the implementation of the New
Technology by placing the relevant number in the Before, During and After
columns:
. . ti 2 lizhtl iznifi 3 d . ti 4 . ti 5 . I1=msigm icant; = s IgJ tly sigm icant; = mo eratety SI niticant; = very sigru icant; = crucIa .
Before During After
Suppliers of raw materials
Suppliers of textile machinery
Customers: local
Customers: in foreign markets
Textile division of the CSIR
Textile Federation
Industrial Development Corporation
Universities
Technikons
Consultants
Textile Industry Training Board
Other
If "other", please specify .
SECTION D - RESULTS OF THE NEW TECHNOLOGY
DIPlease indicate to what extent your expectations have been met in terms of the
following:
1 = not at all; 2 = slightly; 3 = moderately; 4 = significantly; 5 = complete!i'_
1 2 3 4 5
To become more competitive
To reduce costs
To maintain market share
To fmd new markets
To improve quality
To reduce delivery times
To respond to competitors
Other
If "other", please specify ..
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D2 Please indicate how the following measures of your firm's production performance
h h d f 1994 1999ave c ange rom -
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Stock turns per year
Stock:
Raw materials
(weeks of in_put)
Work in progress
(weeks of production)
Finished goods
(weeks of output)
Throughput time (weeks)
Value-added time (weeks)
Rejects (percentage of output)
Reworks (percentage of output)
Deliveries:
Percentage on time
Late:
Percentage more than two weeks
Percentage less than two weeks
D3 If specific figures for the information requested in D2 are not available, please
indicate whether you believe the following has increased, decreased or remained
b I X' h I b ( )constant y piacmg an mt e re evant ox es :
Increased Decreased Unchanged
Stock turns per year
Stock:
Raw materials
(weeks of input)
Work in progress
(weeks of production)
Finished goods
(weeks of output)
Throughput time (weeks)
Value-added time (weeks)
Rejects (percentage of output)
Reworks (percentage of output)
Deliveries:
Percentage on time
Late:
Percentage more than two weeks
Percentage less than two weeks
D4 If the new technology has enabled you to find new markets, please indicate the
importance of the following as actual new markets for your firm:
. . ti 2 lizhtl . if 3 d . 'fi 4 ti 5 . II=msigm icant; = s g: tty sigru ïcant; = mo erately signi icant; = very sigm icant; = crucIa .
1 2 3 4 5
The local market
Southern Africa
The rest of Africa
Asia
Europe
America
Other
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If "other", please specify .
D5 Since the implementation of the new technology, has your firm's economic
performance:
Improved
Remained stable
Deteriorated
Thank you very much for your time. Would you kindly supply the following information:
INDIVIDUAL COMPANY INFORMATION WILL BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL.
Name of Respondent: .
Telephone number:
Fax number: .
E-mail address: .
DEFINITIONS:
Technology network alliance: Where two or more firms that would ordinarily be competitors work together for
the purpose of obtaining new technology.
SMME's: Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises
CSIR: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
CAD: Computer aided design, which involves the use of computer hardware and design software to model new
textile ideas in 2D or 3D on the computer screen.
CAM: Computer aided manufacturing, which involves the use of computer systems to control manufacturing
equipment, making it easier and quicker to produce cost-effective one-off, batch produced and high
volume textile products.
CIM: Computer integrated manufacturing systems integrate the use of all the different functions of computers,
including CAD/CAM, to enable fast, efficient and cost-effective textile manufacturing. CIM enables
concurrent design and manufacturing, making use of Information and Communications Technology and
Product Data Management Systems.
CNC: Computer numerically controlled machines are used in computer aided manufacturing, to enable textile
manufacturers to make products accurately, economically and to increase efficiency. CNC machines are
controlled by computer software and enable automated production of textiles, such as fibres, yarns,
woven, knitted and printed fabrics.
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APPENDIX 6.2
TABLE A6.1
Name22 Year Region Employment Exports Ownership
established Structure
1994 1999
TF1 1999 Gauteng 7 No RSA
TF2 1947 Gauteng 302 250 No RSA&
Italian
TF3 1948 Gauteng 32 39 No RSA
TF4 1953 Western 280 No RSA
Cape
TF5 1972 Western 450 320 Yes RSA&
Cape German
TF6 1968 Western 105 180 Yes RSA
Cape
TF7 1976 Western 95 95 No RSA
Cape
TF8 1985 Western 60 250 Yes RSA
Cape
TF9 1962 Western 150 180 Yes RSA&
Cape German
TF10 1965 Eastern 400 600 Yes RSA&
Cape Italian
TF11 1995 Eastern 32 Yes RSA&
Cape German
TF12 1990 Eastern 52 71 Yes RSA
Cape
TF13 1998 Kwazulu- 250 135 Yes RSA&
Natal German
TF14 1950 Kwazulu- 800 500 Yes RSA
Natal
TF15 1998 Kwazulu- 75 Yes RSA
Natal
TF16 1950 Kwazulu- 320 200 Yes RSA&
Natal German
TF17 1992 Kwazulu- 232 235 Yes RSA
Natal
TF18 1953 Kwazulu- No Response RSA&
Natal Italian
TF19 1977 Kwazulu- 350 250 Yes RSA&
Natal American
TF20 1977 Kwazulu- 300 240 Yes RSA&
Natal American
22 TF = Textile Firm.
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CHAPTER 7
TECHNOLOGY, ORGANISATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIRM: THREE
CASESTUDIES
7.1 INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 6 we have constructed composite profiles of firms, which allowed us
to classify them as leading, muddling through and lagging behind on the basisof
certain criteria. In this chapter we want to peek inside the firm over time in
order to investigate the behaviour of firms with respect to their:
• competencies, innovative activities, productive specialisation and
organisational structure;
• strategic choices over time;
• relationships developed with suppliers and users. Although interaction
with suppliers and usersthrough the exchange of products, knowledge
and people is important, the ways in which they influence the process
of structural change (as in vertical integration and in long-term
relationships) deserve particular attention;
• relationship with institutions, if any. Universities, industry
associations, research organisations, financial institutions and the
government affect structural change within the industry in various
ways, for example, in providing human capital, research output,
assisting in diffusion of new technical knowledge, etc.
• response to exogenousenvironmental factors, such as policy changes,
demand side changes, natural disasters and changes in general
economic conditions. The impact of these factors on the firm should,
of course, also be taken account of.
Like Penrose (1959), we are interested in 'flesh-and-blood' firms, organisations
of people with control over productive assets, but not over the environment in
which they compete. The objectives are, firstly, to gain a better understanding
of what firms do, why they make certain decisions, especially about technology;
and secondly, to draw out those features associated with successful and less
successful performance, and to study them in more depth than we have done in
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Chapter 6. Although the primary focus of this study is the implementation of new
technology, we want to illustrate in this chapter how the successful
implementation of technology depends on factors such as simultaneous
organisational change, the competencies of management and labour and the
history of the organisation. We further want to illustrate the important role that
individuals, e.g. entrepreneurs and managers, play in shaping firms and
institutions. This is relevant for the historical as well as the analysis section. To
meet these objectives, it is necessary for organisational studies, business
history, and evolutionary economics to meet, as Dosi (2000:34) puts it. For this
purposewe study the case histories of three firms: one that can be considered a
leading firm, one with great potential (now in the processof recovery) and one
who hasfailed since the initiation of this study.
We proceed as follows. First, we write up the case histories. Then we draw out
differences and similarities amongst the firms, based on selected criteria,
distilled from the literature. We start the analysis in each section with a brief
explanation of the relevant concepts from the literature and then draw on the
case studies under review to illuminate these issues further. The last section
provides a summary and preview of Chapter 8.
7.2 CHRONOLOGICALCASEHISTORIES
7.2.1 Frame Textiles
Frame Textiles is the oldest of the firms included in our case studies. In 1927
young Phillip Frame arrived in South Africa from Dresden, Germany. With his
background and training in textiles, it did not take him very long to realise that
the textile industry in South Africa was barely in its embryonic stage and that
the country held vast opportunities (Glaser, 1985:28). His first venture was the
establishment of a blanket factory in Durban in 1928. He considered Durban a
good industrial location becauseof its proximity to the (then) Transvaal and Free
State and the adjacent African market. The availability of harbour facilities and
other infrastructure also counted in its favour. The first decade of Frame
Textiles' existence also included ventures into shoe and underwear
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manufacturing (in competition with imports from Japan and other Eastern
countries). Natal Canvas Rubber Manufacturers (Ltd) produced 8 000 pairs of
shoes a day, while Natal Underwear Manufacturers (Ltd) produced 15 million
pieces of underwear a year to supply the men's, women's and children's
underwear market, which previously relied entirely on imports. To ensure that
the underwear factory could be independent of imports, Natal Knitting Mills
(Ltd) was established to supply the knitted cloth required (The Frame Group,
1978:5).
In the late 1930s, Phillip Frame announced his belief in a policy of industrial
decentralisation and, as a first step in implementing this policy, he established
another blanket factory in East London. As this policy proved to be economically
viable, additional blanket factories were established in the Western Cape and
Transvaal. By the beginning of the SecondWorld War, the enterprises of the
Frame Group were operating under the name Consolidated Textile Mills Limited
and comprised five blanket factories, the underwear factory and the knitting
mill in Natal (The FrameGroup, 1978:5).
Operations were seriously hampered by the war in that yarn supplies from
Europe and the United States were cut off and those available from India and
South America were prohibitively expensive. Shortages often resulted in plants
remaining idle. This strengthened Phillip Frame's resolve to reduce reliance on
fluctuating imported supplies. While supplying goods to the South African and
Allied forces, Frame was nevertheless able to help fill the gap in the civilian
market left by the lack of imports of textiles and footwear from Europe. Exports
to neighbouring countries (Rhodesia', Malawi and Zambia) also took off. When
the Rhodesian government, like the South African government, after the war
introduced policies to favour local industrialisation, Frame established its first
blanket factory outside South Africa at Bulawayo (Consolidated Textiles (Rhod.)
Limited) (The FrameGroup, 1978:5).
In the third decade of its existence, Frame Textiles faced fierce competition
from imports, especially those from Asia, labour difficulties and the added
INow Zimbabwe.
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problem of acquiring textile machinery. The labour difficulties entailed finding
trained technicians overseas and training local unskilled workers in the
complexities of modern textile machinery. That is to say, if the machinery could
be obtained: much of British and other European textile machinery had been
destroyed and America's first priority was re-equipping its own textile industry.
The waiting period for delivery from Europe and the United States was as much
as five years. To circumvent this problem, Phillip Frame made a plan amounting
to a joint venture between his firm and Lancashire Cotton Corporation of
Manchester, England to establish a spinning mill at Ladysmith. The British firm
had to supply the machinery and the company was called the Consolidated
Lancashire Cotton Corporation Limited. The first yarn was produced in 1948.
When Frame later acquired all the shares in the company, he changed the name
to Consolidated FrameCotton Corporation Limited (The FrameGroup, 1978:6).
In the 1950sthe group moved into the production of woollen, cotton and rayon
piece goods, establishing Consolidated Fine Spinners and Weaverswith a factory
in East London. To meet the increased demand for yarn, a modern spinning mill
was built at New Germany in Natal. Now the firm acquired two wool washeries
and established another one at Pinetown. It also established its own buying
office in London, tasked with sourcing raw materials and spare machine parts,
recruiting personnel and gathering intelligence on developments in the textile
industry overseas (The FrameGroup, 1978:6).
The fourth decade was a further expansion phase. Major developments included
the erection of a finishing plant (called Texfin) at Mobeni, Natal for bleaching,
dyeing, printing, and finishing. The number of cotton mills in the group was
expanded with the establishment of five more mills at a new location (New
Germany). Further acquisitions were also made in the form of South African
Woollen Mills Limited, Mowbray, and the Standard Woollen Mills Limited and
Harris Cotton Mills Limited at Harrismith. Further cross-border expansions took
place with the purchase of two more textile mills in Rhodesiaand a large textile
factory in Zambia. After Malawi gained its independence, Frame established a
textile mill at Blantyre (The FrameGroup, 1978:6).
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The pervasivenessof Phillip Frame's influence is illustrated in the way his name
has become embedded in educational and social structures. At the University of
Port Elizabeth a department of Textile Technology was created and the Chair of
Textile Technology was named after Phillip Frame. Various communities thought
it appropriate to recognise his contrtbutions.' (The FrameGroup, 1978:7).
The growth phase continued into the fifth decade, while considerable
investments were made in replacing old and obsolete machinery. The firm also
realised its pioneering dream of building its own polyester fibre and filament
plant, which came on stream in the fiftieth year of the FrameGroup's existence.
In this period import competition from the Far East was stronger than ever and
the domestic economy was depressed, presenting the group with an extremely
challenging trading environment. It nevertheless persevered and started to see
export success, a strategic route that it only recently opted for (The Frame
Group, 1978:7).
By 1978 the Frame Group employed 30 500 people, with affiliated factories and
selling offices in Bloemfontein, CapeTown, East London, Harrismith, Huguenot,
Jacobs, Johannesburg, Ladysmith, New Germany, Mowbray, Pietersburg,
Pinetown, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria, Bulawayo, Salisbury (now Harare), Zambia
and Malawi and a buying office in London (The Frame Group, 1978:8).
Phillip Frame turned 78 in 1978 and retirement was looming. The question of
who his successorwould be was an important one for the firm and industry and
market commentators. The board of directors however, invited Phillip Frame to
stay on at the helm of the company, which he did until his death on 18 January
1979 (Brown, 1979:242).
The last decade under Phillip Frame's leadership was a difficult one in South
Africa's history. In the 1970sthe industrial relations issue reached boiling point
with trade unions actively resisting labour laws that denied the right of
association (membership of a trade union) to black SouthAfricans.
2 For example, Phillip Frame Industrial Park (New Germany), Phillip Frame Industrial Township
(Harrismith), Phillip Frame Chair of Textile Technology, Port Elizabeth and Phillip Frame Road (East
London).
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Massivestrikes erupted in Natal, with Durban being the focal point", Right in the
middle of this turmoil was Frame, one of the largest employers in the country.
The strikes had no immediate causesat the workplace and the strikers made no
explicit demands, but this was a potent expression of the general dissatisfaction
of black employees. These strikes were the impetus that initiated a new era in
the South African industrial relations system (Bendix, 1992:338-339).
As part of the National Textile Manufacturers' Association (NTMA) Frame faced
several wage disputes in the late seventies" (Wage Disputes, 1978:447). The
unions, however, could not resort to strike action, because Africans workers
could still not participate legally and the union was too weak without them.
After a hard-fought battle for higher wages, the dispute was finally settled to
the reasonable satisfaction of both parties in November 1978 (Industrial
Disputes, 1978:446).
The question of Frame's successorwas not a clear-cut one to answer, since, in
the view of market analysts and industry commentators, nobody in the family or
the organisation seemed to be made of the same fibre as its founder. Phillip
Frame himself solved the problem by specifying his successorsin his will: a
troika, whom he believed complemented each other's talents. They were Archie
Berman, whose marketing and production skills market analysts praised, Selwyn
Lurie, believed to be adept at accounting and Sid Peimer, the strongest on the
plant and machinery side (in the eyes of market analysts and industry
commentators at the time) (Frame Group. The committee of three, 1979:56).
They were faced with rescuing the company's public image, which took a
beating in the industrial relations battle, as well as improving customer
3 These strikes were of such significance that a commission (The Wiehahn Commission) was appointed in
1977 to make recommendations to change the country's labour laws. lts most revolutionary proposal was that
freedom of association be granted to all employees. This meant that black trade unions could register and
become legal. Most of the commission's recommendations were accepted by the government and are
contained in the Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act of 1979 and subsequent Amendment Acts (Bendix,
1992:320-321 ).
4 One of Frame's fiercest critics was Federation of South African Trade Unions secretary, Alec Erwin
(Labour tough line, 1980: 1106). Erwin is now the Minister of Trade and Industry and works closely with the
management of Frame and other textile firms to develop and implement policies to ensure the survival and
growth of the textile industry.
5 The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 excluded African males from the defmition of 'employee' and
therefore barred them from legally participating in the industrial relations system (Bendix, 1992:319).
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relations. The markets also expected a reversal of Frame's extremely
conservative financial policy: the firm had no debt, substantial reservesand paid
very parsimonious divtdends". The very specific terms of Phillip Frame's will,
however, tied the handsof the managers,so that they pretty much had to follow
the samepolicies as before.
For the first half of the 1980s, the company was tied up in two protracted court
battles. Phillip Frame's widow and daughter contested his last will drawn up in
1974, wanting to re-instate an earlier will, signed in September 1967. Re-
instatement of the 1967 testament would have far-reaching implications for the
Frame Group. The earlier will stipulated that Frame's son in law, Max Ulfane,
would become chairman of the Frame Board and Managing Director, and could
only be removed by a unanimous decision by the administrators of the estate.
The administrators included Ulfane, who was Phillip Frame's understudy and
'heir-to-the-thrown' until he opted to move to the UK, resulting in his removal
from the will and control of the Frame Group (Textiles seeking survival,
1980:782). The second court battle was that of two different labour unions
fighting for recognition on the premises of the different companies in the Frame
stable". Frame previously took a hard line with the unions and preferred to deal
with the rather tame Textile Workers' Industrial Union as opposed to the more
demanding National Union of Textile Workers (Glaser, 1985:30).
During this time, profitability in the group remained low and assets largely
under-utilised. Shareprices, however, rose on speculation that a take over could
be on the cards, should the Frame family win the court battle. The share prices
rose every time the case was supposed to be heard in court (the case was
frequently postponed). The most likely candidate for the take- over bid seemed
to be the Smith Group, through its subsidiary, Romatex (Ruffet, 1983:954).
Another potential take-over bidder often mentioned was the Cape-based
6 On the back of these expectations, the market capitalisation of the four companies almost doubled to R51
million from R26. 7 million. Consolidated Textiles shares traded at 265c compared to132c before Frame's
death, while Natal Consolidated rose from 275c to 525c. Natal Canvas reached 350c, up from 200c and SA
wool was at 235c, compared to l30c (Frame Group. The Committee of three, 1979:56).
7 Frame's legal battle with the National Union of Textile Workers alone, involved 53 court appearances
(Glaser, 1985 :30).
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clothing group, Seardel (both Romatex and Seardel would be significant in
Frame's future, but not in the way envisaged in the 1980s).
Incidentally, both battles were settled in the same year (1985): Frame's family
won theirs and agreements were reached with the Textile Workers Industrial
Union and the National Union of Textile Workers (McNulty, 1985:117). It was now
expected that Phillip Frame's conservative dividend policy would be relaxed and
that someof the group's assetsbe disposedof.
A 500%increase in dividends was indeed announced in November 1985. A clearer
picture of the group's asset base was also emerging after certain subsidiaries
had been consolidated and associate interests formerly excluded from published
accounts were now included. The results highlighted that the sharesof the listed
companies were still trading at a considerable discount to net worth. Evenmore
alarming was the effect that the more realistic reporting of assets had on
profitability ratios, now even lower than before. It was further estimated that
many of the group's factories would soon need considerable upgrades (Glaser,
1985:113).
July 1986 brought the changing of the guard at Frame - the 'committee of
three', who had by and large still carried on the traditions of Phillip Frame,
departed. New blood in the person of Justin Schaffer, former MD of SA Nylon
Spinners, took over from the troika. Schaffer's entrepreneurial talent was hailed
as the change that was needed to rejuvenate the group (Glaser, 1986:96). Major
changes were now to take place, from restructuring of holdings to that of
operations and strategies, departing from routines employed in the group for
years. These aspectsare discussedin detail in the analysis section.
In 1987 the shares held by the Phillip FrameTrust were sold to institutions, such
asAllan Gray, Sanlamand Southern Life in the largest single deal ever concluded
on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (at that time). As the new institutional
shareholders were likely to be long-term shareholders, the management of
Frame could expect to get the support they needed for their expansion and
improvement plans (Kilalea, 1987:645).
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The four listed companies in the Frame Group were restructured into Frame
Group Holdings (the holding company) and Consolidated Frame Textiles (the
operating arm). In 1988 Mervyn King, former judge and turn-around
entrepreneur, was appointed to drive the turnaround at Frame. At the time of
the departure of the previous MDthe restructuring and resuscitating processwas
not yet complete, while the cost of the restructuring coupled with poor
economic conditions and import competition drove the group's performance into
negative territory. Restructuring needs had begun to eat into cash reserves and
the group was no longer debt free. The consolidation of operations resulted in
massive retrenchments of labour, which increased restructuring costs and
pressure from trade unions to help resettle and/or retrain retrenched workers
(Payne, 1988:107, 1989:106, Kenney, 1989b: 121). Total employment had
dropped from 26 187 in 1985 to 19 146 at the 1989 year-end (McNulty, 1990a:
27). The results of the economic cool down and the higher interest rates in the
latter part of the 1980shad forced Frame to return to a conservative dividend
policy. The dividend had remained stable at 60c per share since 1986 (de Lange,
1989:67). The group continued to feel the costs of restructuring and expansion.
Further consolidation had to entail shrinking, moving or disposing of 'non-
performers' (McNulty, 1990a: 27). Apart from the obstacles mentioned above,
the 1990 financial year also saw an escalation of the political violence in Natal
and its spill-over into the workplace, badly affecting productivity levels
(McNulty, 1990b: 108). The first three years of the 1990swere dismal years for
the Frame Group. The domestic economy continued its downward slide, while
import competition intensified and the combined effect of the depreciation of
the Randand high interest rates meant that the necessarycapital expenditure at
the group's plants came at a much higher than expected cost. The debt portfolio
grew to more than R500million by 1993, while lossesof up to R1million a day
were incurred (Jones, 1997a: 1).
In 1990, Walter Simeoni (originally from Austria) was appointed as operations
director, but is was as MD of Consolidated Frame that he, together with
Chairman Mervyn King and deputy Chairman Roy Sable managed to pull off the
turnaround that saw the group return to profit in 1994. We discussthe details of
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the recovery programme in the analysis section. Frame maintained stable, but
unspectacular growth between 1994 and 1997, while further consolidation and
investment took place. In October 1996 Frame acquired 51%of Romatex, the
second largest listed textile company in South Africa. Romatex, who has
interests in cotton and wool fabrics, household textiles, floor coverings and
chemicals, was experiencing difficulties in the turbulent times that the South
African textile industry was facing and Framewas able to acquire the sharesat a
bargain price. Advantages for Frame included access to markets where it was
previously not active, such as carpets and worsted fabrics and its strategic
presence in the Western Cape province (Frame's stronghold is in Kwazulu-Natal
province)(Jones, 1996b: 1; Jones, 1997a: 2). Although the 1997 financial year
saw the completion of several of the projects in the recovery programme, the
acquisition of Romatex meant that more structural changes were necessary to
unlock the wealth-creation potential of its asset base, which now exceeded R1.3
billion (Thompson, 1997:114). Prospects for 1998were also much improved due
to healthy order books, a lower cost structure due to the new technology
installed, smaller losses from Romatex and larger profits from the property
divislon."
Mervyn King left the Frame group to take up banking in 1998, while Roy Sable,
previously deputy chairman, now became chairman and Aaron Searll, chairman
of Seardel, South Africa's largest clothing manufacturer became deputy
chairman. Walter Simeoni remained group MD (Jones, 1998a: 1). Under the
leadership of this team, Frame continued to regain competitiveness in the
1990s, focusing increasingly on growing the share of output destined for exports
(Claassen, 2001:1). In October 1999 the unbundling process was finally
completed when Frame eliminated its pyramid structure and crossholding in
Consolidated Frame Textiles. The latter was renamed the Frame Group and the
cash shell of Frame Group Holdings was sold to a Johannesburg-based
consortium, who has changed the name to Furnex Capital (Jones, 1999b:
1;Radebe, 2000:1). In 2000, in the light of the export growth opportunities
8 Because of all the unencumbered property holdings inherited from Phillip Frame's insistence on owning the
property on which the firm operated, a property division was created to manage the vast property holdings
and to lease those land and buildings that have become redundant after the 'down-sizing' exercise was
completed. This has become a profitable division of the fIrm.
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opening up under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, Seardel, who already
owned some shares in Frame, decided that a merger with the largest textile
manufacturer would stand it in good stead with respect to its export strategy.
Frame shareholders were amenable to the idea of a merger with Seardel and
Competition Commissionapproval of the merger was granted unconditionally in
December 2000. The SouthAfrican Clothing and Textile Workers' Union (Sactwu)
did not oppose the merger, either. The Frame Group delisted on 8 December
2000 (PSGOnline, 2001:154).
Frame gave the earnings of Seardel for the 2001 financial year a major boost
(Matthews, 2003) and continues to do so. Frame's contribution to revenue for
the 2002 financial year was 45%(up from 28%in 2001) and the textile division's
operating profit increased by 65%, eclipsing the 24%increase achieved by the
apparel division (CapeBusinessNews, 2003:1-2).
7.2.2 Glodina Holdings
Glodina's roots go back to 1953 when three brothers, Sergio, Aldo, and Oscar
Balladon, bought Dano Textiles, a printing and dyeing firm in Kwazulu-Natal.
They immediately started expanding by buying 20 weaving looms in order to
produce their own towelling (Korner, 2003:1). Both Aldo and Oscar received
textile training in Europe. They named their towelling products after their
mother, Glodina. Today Glodina is a household name in SouthAfrica.
Glodina Holdings was founded in 1986 and listed on the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange in 19879• The company manufactures and markets household textiles
such as towels, bathroom accessories, bedding and nappies. Its operational and
wholly-owned subsidiaries include Dano Textile Industries and Textowel
Weavers. Popular brand names include Black Label, Glodina, Glodina Beach and
RoyalShield (Profile Media, 2003:218).
9 Glodina's history before its listing in 1987 is not publicly available; hence we concentrate our analysis on
the history of Glodina since 1987.
208
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
The first year after its listing was an excellent one, despite the difficult times
that the economy and the rest of the textile industry were experiencing. The
company offered a dividend yield of 8,5% and a price earnings ratio of 4,7
compared to an average of 6 and 6,7 respectively for the textiles and clothing
sector. Because of its quality products, demand remained strong, order books
were full, and capacity was fully utilised 24 hours a day, sevendays a week. The
company was also starting to look at export possibilities and appointed an export
consultant for this purpose (Venter, 1988:99).
Glodina's decision to move part of its operations to QwaQwa, a self-governing
homeland," to reap the benefits of the decentralisation incentives offered by
government resulted in unexpected difficulties, especially affecting production
efficiencies. As a result margins for the 1988 financial year were down
considerably, from 18,9%to 14,2%and return on capital fell from 21,2% to a
lowly 13,4%.During the 1989financial year the firm introduced its strategic plan
to improve efficiency and productivity at both the Hammersdale and QwaQwa
plants (Kenney, 1989a: 89). We discuss the details of this strategic plan in the
analysis section.
Like other firms in the industry, Glodina was adversely affected by the political
violence in Natal in the 1980s and early 1990s and the general uncertainty
accompanying the process of political change in South Africa. Despite these
uncertainties, Glodina continued with its capital expansion programme,
estimated at R1.2 million. This added to its already high gearing", but it was
hoped that the improvements in efficiency would lead to cost savings, which
would offset the high interest burden in due time (Formby, 1990:96). The
difficulties of the early 1990s, compounded by increased imports, culminated in
a pre-tax loss of R3.2 million in 1992. No dividends were paid for the first three
years of the 1990s.The firm, however, started to recover in 1993, ahead of the
general economic recovery in 1994. The 1993 financial year saw the pre-tax loss
10 As part of the South African government's separate development plan, homelands were created along
ethnic lines. Some of these, Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei, opted for independence, while the
rest remained part of South Africa, as self-governing homelands. Generous industrial decentralisation
incentives were offered to firms who were willing to invest in these areas earmarked by government (Nkuhlu,
1987:35).
II Total interest bearing debt plus preferential share capital as a percentage of net asset value (Financial Mail,
December 5, 1980:1215).
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of 1992 turned into a profit of R3.1million. The government's offer to the GAn
to reduce tariff protection would also help the firm, becauseduties on its raw
material, especially cotton yarn, would also now be reduced (Greig,
1994:80;Joubert, 1995:102).
Financial year 1996 was another difficult year, seeing pre-tax profits decline
from its 1995 level of R6.8 million to R1.26 million. Apart from the general
difficulties in the industry, Glodina experienced problems with the
implementation of its capital expansion programme, which drastically affected
production and stock levels so that the company was unable to service its order
book (Connolly, 1997:50). R8.3 million was invested in plant and machinery,
mainly on the installation of new weaving systemsand storage racks, as part of
the ongoing factory upgrade programme. During 1995 and 1996a total of R22.5
million of capital expenditure took place. In 1998 the company was adversely
affected by the higher interest rates imposed to mediate the impact of
contagion from the Asian financial crisis. Economic growth was sluggish and
consumer demand declined, but the management believed that the company
was well positioned to survive the tough conditions. The interim results for 1998
showed another pre-tax loss and the firm was concentrating on improving
productivity locally and considering producing in a lower-cost country. Results to
June 1999were again disappointing and the strategy of producing outside South
Africa became a reality with the announcement that a 50:50 joint venture with
Merspin, a textile producer listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange, had been
entered into. This was considered a strategic move into the regional pipeline,
with the eye on the benefits that a larger regional market such as the Southern
African Development Community promised. The lower production costs in
Zimbabwe were also a serious consideration. In terms of the agreement, Glodina
would establish a new mill (Gloweave) near Bulawayo, where products for export
markets would be produced. The idea was to take advantage of the duty-free
accessto UKand USmarkets that Zimbabwe enjoyed at the time (Jones, 1999a:
2-5; Campbell, 1999:1-2).
During 1999 retrenchment of employees was deemed necessary to reduce
manufacturing costs, while the firm's after tax loss for the year amounted to
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R3.7 million. The management did not expect the firm to be profitable in the
short to medium term, while margins remained under pressure (Dispatch Online,
1999).
The joint venture in Zimbabwe began in March 2000, but was plagued by start-up
inefficiencies. Exports from the South African units increased relative to 1999,
turnover increased by 11% and interest rates were lower, but the losses
continued. Pre-tax profit to June 2000 amounted to R2.7million (Van Rensburg,
2000:69). The second half of 2000 did not bring the expected return to profits as
domestic retailing conditions continued to deteriorate and earnings declined
further (Van Rensburg, 2001:56). By now the earlier unease about economic
conditions in Zimbabwe had turned into serious concern and management felt
obliged to make an abnormal provision for the full amount of the investment in
Zimbabwe (R3.4 million). A large increase in provision for bad debts also added
to the woeful results. The company's hopeswere still focused on export growth
(although it was not a beneficiary of the AGOA, which excludes direct textile
exports) and cost reductions. The retirement of the chairman of the Board of
directors was announced quietly (Jenvey, 2001a: 2-3).
Because of its continued poor performance and the weak prospects for a
recovery in trading conditions, Glodina's shares took a beating on the
Johannesburg Securities Exchange. The share price drifted from 48c in August
2000 to 20c in August 2001. This situation attracted the interest of ClaasDaun, a
German private investor, who is renowned for his strategy of buying struggling
manufacturing companies and turning them around to profitability. In 2000 Daun
bought up the 32%of Glodina, held by Ettington Investments (Inggs, 2001a: 1). In
2001 the German entrepreneur acquired the shares of key shareholders (notably
the Balladon family) and made an unconditional offer to minority shareholders,
but most of them elected to hold on to their shares. Daun became a member of
the Board in November 2001, while his right-hand man in South Africa, Paul
Schouten, was appointed Managing Director (Korner, 2003:1; Jenvey, 2001a: 1-
2).
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After the take-over by Claas Daun, Glodina has used a R35 million rights issue to
finance a recapitalisation programme in order to return the firm to profitability.
Although the turnaround has not yet been achieved, the extent of the losses
incurred since 1998 has been declining, with headline loss per share reaching
43,9 cents at the end of the 2002, as opposed to 608,9 cents in the previous
financial year (Payne, 2003: 1).
In 2002, Glodina proposed a merger with Zorbatex, the towelling division of
Hellierwood Holdings. The attraction was the complementary capacity that the
merger would bring. Glodina later rescinded on the merger, citing 'material
misrepresentation' in the financial statements of Hellierwood Holdings. This
action resulted in an abnormal loss of R1.8 million (being the cost it had to incur
for withdrawing from the merger) in the 2002 financial year (Jenvey, 2003:1).
During the early months of 2003, both Daun and Schouten had been buying up
minority shares in Glodina Holdings. On during May 2003 their shares were sold
to Daun's international company, Daun & Cie, who in turn sold to Kap
Beteiligungs AG, a company controlled by Daun (Moneymax, 2003). We discuss
the significance of this latest move in the analysis section.
7.2.3 The Coastal Group
Very little is known about the defunct Coastal Clothing whose shell investors
from South Africa and Indonesia bought in 1995 to create the Coastal group with
plans to become one of the leading fully integrated (from manufactured fibres
and cotton seeds to garments) textile and clothing manufacturers in the
Southern African region (Jones, 1996). Its vision was 'to clothe people
fashionably by being globally orientated'. (Textile Federation, 1999: 12). The
Coastal Group was re-listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1995. The
group fully intended to start a renaissance in the South African textile industry,
despite the scepticism of some in the industry (Jones, 2000). The Coastal Group
was the holding company for four operating companies involved in the
manufacture of polyester and cotton-based fashion textile products in Southern
Africa. The group was also involved in cotton farming.
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In the year of its listing the company was not operational and recorded an
attributable lossof R1.26million and a lossper share of 3,23c. The next year did
not go much better, becausethe delivery of machinery for the finishing plant in
Hammersdaledid not take place and the firm remained non-operational. Funding
(R51.3 million) for the restructuring of other plants in South Africa and
Botswana, however, did arrive from Polysindo", the Indonesian majority
shareholder, and prospects for the 1997financial year looked promising.
In pursuit of their objective of growth and increased stakeholder wealth by
strategic expansion and diversification, Coastal acquired 100%of DeNim Textiles
(Hammersdale) and a 77% interest in Algo Spinning and Weaving Mills in
Gaborone, Botswana during 1997. At the time of its acquisition by Coastal, De
Nim was described as the leader in the production of denim fabrics in South
Africa. The backward and forward integration of De Nim gave it strategic
advantages in the areas of raw material procurement and the benefits accruing
from garment exports. De Nim boosted the group's turnover from R300000 to
R214.9million and turned a R2.2 million loss into a R16.1 million profit (Jones,
2000:1). Algo Spinning and Weaving produced quality denim fabrics for the
Southern African markets. In keeping with the group's overall strategy these
companies were to undergo major expansion programmes and structural and
technical re-alignment in order to maximise their inherent growth potential. The
expansion plan for DeNim aimed to increase production from 1.1 million meters
to 1.8 million meters a month. The company also invested in two greenfields
projects in Botswana and Hammersdale, South Africa. The new venture in
Botswana (Haltek) would produce polyester fabric, while the Hammersdale
venture was a finishing plant for polyester fabrics and garments, mainly men's
suits and women's dresses. The Hammersdale plant was expected to produce
three mill ion meters of fabric per month (Bennett, 1998:1). Further plans
included an $8 million investment in 10 000m2 of factory space at Prospecton,
where a twisting project would convert imported yarn into fabric, as well as a
clothing factory in Botswana to produce 6 million garments a year for the export
markets. To increase its clothing manufacturing capacity, Coastal made a hostile
12 Through its subsidiary, Texmaco.
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take-over bid for rival South African clothing maker AM Moolla, but failed to
acquire 51% of the shareholding and quietly abandoned the bid (Bennett,
1998:2).
In the company's 1997 annual report, the directors announced that
implementation of their 'aggressive upstream and downstream expansions' will
increase the total asset base from R400million to R600million by 2000. They
would invest a further R100 million in the denim division to increase its
flexibility and more than double its capacity. Plans were also underway to
establish a joint venture in a neighbouring country, which would increase
Coastal's cotton growing land by 20 000 hectares and double the yield (Jones,
1998b: 2).
In July 2000 De Nim, who employed 720 people at the time, was put in
provisional liquidation after Coastal's bankers announced that no further funding
would be advanced. Coastal's directors in South Africa struggled for months to
salvage De Nim and safeguard the rest of the group, while promised funding
from the Indonesian partner was not forthcoming. Having to raise funds locally
increased the group's indebtedness. At the end of the 1999 financial year, the
group's long-term liabilities stood at R212.7million, up from R184.6million in
1998, while current liabilities grew from R101million to R233.7million. A R21.1
million profit for 1998was transformed into a R34.6million loss in 1999. De Nim
was the only fully operational and cash-generating entity in the group and its
profits were used to provide funding for the greenfields projects in Botswana
and Hammersdale. However, when these projects came on stream, their working
capital demands far outstripped the cash that De Nim could provide in the
absence of the funding promised by the foreign partner, Texmaco (Jenvey,
2000a: 2).
The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) in South Africa became involved in
a salvaging operation at Coastal on the condition that the promised funding for
restructuring from the Indonesian partner would materialise. The hope was
that a revived Coastal would be well-positioned to take advantage of the
benefits offered by AGOA(Inggs, 2000:1).
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However, the salvageattempts by the IDCwere hampered by cash flow problems
and the reality that the Indonesian partner was unable to supply the necessary
funds. The final liquidation of De Nim and the demise of the Coastal group were
brought to a head by a minor creditor (owed R2million). Coastal's shareson the
Johannesburg Stock Exchangewere suspendedon the 24th of October 2000. Its
South African subsidiaries were liquidated on the 30th of October 2000, while
applications to wind up the businessof Algo Spinning and Weaving and Haltek
were heard in the BotswanaHigh Court during the sameweek (Inggs,2000:1).
De Nim was sold to China Garments as a going concern. The Coastal Group Ltd
was delisted on the 3rd of June 2002 (Profile Media, 2003:402).
The demise of the Coastal Group could not have come at a worse time for the
South African textile industry, desperate to retain credibility in order to benefit
from AGOA(Jones, 2000:1).
We now proceed to draw out similarities and differences amongst our firms,
based on certain criteria relating to the behaviour of firms and the exogenous
factors that influenced their behaviour and performance. In the analysis section
we make use of the insights garnered from the literature (described in Chapter
2) to help us make sense of the rich and varied details in the case histories
before us.
7.3 COMPARATIVEANALYSIS:ENDOGENOUSFACTORS
It is imperative to bear in mind that our purpose here is to bring under the
spotlight factors that could significantly influence the ability of firms to acquire
and implement new technology successfully. In this section we first introduce
the notion of routines in relation to what firms do and then ask four broad
questions:
• What did the firms in our case study strive to achieve in the short and
long term?
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• How did they go about the businessof achieving these objectives?
• What was the role of individuals (such as entrepreneurs and managers)
and institutions in this process?
• How did factors external to the firm influence the behaviour and
performance of the firms in our case study? (This last question is
answered in section 7.4).
In the analysis it becomesevident how routines permeate the activities of firms
over time and how they evolve as circumstances change.
7.3.1 Routines and Learning
Firms clearly have a multitude of routines, some more complex and dynamic
than others, as we have explained in Chapter 2. For our current purposes, our
analysis focuses on three kinds of routines that have been developed, used, re-
used and abandonedover the history of the firms in our case study:
• Standard operating procedures (embodied and expressed in productive
activities and technologies);
• Routines that determine the investment decisions of the firm (e.g. the
rules governing its growth and decline);
• The deliberate search procedures of the firm (Researchand Development
to discover new ways of doing things, e.g. improve technology, introduce
new products or find new markets or sources of inputs). These processes
are sometimes also called 'learning' and are summed up as the firm's
dynamic capobittties in the evolutionary economics literature (Cohendet
and Llerena, 2003:275).
Various selection mechanisms act on routines over time. In the competence-
based approach to the theory of the firm, these mechanismsare broadly divided
into external ('natural selection') mechanisms, i.e. market forces and the
internal selection mechanisms, introduced and practised by management
(Cohendet and Llerena, 2003:277). Sucha stark dichotomy, however, ignores the
possibility of feedback between these two types of selection mechanisms.
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Examples from our case studies show that there is in fact continuous signalling
going on between these mechanisms and it is the task of the
manager/ entrepreneur to recognise and interpret the signals and act on it.
Sometimes such signals attract the attention of outside entrepreneurs and the
firm may become the target of a take-over bid (e.g. Daunwith Glodina, Frame
with Romatex and others). One of the most important selection mechanismsin a
market economy is the financial institution, which in its decisions to make
available additional capital facilitates firm growth and survival (Garnsey,
1998:534).
Developing, adapting and changing routines require the acquisition of
information and knowledge acrossthe firm, which implies a learning processand
the need to develop mechanismsto learn and unlearn continuously. The business
management literature tends to portray this learning process as neat and
systematic, as the following sample illustrates:
"A learning organisation is not built by irrational principles; rather, very
systematic and concerted efforts are necessary to create and nurture it". With
this background, Mohanty and Deshmukh (1999:314) propose the following
process:
• An organisation chalks out a manufacturing strategy and identifies a set of
strategic manufacturing initiatives.
• The organisation formulates real time action plans based on the strategy
above and commits resources to various initiatives.
• The organisation makesconsciousefforts towards improving the quality of
decisions. These efforts are basically the drivers of a learning
organisation.
But, as our case studies illustrate, the firm does not start with a clean slate, but
with an existing knowledge base embodied in the individuals in the firm. This
includes the tacit knowledge that individuals bring with them to the firm and
that they acquire as they become more acquainted with the workings of the
firm. According to Penrose (1959:53), 'learning changes the productive
opportunities of the firm in ways unrelated to changes in the environment." To
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benefit from such learning one has to be open to the possibility that one's own
perception of competence may be vastly different from what an external
selection process considers competent. For example, in 1981 the Frame Group
saw itself as "a vast, dynamic and multi-faceted organisation. Its products must
be competitive in quality and price and to achieve this, the organisation must be
efficient in all respects." The tone of this statement was quite contrary to the
views that market analysts at the time held about the group: " ...the under-
utilisation of assets, reflected in the abysmal profit returns as well as
excessively high current ratios, indicated quite the opposite." (Thompson,
1981: 1122). Useful learning here would thus require taking this feedback into
account and adapting routines on the basisof new knowledge.
Learning mechanisms can be organised in an informal and a formal way. We
discuss formal organisation of learning under the section on labour. The
organisation of R&Dis discussedunder search routines (Section 7.3.1.3).
Developing and establishing routines as habits is a notion that at least one of our
firms encourages in so many words. The following quote from Aristotle
repeatedly appears in Frame'sdocumentation: " We are what we repeatedly do.
Excellence, therefore, is not an act, but a habit." (Frame Annual Report,
2001 :2), As president of the South African Textile Federation, Simeoni is also
establishing this notion in the consciousness of the industry association's
members (Simeoni, 2002: 1-2).
7.3.1.1 Standard operating procedures: productive activities and
production strategies
Frame initially started out with a specialisation in blanket production and
dominated this market for decades. After a period of diversification into various
markets, which ranged from footwear to underwear and floor coverings, the firm
is now a fully vertically integrated organisation. The organisation comprises 13
divisions, covering short staple and worsted spinning systems, processing fine
wools and blends as well as cotton and cotton blends (Frame Annual Report,
2001:1). As part of the Seardel stable Frame also has access to the clothing
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sector. Thus, while the firm was a generalist with little integration during the
Phillip Frame era, it can now be described as a streamlined, integrated
organisation. Production technologies comprise circular knitting, weaving and
non-woven technologies.
Glodina has always had a specialisation in household textiles, but has over the
years expanded the range of products on offer, as we report in the innovation
section.
Coastal's aim was a fully integrated pipeline from raw materials to garments,
which in the end, did not materialise. Its broad production strategy was to use
De Nim as a fully functioning, cash generating entity, while it was trying to get
the green fields projects off the ground and restructure the other acquisitions.
7.3.1.2 Investment routines
Phillip Frame's investment routine was twofold: with respect to dividend policy
and financing of investment. Routines are seldom stated so explicitly, so we
quote at length. He spelt out his investment routine as follows:
"The policy of the group hasalways been - after paying taxation and reasonable
dividends - to create reserves in order to provide the funds required for
modernisation, development and expansion. In the first place, 40%of the profit
of a company must be allocated for taxation. Secondly, at least 25%of the
company's profits must be provided for renewing, replacing and modernising
plant and machinery. A company is therefore left with about 35%of its profits
with which to pay dividends and to create reserves to meet emergency and
recession periods and for further expansion." (Brown, 1979:242). Frame's
insistence on acquiring everything on cash terms, including land and buildings,
has a strong path dependency related to his German origin. He lived through the
financial difficulties of the German economy in the 1920s, and this apparently
instilled in him a permanent aversion to debt (Glaser, 1985:29). When he died
the FrameGroup had no debt whatsoever.
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The management troika that succeeded Phillip Frame continued to apply this
routine, to the dissatisfaction of many a commentator in the financial press.
However, given the group's low profitability, and the extreme difficulty of
improving the situation in the face of the economic decline of the early 1980s,
management could not justify abandoning this conservative stance in favour of
external financing. As one analyst put it: "In this regard, the Frame Group
seems to have carefully positioned itself between a rock and a hard place."
(Wilson, 1982:1091).
As noted earlier, the troika abandoned Phillip Frame's investment rules in order
to raise the dividend 500%.However, under the new management, led by Mervyn
King, the firm increased its debt considerably to finance capital expenditure.
Becauseof the sharp increase in debt and the higher interest rates, the firm was
forced to return to the previous conservative dividend policy (de Lange,
1989:67).
Glodina for most of the 1990sfollowed a very conservative dividend policy and
this situation still continues: the firm has not paid any dividends for the last five
years - with good reason, since the firm has been languishing in the red over
this period (Jenvey, 2003:1).
Coastal also opted for a conservative dividend policy in the 1997 financial year,
despite a rise in earnings, because of the demands that expansions put on cash
holdings (Jones, 1998b). Eventually, it was cash flow problems that brought
Coastal to its kneesand into final liquidation.
7.3.1.3 Search routines, innovativeness and the acquisition of new
technoLogy
In this section we first consider the firms' search routines, especially the
organisation of R&D, followed by the innovative activities, and finally the nature
of investments in new technology (Theseaspects are summarised in Table 7.1).
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Frame has its own R&Ddivision in-house, but it also cooperates with other firms
and institutions such as the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS)with
respect to research on quality and environmental certification. Frame also has a
group of very experienced people with science degrees, who serve on the firm's
R&Dcouncil. These researchers produce hundreds of new products per annum,
of which the firm estimates, about 20%are commercially viable (Frame Annual
Report, 2001:2).
Glodina's strategic focus is on technological renewal from R&D, but also new
technology, which it buys in (Greig, 1994:80). The firm has its own in-house R&D
division, but also makesuse of services of other institutions such as the SABSfor
quality and ISO14000related research (Glodina CompanyPortfolio, 2003).
Coastal's arrangement of R&D was fully tied-in with that of its foreign
technology partner. The firm further relied on the competencies of its
technology and equipment suppliers (Payne, 1999:1-4).
Under Phillip Frame the firm's innovative activities focused on product
innovations in order to exploit new market opportunities, especially in areas
that were previously supplied by imports. The Frame of the last 25 years or so
needed to be innovative in terms of products, process technologies and
organisation in order to survive and grow in a fast changing environment. For
example, we have elaborated earlier on the changes in consumer preferences,
especially those rewarding environmentally friendly manufacturing processes.
Mindful of the need to comply with environmental requirements (especially to
grow exports to developed countries), Frame embarked on a major technological
development project in a joint venture with Benninger, a Swiss machine
manufacturer. The aim was to develop a new indigo denim plant that would
treble Frame's production capacity and outperform other denim technologies in
terms of cost effectiveness and environmental concerns. Frame invested R80
million in this plant that would be the first of its kind in the world." The fabric
13 A second one has since been established elsewhere (Interview with Frame's management, 17 November
2000).
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produced with the aid of this technology" would be superior to the output of
traditional denim technologies, but Frame would have to take the responsibility
of being the pioneer, carrying the costs of teething problems and the training
required to handle the leading-edge technology. This alliance and the
technology resulting from it can be considered competence enhancing, as
opposed to competence destroying in the sense that it was complementary to
the competencies developed under Frame's rejuvenation programme of the
preceding years and the investment in other new technologies."
The new indigo denim plant at Frame took longer than expected to work
smoothly. This was partly foreseen, because of the revolutionary nature of the
technology, which entailed some unpredictability. The difficulties with the
chemical complexities of the process technology were foreseen, but there were
also mechanical difficulties, which the Frame management and their alliance
partner did not foresee (Frame Annual Report, 1999:2).
During the 2000 financial year Frame invested RBOmillion specifically to take
advantage of the opportunities offered by the AGOA,and had planned to invest a
further R200 million in order to improve productivity, cost-effectiveness and
capacity. Simeoni aims to be ready to take advantage of the increased demand
for fabrics produced in Sub-SaharanAfrica when the AGOAexemption, which
allows least developed countries to use fabric from any country to produce
clothing for the USmarket, lapses in 2004 (Inggs, 2001b: 1).
The 2001 and 2002 financial years saw further technology upgrades and
expansion. Capital expenditure in 2001 amounted to R95 million 16 (including
some overruns from the previous financial year), while another R75million was
14 The new process uses advanced chemical technology, precision engineering and unique computerised
control and monitoring systems. (Lourens, 1997:32)
15 These new technologies include 140 state-of-the-art air jet weaving looms, a modernised open-end
spinning plant and the latest ring-spinning technology (Frame Annual Report, 1999). The air-jet weaving
plant replaced 400 older machines and would manufacture 50% of the group's output of woven fabric (Jones,
1997b: 1).
16 The lion's share of the investments went into a new spinning mill, upgrading of winding and spinning mills
in New Germany, a new continuous mercerising range for wide width fabric at Texfin, a new denim finishing
range and fully automated packaging line, a fully automated fitted sheet machine at Frame Manchester, a
complete fibre preparation, needle punch and thermal treatment plant at Fibretex and a major hard and
software upgrade to link group activities more effectively (Frame Annual Report, 2001:2).
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spent in 2002. Another R120million in capital expenditure has been budgeted
for the short-term. The commissioning and implementation of the technology
invested in during 2002 once again encountered problems and delays, which
negatively affected the firm's delivery times. The international textile suppliers
were unable to meet the firm's pre-determined performance parameters during
and after commissioning, with a domino effect that ended in less than adequate
performance by the firm. The group MDconsidered this experience the pain that
comeswith progress (FrameAnnual Report, 2002:3).
Glodina's innovative activities focus on new product development to enlarge
existing markets and/or enter new ones. Examplesof design innovations include
the industrial strength, warp-knit towel (Marathon) aimed at the hospitality
industry, an upmarket sheeting range, as well as the Glodina Beach range of
towels (Glodina CompanyProfile, 2003:1).
Coastal's redeeming feature with respect to innovativeness relates to the
recognition of a new or better source of inputs. Coastal saw a gap in the market
for polyester fabric produced in Southern Africa and its exclusive access to
imported yarn through its Indonesian connections, gave it an edge over other
competitors (Msomi, 1999:1).
Investment in new technology at both Frame and Glodina included hardware and
software, which enabled computer integrated manufacturing (CIM) and better
handling and distribution. ICTalso allowed entrance to e-commerce, and virtual
market places, such as the trading houses and other e-commerce ventures
described in Chapter 4.
Both Frame and Glodina believe in clean production and have made the
necessary investments to minimise environmental damage. In addition to the
environmentally friendly denim plant, Frame is also ISO14000 certified and is
involved in the clean production programme in South Africa (details are
discussedunder the section on institutions). Glodina had, for example, invested
in electrical boilers, which use less energy and generate less negative
externalities than conventional coal-fired ones (Environmentally friendly steam
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deal, 1998:2). Glodina's production processes are also compliant with ISO 14000
requirements (Glodina Company Profile, 2003:1).
7.3.1.3.1 New technology and the error of over-optimism
Errors of over-optimism according to Kirzner (1997:43) occur when a market
participant expects to be able to complete a plan, which cannot be completed
(at least not in the timeframe assigned to it). Of this Coastal is a prime example.
Whereas it took Frame two and a half years to develop and implement their new
environmentally-friendly denim plant, Coastal expected its green fields projects
to be operational within a year, while they were simultaneously involved in
expanding and restructuring other operations. This was a tall order indeed. As it
turned out, the ambitions of the Coastal management were not fulfilled. When
De Nim was sold in October 2000, much of the new equipment needed for its
turnaround was still in its plastic packaging (Jones, 2000: 1)
TABLE 7.1. ROUTINES, INNOVATIVENESSAND NEW TECHNOLOGY
CRITERIA FRAME GlODINA COASTAL
Search routines In-house & Joint In-house and Foreign technology
(R&D) venture; buy-in; partner
SABS SABS
New technology CAD/CAM Clean Delays in delivery
Denim plant; production and implementation
problems with Problems with of new technology
implementation; did implementation
not consistently
upgrade machinery
Investment Phillip Frame lapses in focus lack of focus
routines and (Cash rule, reserves, and foresight Reliance on foreign
strategies low dividends) Bounded partners
later management's rationality
departure from these
rules
Innovativeness Process and product Product Source of raw
innovation innovation materials
Production Specialisation versus Specialisation in Fully integrated
strategies diversification/ household pipeline from raw
generalisation textiles materials to
garments
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The lesson from the Coastal experience seems to be not to attempt to advance
on too many fronts at once, but to use existing firm capabilities as far as
possible since it takes time to build new ones. New expertise can be bought, but
the experience of working together must still be built, a fact emphasised by
Penrose (1959:52) and discovered by Coastal in Botswana and Glodina in
Zimbabwe.
7.3.2 Long-Term and Interim Objectives
7.3.2.1 Long-term objectives
In the economics literature there has been much debate about the objectives of
the firm. Is it profit maximisation as assumed by the neoclassical theory, or
satisficing or a combination of other objectives such as market share, size, etc.
for which profit is an underlying, implicit requirement? (Seefor example Ricketts
(1987), for a comprehensive overview of the issues).
We report here on the long-term (over-arching) objectives of the firms as
publicised by their leaders (Summarisedin Table 7.2).
Against the background of the changing international trade environment and
changing policies in the domestic economy (see exogenousfactors below), Frame
defines its overarching objective as 'becoming a competitive textile
manufacturer by focusing on training people, deploying the latest technology
available and providing the highest level of service to its customers.' (Frame
Annual Report, 1997:2). Looking back at the history of Frame, this seemsto have
been an ever-present long-term strategy, although it was not voiced in these
exact words.
Glodina's long-term objective is to 'become a quality competitor in a highly
competitive niche market' (household textiles).
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Coastal wanted to be the largest fully integrated textiles and clothing
manufacturer in Southern Africa and it had aspirations of being one of the
largest in Africa, too.
To achieve their long-term objectives, firms formulate short-term or interim
objectives, which one could view as building blocks on the road to the long-term
objectives. It is these interim objectives that we consider next.
7.3.2.2 Interim Objective«
By interim objectives we mean the focus of the firm in the short - to medium
term en route to achieving the overall long-term objective. The firms often had
multiple aims and their priorities changed over time. For example, while at
Frame, Phillip Frame placed much store in market share and the size of his
ernptre", accepting low profitability in pursuit of this goal; the appointment of
Mervyn King brought a clear focus on profit, rather than size. In fact, the
downsizing and rationalisation strategy introduced by King streamlined the
empire left by Frame to four businessunits under a holding company (de Lange,
1989:67). Each of the businessunits was expected to be profitable in its own
right.
Glodina has tried to achieve its long-term objective by focusing on the interim
strategies of modernising equipment, extensive staff training and niche
marketing. The company chose to concentrate on technological developments to
help it remain competitive when import competition intensifies becauseof trade
liberalisation. Chairman John Balladon believed that " Only the fittest will
survive." (Joubert, 1995: 102). Glodina at times displayed a lack of strategic
focus, with its strategies and priorities changing from one reporting period to
another (often every six months at the interim reporting stage). For example,
the strategic decision reported in the interim results to June 1999was to reduce
stock levels by lowering production output and clearing excess stock at lower
prices (Despatch Online, 1999). This was in contrast to the strategic intent
17 In this pursuit he was successful: at the time of his death, industry sources maintained that the Frame
Group was the biggest single maker of blankets in the world and the largest textile concern in the southern
hemisphere (Fiford, 1984:32).
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published six months previously: although price was important in consumers'
spending decisions, Glodina was not prepared to compromise on quality and
would strive for improved productivity through the entire businessin order to lift
margins (JSEHandbook, 1998). Although the oscillation in focus may be seen as
lack of direction on the part of management, it could also be interpreted as
having learned to respond flexibly to internal and market conditions. The
important point, however, is to consider the selection mechanisms, in
particular, the feedback from the markets. Market analysts, as we have pointed
out, play an important signalling role in bridging the gap between the firm's
internal selection mechanisms (in the minds of management) and the external
selection mechanisms of the market. In the case of Glodina (as with Frame
earlier - section 7.3.1) there was a wide gap between what management
believed was acceptable performance for the firm and the view of analysts in
the market. For example, in response to management's assessmentin the 1998
financial results that the current losses were acceptable under the difficult
economic conditions, one analyst bluntly suggested that management should
resign, since losses should never be treated as acceptable so acquiescently
(Rutherford, 1998:88). As it turned out, better days did not arrive and the firm
had to be rescued by an outside investor. Under the current management,
Glodina continues to focus on maintaining its reputation and market share in the
domestic market and to break into the global market in certain niches (we
discussthe details of the marketing strategy in Section 7.3.4).
Although Coastal's ten-year strategic plan placed performance as the top
priority or main objective, the majority of communications by top management,
notably its Managing Director, Rajen Pillay, seemed to be focused almost
exclusively on growth, i.e. achieving a desired size relative to other competitors
in the African region:
,...Pillay believes Coastal is poised to become one of the largest fabric producers
in Africa with an output of 56 million m2 per year (Payne, 1999:2).
,...the group acquired a 77%interest in the Gaborone-based Algo Spinning and
Weaving Mills. These acquisitions are a continuation of the Group's objective of
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growth and increased stakeholder-wealth by strategic expansion and
diversification.' (Chairman's statement, Coastal Group, 1997, quoted in JSE
Handbook, 1997:144).
'Rajen Pillay, the group managing director, ...claimed that the Coastal Group
would soon become one of the main textile groups in the country, boasting the
most state-of-the-art technology.' (Jones, 1996:1).
TABLE7.2: OBJECTIVESANDGROWTHSTRATEGIES
CRITERIA FRAME GLODINA COASTAL
Firm's Margins To be quality To be largest
objectives Market share competitor in integrated
Maximising profits niche market textile and
SalesGrowth (1990s) (household clothing firm
/expansion (size versus textiles) in Southern
performance) Africa
Growth Organic growth Acquisition, Acquisition
strategy Greenfields projects organic growth Greenfields
Mergers& acquisitions Joint venture projects
Downsizing/rationalisation Merger Joint venture
Take over
The firms' objectives are operationalised into strategies, which influence their
growth paths and structure, and eventually industry structure. Theseaspects are
the focus of the next section. The growth strategies of the three firms are
summarised in Table 7.2.
7.3.3 Growth Strategies, Growth Paths and Organisational Structure
According to Penrose (1959) a firm's growth is a cumulative, evolutionary
process, reflecting path dependency (Garnsey, 1998:526). Variation and
uncertainty, however, make growth paths of firms unpredictable. Firms faced
with similar external conditions may still end up on different growth paths and
achieve different outcomes. It is these diverse outcomes and the decisions that
underlie the outcomes that will be the focus of our analysis in this section.
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7.3.3.1 Growth strategies and organisational structure
Garnsey (1998: 530) points out that a firm's growth path is seldom a straight line
from inception to maturity. There are various possibilities on this road, which is
characterised by uncertainty. These possibilities include early failure", an early
plateau (in the absence of further stimuli to growth), organic growth and
expansion through green fields projects, mergers and acquisitions. Some firms
also experience growth reversal and downscaling through de-merger or
restructuring processesand closure of some plants or subsidiaries in an attempt
to ensure the future survival of the organisation.
The start-up conditions for Frame, Glodina and Coastal differed considerably.
Whereas for Philip Frame the South African textile industry was virtually a clean
canvason which he could put down his vision for the industry, both Glodina and
Coastal entered when the industry was already well-established. Further, while
Frame grew up under an increasingly protective trade regime and Glodina joined
under this regime, Coastal entered the industry when the pendulum was
swinging the other way: the South African government had begun to reduce the
protection. Whereas the founders of Frame and Glodina had training and
experience in textiles, the founder of Coastal came from an auditing background
and had to rely to a very large extent on the expertise of his foreign partners.
Frame's growth path consisted of green fields investments, organic growth and
mergers and acquisitions. Mergers and acquisitions offer the opportunity to
infuse new blood and capital, acquire new competencies and capabilities and
even to change the culture of the new organisation over time. We discuss only
some of the most significant mergers and acquisitions in Frame's history. In
February 1982 Frame acquired its biggest rival, Natal Cotton and Woollen Mills
(NCWM), and gained virtual control (90%share of production) of the blanket
industry (Frame Group. Additional Cover, 1982:824). This was a potential
problem of overcapacity for Frame, because local demand was declining in a
18 The business management literature abounds with data indicating the high rate of failure of new firms; as
many as half of them fail within the first ten years of their start-up (Garnsey, 1998:551).
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cooling economy and exports into Africa was not feasible for political reasons."
The NCWMacquisition, however, held a major promise with respect to product
innovation. In the light of consumer preferences for blankets becoming more
sophisticated, NCWMhad been concentrating on higher quality acrylic rather
than rayon blankets, which are lighter and finer. Introducing fur-pile blankets,
which were at the time only available through imports, was also an option
(Frame Group. Additional Cover, 1982:824). Like the NCWMtake-over, the
Romatex take-over afforded Frame the opportunity to increase its own size and
gain access to product and geographical markets where it was previously not
active. It was also an opportunity for the management to apply their expertise
and experience acquired in the recent restructuring and rejuvenation of Frame
to another venture as expressed by Brian Connellan, the chairman of Romatex:
"in the last six years Romatex has not produced a return on assets above the
weighted cost of capital. It was unlikely to do so in future and the only way to
create shareholder wealth instead of destroying it was a deal with a party that
could bring rationalisation benefits to a combined business". (Jones, 1997e).
Frame'smerger with Seardel, the largest clothing manufacturer in South Africa,
offered several benefits, of which the most important must be the strategic
avenue it provided to benefit from preferential access to the USmarket under
AGOA(direct textile exports are excluded from AGOA).
Glodina's growth strategies included both organic growth and attempts at
establishing joint ventures and mergers. It is in these last two cases that the
firm's management was seriously hampered by bounded rationality when they
made these strategic decisions. Firstly, in the instance of taking the decision to
pursue a joint venture with Merspin in Zimbabwe, the benefits seemed to
outweigh the disadvantages by far. It was only further down the line when the
seriousness of the economic and political problems in Zimbabwe became
evident, that the management of Glodina realised that under the circumstances
the expected benefits from the deal will not materialise and they accepted the
19 Zimbabwe, for example imported 3 million blankets from Japan out of reluctance to trade with Apartheid
South Africa (Frame Group. Additional Cover, 1982:824).
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costs (R3.4 million) of pulling out of the joint venture. Secondly, after the take-
over of Glodina by ClaasDaun, a merger with Hellierwood subsidiary, Zorbatex,
a towelling product manufacturer, which would have complemented Glodina's
products, was proposed. The advantages to Glodina included lower input costs in
Ladysmith, new plant and equipment, lower borrowings and an established
export record (Jenvey, 2002:1-2). It was only after an offer had been made and
an agreement had been entered into that problems with the financial status of
Zorbatex emerged and Glodina's management reneged on the deal, incurring a
cost of R1.8million.
Both Frame and Glodina have experienced growth reversal and restructuring.
Whereas Frame's restructuring culminated in a return to profit that has been
sustained for almost a decade now, Glodina is still in the processof recovery.
Coastal Textiles in our case studies is an example of early failure after a brief
honeymoon period (1997-1999)when they managed to show a profit and started
to gain recognition in an industry, which was initially quite sceptic about the
wisdom of the goals they had set for themselves (Payne, 1999:1-3). Coastal
chose textiles at a time when perceived prospects for the industry were dismal,
but Pillay was able to convince foreign shareholders of the export potential
under quota-free access conditions from Southern Africa, as well as the
advantages of good infrastructure and low energy costs in South Africa. Pillay
himself perceived it as a major challenge to bring to fruition his vision of Coastal
as the largest integrated textiles and garment firm in Southern Africa. Delays in
implementing the investment on the part of his foreign partners (initially
because of the uncertainties around the transition to a democratic system of
government in South Africa) severely tested Pillay's access to resources in the
start-up phase. (Bennett, 1998:1-3)
Coastal's growth strategies consisted of takeovers and investment in green field
projects. Considering the time-span of the firm's existence (1995-2000), "too
much, too soon"sumsup the growth strategies of the Coastal Group.
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In sum, each firm's growth path led to changesin its organisational structure and
put varying demandson the competencies of its management. We consider these
aspects next.
7.3.3.2 Organisational structure and managerial competencies
When Phillip Frame died, he left behind a veritable web of cross-holdings in
companies, which he himself believed would take three generations to
disentangle. The organisational structure was so complex that the new
management had to design a dedicated computer programme to help unravel the
threads amongst the individual companies. An important concern was to avoid
double counting of assets (Glaser, 1985:29). It eventually took two decades to
streamline the structure of the FrameGroup.
While the Frame management was tied up in court, things were going badly
wrong back at the firm. After the departure of the troika, the new management
of Frame made public some of the mistakes that had been allowed during the
first half of the 1980s:
Foreign exchange lossesof R15, 1 million, and obsolete stock worth R5 million
had to be written off (Glaser, 1987:34). Under the late Phillip Frame - and
continued under the triumvirate -, the company had acquired a manufacturing
orientation that paid little attention to the need for good profit margins. In
pursuit of turnover and market share, margins were cut to the bone and
extraordinary long terms extended to debtors. For example, at the end of June
1986, the Natal Consolidated's debtor's book amounted to R256.6 million,
equivalent to six months' outstanding debt on R544.9 million annual sales
(Glaser, 1987:34). The new directors found 'a serious lack of communication and
considerable tension between managing directors, senior managers and other
employees and an absence of meaningful management information upon which
effective decisions could be made.' They also discovered that 'an absence of
market research and sales forecasting, coupled with a lack of communication
between the manufacturing and sales departments ...often resulted in
unproductive machine utilisation.' (Glaser, 1987:35). Even worse, an imbalance
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between the various sections of plant resulted in weaving capacity far
outstripping the group's ability to dye and finish cotton fabrics; 'product was
sold at unrealistically low prices, which often did not recover the full costs. This
resulted in certain sectors of plant capacity becoming grossly oversold.' (Glaser,
1987:35). One of the perceived drawbacks of the Frame Group of the late 1980s
was its lack of vertical integration. Its output was quite diverse and sold in large
volumes, trying to compete on the basisof low margins. Its investments in new
technology in order to increase value-added were viewed as 'more-of-the-same',
since its competitors were also implementing capital expenditure programmes
with the same objectives in mind (McNulty, 1990:27). Thus, the structure and
strategic focus of the firm had to change. This state of affairs clearly needed
better management competencies and some entrepreneurial action (which we
deal with in the next section).
Glodina had experienced similar problems during the 1990s, suffering from low
productivity, dwindling staff morale and erratic performance with respect to
quality, delivery times and customer services. Since the Daun take-over, staff
morale and productivity at Glodina are much improved. Rejects are down from
12 - 15%of output to about 2 - 3 %(Jenvey, 2002:1-2).
Coastal's South African management, though successful in attaining promises of
funding from its foreign investors, did not recognise and act on a pattern of
promises and delays starting from the very inception of the firm. Notably, the
first delay occurred during the start-up phase, and the last delay in the transfer
of funds was the straw that finally broke the camel's back (Bennett, 1998:2;
Inggs,2000:1).
7.3.4 Selling the Firm's Output: Marketing Strategy and Focus
All three of our firms had their eye on the export market, but for two of them
the domestic market was initially the most important outlet for their products.
Domestically, Frame has moved from staples for the African market (such as
blankets) to more upmarket fabrics and household textiles (Kenney, 1989:121).
As domestic and foreign competitors succeeded in chewing into Frame's market
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share, the company embarked on an aggressiveand costly marketing strategy.
This started paying off in 1990when Frame started clawing back market share
(McNulty, 1990:26). Glodina initially focused on the domestic market alone,
while Coastal aimed at import substitution as well as export growth." In this
section we study the experiences of the firms in the case study with respect to
their marketing strategy and focus (Summarisedin Table 7.3).
7.3.4.1 Swjtching to export orientation
To be competitive in the modern economy requires a much closer relationship
between strategic planning and marketing than ever before, whether the firm
competes only in the domestic market or also internationally. However, when
the firm enters the international arena, it has to deal with a larger number of
more diverse competitors and market conditions, and has to confront a
multitude of decisions (Vernon-Wortzel andWortzel, 1997:301).
In the opinion of some industry commentators", South African textile firms have
no option but to cultivate export markets if they want to survive. Frame has
taken several steps that positioned it favourably to increase exports both
directly and indirectly. Its direct exports entail mainly household textiles, which
it markets through various channels under its own brand names. Indirectly, its
merger with Seardel gives it the opportunity to grow indirect exports by
supplying fabric for Seardel's clothing exports. Frame was also quick to work
with Mauritian clothing manufacturers to supply the necessaryfabrics, which will
allow them to fulfil the large orders from American clients under the AGOA.22
According to Frame's MD,Walter Simeoni, breaking into the USmarket had been
a huge learning curve, which required adapting to exacting quality standards and
agreeing to 'flexible partnerships', which gave American companies the right to
cancel orders even if all their requirements were met (Inggs, 2002a: 1-2).
20Coastal intended to take away more than half the share of imports in the 100g/m2 to 120g/m2 and the
160gm2 to 220g/m2 weight ranges from Taiwan and Korea (Payne, 1999:2).
21Interviews with Jack Kipling, South African Clothing Industry Export Councel and Martin Viljoen, South
African Textile Industry Export Council, 20 November 2000.
22lnterview with Frame Managing Director, New Germany, 17 November 2000.
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Frame's exports of household textiles (curtains, draperies and bed-linen) has
increased on the back of the Rand's depreciation in the short term, but in the
longer term, it is the companies attention to quality, design and service that is
starting to payoff in a very competitive environment. In the UK market, for
example, Frame's products compete for market share with at least 50 other
producers, some of them Brazilian firms, who have also benefited from the
depreciation in their currency (Claasen,2001:1).
In 1996, Glodina's management committed to an export strategy, initially
targeting the industrial (hotel) market in the UK and Germany. At the same
time, they launched a new sheeting range for the small up-market niche in the
domestic market (Jones, 1996a: 1). Glodina'ssales team hasset a target to raise
the percentage of output aimed for the export market to 20%by December 2003
(Inggs, 2002a: 1-2). R5million of the recent rights issuewas spent towards new
equipment for export orders (Inggs, 2002). Daun's position as international
textile entrepreneur" should be able to open up doors to Glodina's exports.
Daun believes the Glodina brand could be repositioned for exports to offset the
low growth prospects and import competition in the domestic market (Glodina
throws in towel to German buyer, 2001:1).
7.3.4.2 Marketing meenanisme and strategies
By marketing mechanisms we mean not only the means to make customers
aware of the firm's products, but also the sourcesof market information that the
firm utilises. The market information includes intelligence about consumer
tastes and preferences as well as information about competitors' strategies and
products.
Our firms have used both traditional mechanisms(such as sales offices and sales
agents) and electronic age methods, such as company websites and virtual
market places on the Internet.
23 The South African interests contribute about R3 billion to Daun's worldwide operations, which span
Germany, France, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Portugal, Canada, the US, China and Uzbekistan (Bolin,
2003).
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Frame was probably the first South African textile firm to establish its own
buying and selling office in London (in the 1950s). This was followed by the
establishment of sales offices in other Southern African countries. Frame
regularly participates in domestic and international exhibitions and prefers one-
on-one contact with customers, rather than working through foreign agents or
government-sponsored trade mtssions."
Frame has its own website, but also plays a part in joint industry efforts, such as
the virtual market place offered by the South African Textile Industry Export
Council (details of other virtual market places are discussedin Chapter 5).
Glodina also participates in exhibitions, uses sales agents, has its own website
and is a member of the South African Textile Industry Export Council (SATIEC).
Glodina's participation in the Living SpaceExhibition in CapeTown, for example
paid off in significant orders from Dubai and the UK (Inggs,2002a: 1-2).
Coastal, by its management's own admission, has lacked a comprehensive
marketing strategy (Gordon, 2000:2). Since De Nim was the only properly
operational entity in the lifetime of Coastal Holdings, it is fairly safe to assume
that the latter continued with the marketing strategies already in place at De
Nim. Coastal had its own website and made use of sales agents in foreign
countries, as well as the market networks of its foreign partners (Bennett,
1998:1-3).
Firms also create awarenessof their brands by participating in public events and
sponsoring fundraising events for charity. Glodina and Frame have done this for a
wide range of charities. Coastal, through its subsidiary, De Nim, sponsored an
annual charity event, coinciding with their race day at Greyville Race course,
Kwazulu-Natal. Focusing on denim, a prize was awarded to the best 'denim
dressed' (Denim Derby, 1997:3).
24 Interview with Marketing Director of Bergriver Textiles, subsidiary of Frame, 13 December 2000.
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TABLE7.3. ENDOGENOUSFACTORS:MARKETINGSTRATEGYANDFOCUS
CRITERIA FRAME GLODINA COASTAL
Marketing Salesoffices, Marketing Had a website
mechanismsand exhibitions, agents consultant, Denim derby
sourcesof and word of mouth salesoffices, Lack of
market E-commerce agents and comprehensive
information exhibitions marketing
E-commerce strategy
Export Strategic focus since Major export Garment
1970s drive from 1996 production
solely for export
Domestic Yes Yes Yes
market
7.3.5 The Role of Entrepreneurial Talent and Labour
Since at least two of the entrepreneurs in our case histories have had a
relationship to labour which is difficult to categorise, yet had an important
influence on the culture of the firm, it makessenseto combine the entrepreneur
and labour in this section of the analysis (Summarised in Table 7.4). The
entrepreneur's role is, however, not limited to his25 relationship to labour.
7.3.5.1 The role of the entrepreneur
Like Schumpeter (1928), Penrose (1959), Kirzner (1997) and others (see for
example Garnsey, 1998:527), we are interested in individuals (especially the
entrepreneur) as change agents. As Garnsey (1998:528) underscores " ...the
immediate impact of their actions is visible at the micro-level and can set off
cumulative processesthat work through to further levels of system aggregation."
In our case studies, the influence of Philip Frame in the early history and the
revolutionary effect of Claas Daun on the South African textile industry of the
latter part of the twentieth century are of particular interest.
Through the histories of these firms runs a common thread, sometimes more
visible than at other times; this is the thread of discovery, solution and renewal,
25 There were no female entrepreneurs in our case histories.
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spun by the hand of the entrepreneur. Over time the entrepreneur played
different roles, fulfilling almost all of the descriptions assigned to him in the
literature on entrepreneurship. As the firms adjusted to changing circumstances,
these entrepreneurs were required to act, e.g. to make better use of 'tacit
knowledge' acquired by human resources in the firm, to make judgemental
decisions to meet the challenges of economic change, to force through new
developments and to restructure property rights in the light of new information
(Ricketts, 1987: 277).
One of the most important tasks facing our managers and entrepreneurs in the
case of Frame and Glodina was to change the culture of the organisation; 'but a
company does not easily change its culture. In everything it does, it carries the
imprints of the entrepreneurs that created it" (Glaser, 1985: 29). In the case of
Frame the ingrained culture was considered an autocratic one and "no matter
how much its ownership and direction change, autocratic roots cannot easily be
made to yield democratic fruits" (Glaser, 1985: 29). The central question asked
in the market was: 'is the Frame group really changing?' (Glaser, 1985:28-30).
Following the interim period in which the troika still carried on along the lines
laid down by Phillip Frame, it was the task of Mervyn King and his team to
overcome the rigidities of the past. This meant changing the culture of a 66-year
old organisation, where many of the management and employees spent their
careers (McNulty, 1990:26-27). King had a legal background, having acted as
legal advisor for Frame in Phillip Frame's era, but had been a non-executive
director at Frame for a few years before his appointment as Chairman. Market
analysts questioned his operational abilities, although he became known as a
turn-around entrepreneur: "King is an excellent conceptualiser about structures
and acquisitions, but can he do operational conceptualising?" (Kenney, 1988:30).
The departing MD, Justin Schaffer, was renowned for his operational ability and
observerswere worried that his departure would leave a vacuum that Kingwould
not be able to fill. Schaffer's departure was precipitated by a difference of
opinion with the Frame board on three essential issues:
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• Whether the businessshould be centralised or decentralised'";
• Whether to mergewith another textile manufacturer; and
• Whether to disposeof a strategic unit within the group.
King's intention was to decentralise and require each company, with its own
chief executive, to focus on its core business.His plan had three core elements:
cost base, quality, and service, which he emphasised should be put into action,
rather than talked about (Kenney, 1988:31).
As it turned out, King's ability to conceptualise around structure, and his knack
for picking able teams were sufficient to put the Frame Group on the road to
restructuring and recovering. That he picked Walter Simeoni, with vast
experience in textile manufacturing and a decidedly entrepreneurial flair, as
operational director was to remain one of the most fortuitous decisions for the
group. Walter Simeoni is now the group MDof the Frame Group, the President of
the South African Textile Federation, Vice-President of the International Textile
Manufacturers' Federation and former Chairman of the Cotton Manufacturers'
Association in South Africa (we discusshis role in these organisations under the
section on institutions).
In the end, King's role could be characterised as that of a catalyst for change
when the firm most needed it (Kenney, 1988:31).
Like Mervyn King at Frame, Claus Daun, chairman of Glodina, also believes in
decentralisation, treating each of his companies as independent business units
with its own chief executive officer. Daun's main role, after identifying the
latent opportunities in a newly-acquired business, is to recapitalise the business
and then find a suitable management team. He has a good sense of what he
wants to see in a manager and can be exacting in his demands: "when
management starts talking about the weak economy and tough trading
conditions, I know it's time for a motivational boost or new appointment" (Inggs,
26 The old guard under Phillip Frame had favoured decentralisation, despite the founder's penchant for
control.
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2002c: 2). Daun holds 10 textiles" companies in South Africa, under the
umbrella organisation, Courtheil Holdings. Daun's group in South Africa had a
turnover of R2 billion, followed by the Frame Group, the second largest textile
group at R1.6 billion in turnover for 2001 (Inggs, 2002c: 1). His other interests in
South Africa, such as cotton farming, automotive leather, automotive
components, and furniture complement his textile holdings to an extent (Inggs,
2002a: 1). Daun is well respected in the industry for his superb understanding of
the global textile world, his eye for the investment potential in South Africa and
his successful turnaround track record to date (Bolin, 2003).
While the management at Frame struggled to change the culture that Phillip
Frame had built up over more than 50 years, the management of our youngest
firm, Coastal, was battling to build a cohesive culture over operations that were
geographically spread out and consisting of established and green fields
projects. It did not help, either, that the firm had an absentee majority
shareholder.
An interesting observation is made in the literature regarding the role of
outsiders (Penrose, 1959) and immigrants (Ricketts, 1987). "Immigrants will look
on established procedures with a new perspective, well aware that things may
be done differently; the very act of migration suggests energy and ambition;
while the costs of incurring the disapprobation of those inconvenienced by
change will be lower for the outsider" (Ricketts, 1987: 45). Penrose (1959:54)
emphasised the different perspectives of outsiders, enabling them to see
opportunities and bottlenecks easier than incumbents. Grindley (1993:67) adds
that outsider status means that such a person is not bound by traditional ideas
and would be much bolder in introducing new ways of doing things. There are
certainly parallels to be drawn between the immigrant/outsider status of Phillip
Frame and Claas Daun and their perception of the investment potential and
opportunities offered by the South African economy. Phillip Frame had
recognised the potential of the SouthAfrican economy during his first visit to the
country and for the rest of his life remained committed to pursuing the
27 These include, amongst others, Unispin, Da Gama Textiles, Spilo, the Fabric Library Group, all
Anglovaal's textile subsidiaries (of which Gelvenor Textiles has been the most spectacular performer), Table
Bay Spinners, Court Fabrics and Home Fabrics (lnggs, 2001a: 1-2).
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opportunities for growth offered by the Southern African region. Daun is very
explicit about his strategy to invest in countries where the perception is worse
than reality. As an outsider, however, he is less likely to remain passive about
government policies that he perceives as detrimental to industry or the economy
as a whole. Whereas South African businesspeople may be reluctant to criticise
government, Daun, though circumspect in his approach does not shy away from
voicing his disapproval (Dispatch Online, 2002:3). Walter Simeoni, on the other
hand, was able to bring about successful restructuring at Frame, perhaps
because he was not part of the old guard, and hailing from Austria with an
extensive past in textiles, brought a different approach to the firm.
7.3.5.2 The entrepreneur, interdependence and influence on the structure
of the industry
Illustrating the 'interdependence' of the firms and the impact of some individual
agents on the industry is the case of De Nim, the subsidiary of Coastal Textiles.
Before being sold to Coastal, De Nim belonged to Claas Daun, who had now
taken over Glodina. Daun had recapitalised De Nim and returned the firm to
profitability, amongst other things building a strong foothold in export markets"
and acquiring strategic alliances. An alliance with Levi Strauss, for example,
included a 3 to 5 year growth programme for both companies (Jones, 2000:1).
Daun's influence on the structure of the South African textile industry has been
the subject of considerable speculation and debate in the industry and the
media. Someanalysts believed that the aim was to consolidate the South African
textile industry into two or three large entities with the critical massto bargain
with the retailers. To date there has been little concrete evidence to support
this view. Daun's companies are aimed at different market segments and are
expected to be profitable as autonomous business units. Obviously, group
synergies between yarn suppliers and fabric manufacturers in the group are to
be expected (Glodina throws in towel to German buyer, 2001). However, the
28 De Nim's exports contributed 38% to turnover and were mainly destined for Europe, Australia, Central
Africa, Canada and the USA. The biggest growth in exports was expected to be generated in the American
market (Jones, 2001).
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unbundling process" that created the opportunity for Daun to acquire, for
example, the textile firms formerly in the Anglovaal stable and the streamlining
of Frame and other textile groups contributed to a textile industry that is now
leaner and in the handsof entrepreneurs who have the expertise and energy to
take it to an era of global competitiveness, according to Walter Simeoni,
president of the Textile Federation (quoted in Cohen, 2002:1).
7.3.5.3 Labour
The experiences of our three firms with respect to labour are varied, complex
and intriguing. While the labour relations issues are inextricably intertwined
with the political history of South Africa, it is possible to discern patterns of
influence created by strong individuals over time, especially at Frame, and to a
lesser extent at Glodina. Phillip Frame ran the business autocratically and
paternalistically. The business was very labour-intensive, and although wages
were low, job security was high. Many employees indeed, spent all of their
working lives in the company. Phillip Frame's paternalistic approach to labour
was manifested in his attempts at improving working conditions in the Frame
factories, which included the provision of in-house training, as well as medical
and savings facilities at a time when such facilities were not the norm in
factories. The firm also offered recreational facilities and supported sports
teams such as netball and football. Frame's establishment of management
liaison committees, which included worker representatives, predated the
government's attempts to introduce such committees in lieu of trade unions by
several years (McNulty, 1990b: 26; the Frame Group of Industrial Organisations,
1978:22-29). It was a major challenge to change from this paternalistic mode of
behaviour to a situation where the firm could deal with organised, independent
trade unions as equals in the work place. As noted, it took a long protracted
battle in the courts to win recognition for trade unions at Frame. Yet, over time
the relationship between management and the trade unions has changed from
being adversarial to one of mutual respect and cooperation. Just like the French
employers and employees in the experiences recounted in Chapter 3, here, a
29 During the Apartheid era, and especially with disinvestments and sanctions in the 1980s, ownership in the
South African manufacturing sector had become concentrated in large diversified conglomerates with
complex cross holdings. The 1990s saw a voluntary unbundling of this conglomerate structure (Smith,
1992:471).
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common threat (import competition) encouraged cooperation between
management and trade unions, to the extent that they now work together to
devise a survival and growth plan for the industry. Better relations with the
trade union are evident from the reduction in man hours lost through industrial
action and stay aways by 87%to 2 316 during the 2001 financial year (Frame
Annual Report, 2001:2).
Perceptions about Daun's relationship to labour are mixed, as witnessed by the
statements of some market analysts, for example: "Daun buys cheap and has no
allegiance to labour." (Quoted in Inggs, 2001a: 1). All Daun's companies,
however, are unionised and he emphasises that his uncompromising stand on
profitability has saved far more jobs than it has cost, citing the 19 000 jobs he
has salvaged by saving South African companies on the brink of collapse (Inggs,
2002:3). Upon take-over at Glodina, Daun made it clear that a joint effort by
management and labour, as well as restructuring and re-alignment would be
required to save the company. The message to labour was quite blunt:
cooperation from labour was of the essenceto avoid a repeat of his only failure
to date: Mooiriver Textiles. This company's financial situation was so dire and
the negotiating position of labour so intractable that saving the company proved
to be beyond Daun's power and 800 jobs were lost3o• The union at Glodina
expressed their willingness to work with Daunand the new management to turn
the company around (Inggs,2001a: 3).
All three our firms have had problems with the skills of workers at different
stages of their development, but especially when they were expanding or
introducing new technology.
Although all three have invested in training, Frame seemsto have been the most
consistent in developing and upgrading the skills of its employees and
management. During 2001, Frame's major training centres facilitated 10 138
training opportunities, a considerable increase on the 5 926 the previous year.
30 Some of these jobs were relocated to the Eastern Cape when parts of Mooiriver Textiles were integrated
with Da Gama Textiles (Inggs, 2001:3).
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The firm has also appointed an additional professional to be responsible for
management and career path development (Frame Annual Report, 2001:2).
TABLE 7.4. ENTREPRENEURIALTALENT AND LABOUR
CRITERIA FRAME GLODINA COASTAL
Entrepreneurial Phillip Frame Brothers Claas Daun (De
talent Walter Simeoni Balladon Nim)
Claas Daun Rajen Pillay
Labour Liaison committees, Trade union Trade union
trade union struggle Training Training skills
for recognition, Low staff and productivity
worker benefits morale problems in
(health, savings, Botswana
training, green areas)
In 2002 the Frame Training Centre was converted to the Frame training College
under the motto "Indawo Yoku Fundela'i" (Frame Annual Report 2002:2). Other
opportunities for learning at Frame are facilitated by the green areas, where
worker teams meet regularly to share ideas, discuss and solve problems."
Glodina's training efforts are concentrated on general competencies at all levels,
as well as technology-specific training. Coastal seems to have been less pro-
active, responding to bottlenecks created by the lack of skills only when they
occurred (Msomi, 1999:2). The firm's management seems to have had a shorter-
term perspective on skills bUilding.33
31 Place of Learning.
32 Interview with Frame Managing Director and factory visit, 17 November 2000.
33 At the Coastal subsidiaries in Botswana, workers went through a four-week training programme before
starting employment. This did not seem to be part of an overall skills development strategy (Msomi, 1999:2).
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TABLE 7.5. LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIPSAND INSTITUTIONS
CRITERIA FRAME GLODINA COASTAL
Long-term Suppliers and Suppliers and Technology
relationships Customers customers partner
De Nim's
relationships
before takeover
Institutions University of Port Textile IOC
Elizabeth, Textile Federation, Textile
Federation, SETA Federation
Employers' SA initiative of Botswana
Association, SETA, German Development
International Textile Business, Africa Corporation
Manufacturers' Association, SA
Federation, SATIEC German
SABS Chamber of
Natal University Commerce and
DANCED Industry,
SATIEC,SABS
7.3.6 Long-Term Relationships: Suppliers, Customers, and Institutions
Although inter-firm relationships have always been important, they took on
increased importance in the face of rapid technological change and intensified
global competition. The 1990s were characterised by the emphasis placed on
strategic alliances, as exemplified by this quote from an Olivetti executive:
"In the 1990s,competition will no longer be between individual companies but
between new, complex corporate groupings. A company's competitive position
no longer (solely) depends on its internal capabilities; it also depends on the
type of relationships it has been able to establish with other firms and the
scope of those relationships." Financial Times, 29 May 1990, quoted in Vernon-
Wortzel and Wortzel, 1997:61).
To the importance given to the relationship with other firms, we may also add
the relationships that the firm has built with other institutions, such as
education and training institutions and industry associations (These relationships
are summarised in Table 7.5).
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Financial institutions for example, are important selection mechanisms in the
market process. Although all three firms were dogged by working capital
constraints, Frame and Glodina (albeit by means of a take-over) managed to
resolve their cash flow problems. Coastal on the other hand, saw poor financial
planning and unexpected delays in transferring funding on the part of its foreign
partners result in the demise of the firm. Coastal's relations with financial
institutions were sullied by allegations of impropriety against both South African
directors and its foreign partner".
The Frame group is vertically integrated and is thus closely involved with its
suppliers of raw materials and yarn, except in the case of cotton, where
government regulations do not allow textile firms to source cotton outside South
Africa before all local cotton has been taken up (see Chapter 5). Frame's
relationships with technology suppliers are mixed. With some suppliers it has a
history of coordination and even joint ventures (as reported under innovations),
whereas others simply supply a particular technological need when required.
Coastal was integrated from cotton growing to garment manufacturing and could
source raw materials for manufactured fibre products through its Indonesian
connections.
Frame's relationship to customers under Phillip Frame was in a sense
paternalistic: he often took a hard line with customers, but in tough times the
firm acted as banker, e.g. debtors were allowed much leeway in payment terms
(McNulty, 1990b: 26). Frame and Glodina have experienced deterioration in their
relationship with customers when difficulties at the firm resulted in an inability
to fill orders or sub-standard delivery performance. Both firms have since then
34 Allegations of fraud and corruption were levelled at both Coastal and its foreign partner. In the case of
Coastal subsidiary (De Nim) irregular payments into the accounts of Coastal directors were investigated by
the liquidator. These payments were made at a time when funds to pay the salaries and wages of employees
were not available and the management was struggling to find the funds to salvage the other companies in the
Coastal group (Jones, 2000:1). In the mean time, Coastal's foreign owner, Polysindo, was under investigation
in an Indonesian banking controversy, where it was alleged that the company's subsidiary, Texmaco,
received loans amounting to $1,3 billion from Bank Negara Indonesia after intervention by the former
president, Suharto. The bank is state-run (Jones, 2000: 1).
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significantly improved their relationships with customers (Glaser, 1987: 34-35;
Connolly, 1997:50).
Both Frame and Glodina's investment in ICT enables them to improve their
relations with suppliers and customers through better communication, real-time
accessto designsand specifications and better delivery performance.
Frame has had a long association with the University of Port Elizabeth, as we
reported in the firm's history, and has over the years also developed a
constructive relationship with higher education institutions in Kwazulu-Natal. For
example, it has used the research expertise of the staff at the Industrial
Restructuring Project at the University of Natal to help develop a strategic plan
for the industry. Together with DANCED,a Danish government sponsored clean
production programme in South Africa, Frame worked with the pollution
research group at the University of Natal on the "Waste Minimisation
Programme". This linkage resulted in a significant saving in material usage
(Frame Annual Report, 2002:3).
We have already referred to the links that both Frame and Glodina have to the
South African Bureau of Standards and the South African Textile Industry Export
Council. In addition, both firms participate in the skills development work of the
Sectoral Education and Training Authority (SETA)for Textiles, Clothing, Leather
and Footwear. Asmembers of the regional employer associations, the firms work
with the trade union (SACTWU) under the auspices of the SETA. This
collaboration has resulted in a rolling three-year Sectoral Skills Plan for Textiles,
Clothing, Leather and Footwear. Skills development plans at firm level are
supposedto be aligned to this industry plan (Seardel Annual Report, 2002:2).
Under the leadership of Walter Simeoni, MDof Frame (acting in his capacity as
head of the Cotton Textile Manufacturers' Association), the textile industry is
funding a training course for customs officials to deal with illegal imports. After
a long process of deliberation and negotiation with the department of Customs
and Excise, a training course was finally approved and implemented. The most
important aim is to enable customs officials to identify 'textile substrates and
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finishes aswell as link them to the appropriate tariff headings' (Textile industry
will fund customs course, 1998).
As president of the SouthAfrican Textile Federation, Simeoni is also in a position
to steer the objectives and the competencies of the industry association from
focusing on lobbying government for import protection to helping members
attain the skills and competencies to be competitive in the global market place.
With his stature in the global textile world, and his work at the South African
initiative of German business, the Africa Association and the South African
German Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Claas Daun is well placed to
broaden Glodina's accessto global knowledge and opportunities.
Coastal had a favourable relationship with the Botswana Development
Corporation, who was willing to invest in its ventures in that country. Coastal
was also a member of the South African Textile Federation and was able to use
the services of the Industrial Development Corporation (IOC) when it needed
salvaging. The relationship with the IOC was, however, short-lived when
allegations of financial impropriety against the directors of Coastal surfaced
(Jones,2000:1).
7.4 EXOGENOUSFACTORSINTHECOMPETITIVEENVIRONMENT
Although we have sporadically referred to instances where exogenous factors,
such as the interest rate, inflation and exchange rates influenced the firms in
the textile industry, our purpose here is to draw the main arguments together in
order to summarise the impact of such factors and the firms' response to
changesin such factors.
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FIGURE7.1. REALGOPGROWTH- SOUTHAFRICA(1962-2002)
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
~ ~ ~ A ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ * ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ $ $ $ $ $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~- ~ ~
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations (2001:425); South African
National Treasury (2003).
7.4.1 General Economic Conditions
The recession of the early 1980s (see Figure 7.1), coupled with high inflation
rates had severe effects on the fortunes of the textile companies. Recessionhad
a dampening effect on consumer spending and inflation caused input costs to
spiral (Fiford, 1985:115).
Until the middle of the 1990s, the domestic market was the most important one
for domestic firms, given the anti-export bias that developed in the South
African economy during the Apartheid years (McCarthy, 1992:456). Changes in
the domestic economy thus had a profound impact on the performance of the
firms in our case study. For example, the worst period in terms of performance
for Frame coincided with the recession between 1990 and 1993 (Figure 7.1),
while Glodina and Coastal were similarly affected during downswings in the
economy.
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FIGURE7.2. PRIMEOVERDRAFTRATE- SOUTHAFRICA(1984-2002)
19841985198619871988198919901991 19921993199419951996199719981999200020012002
Source: South African Institute of Race Relations (2001:439); South African
ReserveBank (2002).
The spillover effect of the Asian crisis of 1997/98 brought lower economic
growth for South Africa (0.7%) in 1998 and 1.9% in 1999. This slowdown in
economic growth (Figure 7.1), coupled with the higher interest rates (Figure 7.2)
squeezed the purchasing power of consumers and thus, the demand for textiles
and clothing, amongst other things.
7.4.2 Exchange Rate Movements
Depreciation of the Randis, by and large, advantageous for exports, but foreign
buyers are aware of currency depreciations and expect to pay less. So, the South
African producers are often price takers in the export market and do not receive
the full advantage of the depreciation. Strategically, several textile firms aiming
at growth through exports proceeded from the assumption that the Rand will
continue to depreciate. The Rand's appreciation in the last quarter of 2002 and
the first months of 2003, now forces them to rethink this assumption and to
focus on more sustainable competitive edges (Enslin, 2003:1). Also, as the local
250
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
currency appreciates, imported textiles and textile products become cheaper,
enticing customers to buy imports rather than domestic products.
South African textile producers import man-made fibre products, chemicals and
dyes, as well as machinery. In some cases the cost of buying and maintaining
machinery in the second half of 2001 was 40%higher than anticipated (Cohen,
2002:2). Investors in imported capital goods are doubly penalised when the
depreciation takes place in the presence of high or rising interest rates. Both
Frame and Glodina are experiencing mixed results becauseof the fluctuation in
the external value of the Rand: while they benefit from imported inputs being
cheaper, their strategic imperative of export growth is hampered significantly
when the Randappreciates.
7.4.3 Industrial Policy
Both Frame Textiles and Glodina were influenced by the government's industrial
decentralisation policy and incentives with undesired results. Glodina elected to
set up a production plant at QwaQwa, a self-governing state in order to gain
accessto the generous incentives offered by the government to induce industrial
decentralisation. Labour was also cheaper in these areas. Unfortunately, Glodina
experienced labour problems and installation of the machinery at the new plant
created hold-ups and inefficiencies (Kenney, 1989:88-89). Frame, on the other
hand, did not benefit from the incentives, because it already had an established
plant in the designated area. Its competitors;" however, could fully benefit
from the generous incentives, which seriously impacted on Frame, making its
cost structure untenable (Frame Group. Running for cover, 1990: 81). Following
similar reasoning to Glodina, Coastal decided to settle in Botswana because of
that country's investment incentives and relatively cheap labour. Coastal's
operations in Botswanawere negatively affected by a lack of skills, resulting in
inefficiencies, delays and higher training costs (Msomi, 1999:2).
35 Mostly foreign (Taiwanese, but not exclusively) investors. Because of the nature of the policy, which made
the incentives available for seven years in a particular designated area, with initially no restrictions on access
in different homelands, foreign investors did 'homeland-hopping' -uprooting their factories when the
incentives expired to relocate to another homeland, with obvious results for the sustainability of investment
and employment (Nkuhlu, 1987:36-38).
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Of our three firms, Coastal, investing in 1995, was the only one who benefited
from the tax holiday offered under the new supply-side measures introduced by
the Department of Trade and Industry, the details of which have been discussed
in Chapter 4.
7.4.4 Trade Policy and Customs Performance
Changesin SouthAfrica's trade policy had been discussedextensively in Chapter
4. Suffice it here to highlight the most important aspects that had an impact on
the firms in our case study.
Frame's dismal performance in the late 1980s was partially blamed on the
reduction of certain tariffs in 1986and the long period of waiting for the report
of the Board of Trade and Industries (now the Board on Tariffs and Trade). The
sharp depreciation of the Rand since 1985 was evidently not sufficient to
improve competitiveness (Payne, 1988:107). In response to imports of low-cost
cotton fabrics, Frame's products were upgraded 'somewhat' (Payne, 1989:106).
Uncertainty linked to the delays in finalising government's trade policy has been
a problem for the firms in our case study at various points in time. Apart from
the example given above, similar delays were experienced in the process of
developing a long-term strategy for the textiles and clothing sectors in the late
1980sand the beginning of the 1990s. Industry leaders were openly critical of
government's handling of the restructuring of trade and industrial policy. Mervyn
King of Frame opined: " ...it is not possible to change industry which has been
driven by policies involving strategic stockpiling, import replacement and 'do-
your-damndest' attitude to becoming an international competitor (overnight)"
(Textile Industries Dyegest Southern Africa, 1990:2). The excruciatingly long
wait for a decision regarding the extension of the Duty Credit Certificate Scheme
will also not go down in history as the high point of government-industry
relations (Details are discussedin Chapter 4).
Frame in particular, absorbing about 40% to 50%of the South African cotton
crop, was disadvantaged by the protection afforded to the local cotton growers.
South African textile producers are forced by law to take up the entire South
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African cotton crop before they may import. In addition, cotton growers receive
protection by meansof an import tariff on imported cotton. Frame in some years
thus faced severe increases in the price of local cotton (asmuch as 38%in 1990,
adding between R30and 40 million to Frame's costs) (McNulty, 1990b: 27) and
delays in other years when the local crop was insufficient, because of the way
that import deliveries are to be structured".
Although the South African textile industry has always faced import competition
from the East, the reduction in protection in terms of South Africa's GATToffer
in the 1990s saw an intensification in import competition. This, coupled with
surges in illegal imports and counterfeit goods, had a severe impact on Frame
especially. Frame has had to contend with copyright infringements on various
occasions, sometimes quite blatantly. For example, it found a direct copy of its
own designsamongst samplesof prints on offer by a textile agent from the East
(Jones, 1998:1). This is a problem for South African textile firms, especially
since they lack cheap raw materials and labour and have to compete through
design excellence and service. When designsare stolen, that advantage is lost.
On the positive side, increased export opportunities under bilateral, regional and
multilateral trade agreements are opened up (as discussedin Chapters 3 and 4).
Within the regional context and the Southern African Development Community,
in particular, South African textile firms want government to pay attention to
education and training issues in the region. The trend to date has been that
South African firms lose skilled employees to employers in the rest of the region,
who are able to pay more for skilled workers, because their wages for lower-
skilled workers are much lower than in South Africa. According to Walter
Simeoni of Frame, all firms in the SADCregional grouping should be subject to
the same rules: "While training and human resources development is vital for
every industry, it is only of value if all within SADCare subject to the same basic
rules." (Jones, 1998b: 1).
36 South African cotton buyers must take delivery of imported cotton in twelve instalments, spread over 12
months (IDC, 1999: 31)
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Both Frame and Glodina, who have started to make somegains in export growth,
will be facing extra costs and efforts to comply with increased security measures
attached to exports into the USmarket. Some American retailers have made
sourcing apparel from Africa contingent upon satisfying US-approved security
measures in the whole pipeline through production to transport (Inggs, 2003:1).
Export markets are difficult enough to break into, making the option of exiting
very costly. These firms will thus have to find cost-effective ways of complying
with the additional requirements.
7.5 SUMMARY ANDPREVIEW OFCHAPTER 8
It is convenient to summarise in terms of the objectives we have set in the
Introduction. These were to understand better what firms do (expressed in their
routines and strategies), why they make certain decisions (their objectives and
motivations), and to identify features associated with successful performance,
as well as failure. With the aid of insights and conceptualisation from
evolutionary economics, businesshistory and organisational studies, we are now
able to summarise our findings.
In Chapter 2, with reference to path dependence, we have highlighted some
questions raised in newer studies, e.g. how do firms choose paths? Is it possible
to escape from particular paths?Do paths cross?From our case studies, we are
able to discern some answers to these questions, although generalisation from
these studies is of course not suggested. Still, it generates insights and links that
can be followed up on sufficient scale in future research to be able to draw
general lessons.We combine the activities of firms over time, for example with
respect to technology and organisation to describe the evolutionary path of the
firm.
Choosingpaths: the initial start-up conditions, the background, perceptions and
objectives of the entrepreneur are all very important building blocks, which are
instrumental in constructing a firm's path over its lifetime. The initial decisions
form the foundation, while a multitude of interactions amongst many individuals
inside and outside the firm build the rest of the path. The firm's routines,
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strategies, competencies and the exigencies of the market (or the broader
environment) all have a role to play in shaping the firm's path. The long path of
Frame and the relatively short path of Coastal have demonstrated this for us.
Changing paths: rejuvenation, restructuring and businessprocess re-orientation
are some of the methods applied by firms to alter their paths. Sometimes, as in
the case of Frame, the process is successful, while in other cases, such as
Coastal, these efforts ended in failure. Sometimes the retirement or death of its
founder creates the opportunity for the organisation to change its path. But, as
we have seen in the case of Frame, this is a difficult, time-intensive process
because the firm is usually so permeated with the influence of the founding
entrepreneur. It was only by the third set of new managersthat enough time had
elapsed for new approaches, routines and strategies to be introduced at Frame.
Crossingand merging paths: mergers and acquisitions, industry dynamics and the
role of the entrepreneur are all very important in bringing about crossing and
merging paths.
Paths cross in many ways, for example, when joint ventures are established for
specific purposes, or when relationships are entered into with suppliers and
customers. Paths merge when earlier separate entities become one through a
merger or take-over. This brings together the histories, competencies and
routines of two organisations, offering both opportunities and challenges, as we
have shown in section 7.3.3. on growth strategies. Crossingpaths seem to have a
temporary nature, while merging paths have the potential to become more
permanent.
Although the external competitive environment was the same for our firms, their
responses to that environment and the nature of their internal circumstances
(knowledge base, organisational structure, competencies, routines, etc.) made
for varied outcomes. Firms differed in the emphasis that they placed on
particular objectives, had multiple aims over time and emphasised different
interim objectives, depending on the circumstances.
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In every major change that the firms wanted to effect, time seemsto have been
very important - time to learn to work together, time to develop routines, time
to recognise false trails and learn from errors. On the other hand, it is
sometimes necessary to 'force through' changes in an environment where
excessive inertia could be catastrophic. There is thus a need to strike a balance
between exploiting an existing situation and what it has to offer and exploring
new opportunities. A caveat that the Coastal history teaches us is not to try and
'leap ahead of competitors without having strong capabilities in the area or truly
understanding what is needed, armed with little more than conviction' and
optimism (Grindley, 1993: 64).
According to Nelson and Winter (1982:110) an evolutionary theory of the firm
should try and explain the ongoing interrelated processes of change in
technology and organisation. While our analysis is more descriptive, rather than
explanatory, the outcome does illustrate the complexity of the co-evolution of
technological and organisational change. If we consider the time and effort that
the restructuring processesin our firms had taken, and the problems that all of
them had in organising their production, labour use, and distribution activities so
as to reap the benefits of their investment in new technology, then our analysis
with respect to organisational change in firms seems to be in agreement with
Nelson (1994:246):
"...organisational innovation may be much more difficult than technological
innovation. Changesin articulated strategy may be easy, but to revise structure
to meet those changes, and, especially to put in place new core caoabilities,
may be extremely difficult." (Emphasisadded).
Equilibrium versions of the theory of the firm seem to assume that actors in the
market process already know what their role is, and furthermore, exactly what
they must do within a given set of constraints to achieve optimal results
(Kirzner, 1997:10). As many documented businesshistories and indeed our own
case studies testify, this is an approach that largely abstracts away the many
search and learning processes that firms have to engage in to make sense of
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their circumstances, identify their options and take and implement decisions
under conditions of bounded rationality.
Whereas the literature on selection mechanisms that act on routines usually
assumes that these mechanisms are either internal to the firm (e.g.
management decisions) or external to the firm (e.g. market forces), our case
studies illustrate that there is a continuous feedback effect between these
mechanisms. Market analysts, for example, publish views on the performance of
a firm, signalling approval or disapproval and so influence external decision
makers, such as potential investors, but also the management of the firm.
Firms' performances wax and wane over time as their environments change and
they select certain responsesto these changes. Their adaptation need not be
optimal in order for them to survive. This ongoing change and responseobserved
in the history of firms brings us to the conclusion that evolutionary biologists
(and others) have been expounding for years:
"...there's never such a th;ng as a permanent or [ina! or optimum aaaptation of
a liteform to 'the' environment. Except in the most protected and static
surrounds, there must be an endless cnain of adaptations." Saganand Druyan
(1993: 95-96).
Chapter 8 summarisesand concludes the study.
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CHAPTER8
SUMMARYANDCONCLUSIONS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The overall aim of this study was to gain an understanding of the behaviour of
firms in the processof introducing new technology as a means to become more
competitive in a changing environment. To pursue this aim, the approach
followed in evolutionary economicswas chosen.
Evolutionary analysis is concerned with explaining the development of
'something' over time in terms of how it got there. In evolutionary economics,
analysis usually takes place at three levels: the industry, the firm, and the
broader environment, which includes institutions.
The 'something' that we focused on broadly in this study, was the South African
textile industry. In particular, we wanted to investigate the implementation of
new technology in a mature industry, i.e. the SouthAfrican textile industry. This
chapter summarisesour findings and concludes the study.
Instead of a chapter-by-chapter summary, we next draw out themes that recur
throughout the study.
8.2 SUMMARYOF FINDINGS
In Chapter 3 we have established that the global textile industry faces
tremendous challenges, such as changes in technology, the trade regime and
consumers' tastes and preferences. Two challenges in particular are perceived as
major threats to the survival of textile firms. The first is the phasingout of the
World Trade Organisation's Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) by 1
January 2005. The conclusion of the implementation of the ATCwill change the
competitive landscape for textile exporters, eliminating the secure market
access based on quotas. The second is China's production capacities in textiles,
258
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
which are perceived by many as a looming disaster for other textile producers
worldwide. Those suffering from the 'China Syndrome' believe that Chinese
textile exports could obliterate almost all other textile exporters. These changes
impact on the structure of the industry through the responsesof the firms, but
these responses in turn influence trends in the industry. For example,
technological progress influences firm behaviour and the direction that the
industry takes. The direction that the industry takes, e.g. diverting to non-
apparel textiles, in turn, influences the direction of future technological change.
In Chapter 3 we have also argued that considering only the aggregate picture
could be misleading and potentially harmful, should policy be based on such
observations alone. Having established the need for further analysis at industry
and firm level, the belief that aggregate trends conceal much diversity was
indeed borne out by our findings.
Our analysis at the global, country-specific and firm level shows that the
responses of firms to the challenges created by their changing competitive
environment can be divided into two broad categories. First, they used their own
resources and those of their industry associations to lobby their respective
governments for further import protection. This responsewas prevalent in many
countries, such as the United States, France, India, and South Africa, and to a
lesser extent, also in Italy. In some countries, such as in France in the 1970sand
early 1980s, this approach led them not to invest in the latest textile
technologies that would have enabled them to remain competitive (as it did in
the case of Italian producers, where investment in new technology was a very
important survival and growth strategy).
The second category of responsesincludes a number of strategies employed to
face the challenges and use the changing environment to their advantage. This
included taking the competition to low-wage countries by relocating to these
areas, product and market diversification, innovative marketing strategies, and
increased attention to environmental, quality, and social responsibility concerns.
The latter gives European and some South African firms an edge over firms in
low-wage countries that have not yet begun to integrate these aspects into their
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production processes.Above all, investing in the new technologies available to
textile firms, created important opportunities for rejuvenation and growth.
Various strategic opportunities for textile firms were opened up by technological
developments on four fronts, namely:
• Modern textile machinery where the trend is to increase speed and
efficiency;
• Incorporation of information and communications technology;
• The development of new and hybrid inputs, such as intelligent fibres with
novel uses, and
• Innovations in organisational and management practices.
Our analysis (especially in chapters 4, 6 and 7), however, showsthat none of the
benefits promised by the new technology will materialise automatically upon
purchasing the new hardware and software. From our analysis, two broad
problem areas emerge, i.e. the firms' behaviour with respect to labour and the
apparent mismatch between the nature and requirements of the new technology
and the organisational structure of management and production. Thus,
strategies that worked well combined investment in new technology with human
capital upgrades and organisational change, which favoured participation of
labour in the implementation process. The latter was particularly important
where investment in new technology was part of a restructuring process (as is to
be expected in a mature industry trying to rejuvenate itself). Added to this was
the expansion of perspectives from focusing on the domestic market to seizing
export opportunities. This was, however, not an easy course to negotiate,
especially with unstable exchange rates, rising interest rates, and slowing
economic growth in South Africa's trading partners. Considering the role of
institutions, some important observations can be made:
• Institutions, e.g. industry associations, display a degree of inertia even
when it is obvious that the needs of their members have changed. The
American and European clothing and textile industry associations
continued to lobby their governments for protection against imports,
although sentiments in their constituencies had changed in favour of freer
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trade (Chapter 3). Likewise, in South Africa the Textile Federation was
relatively slow in changing its competencies developed under an imports
substitution regime to serve members that faced trade liberalisation and
needed to become competitive exporters (Chapters4, 5 and 6).
• In the South African textile industry, firms made very little use of the
services offered by the various institutions, e.g. government departments,
research, training and education institutions active in the industry. The
reasons for this phenomenon varied from firms being unaware of the
services to a belief that the services were inadequate or the procedures
to accessthe serviceswere too cumbersome (Chapters 5 and 6).
• Those firms that were able to benefit from effective relationships with
various institutions built these links over time by means of meaningful
participation and in some caseswere able to influence the direction of
institutional evolution, e.g. in training institutions and the Cleaner
Production initiatives (Chapters 5 and 7).
Chapters 6 and 7 further emphasise the important role that individual change
agents, such as entrepreneurs and managers, play, not only in the technology
implementation process, but also in shaping the growth path of firms, and
eventually in industry dynamics.
Our conclusion is thus that investing in new technology is a necessary but not
sufficient strategy for successful rejuvenation of firms in a mature industry.
Complementary changes, such as in organisational structure, use of human
resources, product, and market mix and supply chain relations, are of crucial
importance, too.
8.3 SUGGESTIONSREGARDINGTHETHEORYOFTHE FIRM
Combining the findings of the empirical work in Chapters 6 and 7, three
suggestions with respect to the theory of the firms from an evolutionary
perspective are identified:
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• Selection mechanisms and feedback effects. Selection mechanisms are
usually assumed to be internal to the firm (e.g. management decisions)
and external to the firm (market mechanisms). Sucha strict dichotomy,
however, ignores the continuous feedback effects between internal and
external mechanisms. Our case studies have illustrated how the views of
market analysts, for example, influence the share price of firms,
signalling approval or disapproval to management. The decisions that
management makes and the information that they choose to make
public, on the other hand, influence the views of market analysts,
investors, and other financial market decision makers.
• Choosing, changing, crossing, and merging paths. While the notion of
path dependence has received plenty of attention in the literature,
extending the metaphor to exploring the dynamics of paths over time has
not. In this study we have, firstly, paid attention to how firms choose
paths, observing that the initial start-up conditions, the background,
perceptions and objectives of the entrepreneur are all very important in
constructing the firm's path over time. The initial decisions form the
foundation, while the rest of the path is built on a multitude of
interactions amongst many individuals internal and external to the firm.
The firm's path is further shaped by its routines (and ability to adapt and
develop routines), strategies, competencies, and the demands that the
broader environment makes on the firm. Secondly, the possibility of
changing the firm's path arises through restructuring and rejuvenation
processes, and sometimes through the retirement or death of the
founder(s). This is often a difficult, time-intensive process, because of
the organisational culture created by the founding entrepreneurs and the
presence of inertia and uncertainty. Thirdly, crossing paths may occur
through the establishment of relationships with customers and suppliers
(e.g. joint development of specific products or machinery), while paths
may merge through mergers and acquisitions. The latter is a more drastic
change, bringing together the histories, routines, and competencies of
the two or more organisations. This offers the chance of continuing on an
altered path, if the process is successful, or the demise of the new entity
if not.
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• Unlike firms in equilibrium versions of the theory of the firm, firms
subject to bounded rationality in an evolutionary world do not know
exactly what their constraints are and what they must do to make
optimal decisions. As in many documented businesshistories, the firms in
our case studies went through learning processes,often of the trial-and-
error variety, changing their objectives over time and sometimes even
losing sight of their objectives. Their performance varied over time as
circumstances changed and they employed different strategies to deal
with the new circumstances. Our case studies illustrate that firms facing
the same external competitive environment, could, through their
attempts at adaptation, experience diverse outcomes.
8.4 COMPLEMENTARITYBETWEEN COMPLEXMODELS AND MICRO-LEVEL
ANALYSIS
In this study a micro-level of analysis was chosen. We contend, however, that
detailed micro-level analysis is a useful complement to aggregate, and complex
models in economics. Micro-level analysis complements complex models in two
ways. The first is a conceptual contribution in the sense that relationships and
patterns discerned from industry and firm level studies could help to specify and
test such relationships in complex models. Secondly, if anything, the rich details
that such micro-level analysis generates could serve to anchor complex models
and their assumptionsa little better in the real world.
8.5 MODERNTEXTILESANDPAVITT'STAXONOMY
With everything that we have learned about the modern textile industry, we are
now in a position to reconsider the place of this industry in Pavitt's taxonomy.
In Keith Pavitt's taxonomy of industries, classified on the basis of their
innovative activities (See Chapter 2), the textile industry is classified as
supplier-dominated. Ke (1995: 56) concurs with this view:
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" ...the textile-oppare! industries have mature products and have
experienced more discrete technologjcal progress. TMs ;ndustry group is
essenOally a recipient: of new technolog;es developed by caoitai good
industries ....All notable tecnnologïcal changes in the ;ndustry, from
innovation of newer macbtnery such as open end sp;nn;ng, air jet and
water jet shuttleless weaving to automation in texttie mms and
computer-aided des;gn in apparel plants, are ;n;Oally made by capital
goods inaustries. Fino! products by tnis ;ndustry do not make perceptible
tecbnoiogica! contributions to other segments of the economy. Besides
the technology embodied in new or upgraded equipment, proportionatlv
less investment has been devoted to technoiogica! progress."
When we consider the nature of technological developments in the modern
textile industry, the organisation of R&D and the integration of the industry, as
described in this thesis, we see a picture of an industry that no longer fits
comfortably into the supplier-dominated category as described by Pavitt (1984)
and Ke (1995) quoted above. To be more specific, the difference lies in the
following characteristics of the modern textile industry:
• The cutting edge R&D that takes place in the textile industry (see
Chapter 3 for examples);
• The organisation of R&D no longer suggests reliance on suppliers only.
Successful firms in the modern textile industry have their own R&D
facilities in-house, but also combine their efforts with other institutions
and firms, such as suppliers of machinery, testing laboratories and
standards bodies, as well as education and training institutions. Some
alliances are for specific purposes, such as joint development of a specific
machine and others are of a long-term nature.
• The products and technological breakthroughs of the textile industry are
used in other, often high-tech industries and innovations in textiles make
important contributions to other sectors of the economy, e.g. in the
medical field as well as in geotextiles. Aviation fabrics are used, for
example, in NASAspace missions and the textile industry is poised to
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contribute new fibres to replace optic fibres in communication (as
explained in Chapter 3).
• The multi-disciplinary nature of R&D in the textile industry; R&D in
textiles still include the traditional sciences such as chemistry and
engineering, but the field hasexpanded to include also biotechnology and
economic and management sciences, amongst others.
• Because of the development of strategic alliances and a much more
integrated pipeline, the boundaries between the domain of the supplier
and the textile manufacturer have become blurred. Someyarn and fabric
producers do their own fibre development and production, while others
enter into joint ventures with manufactured fibre producers and machine
producers. Also, since the advent of integrated supply-chain management,
enabled by developments in modern information and communications
technology, textile manufacturers have the potential to develop much
tighter networks with their suppliers and customers.
We therefore conclude that the challenges that firms in the textile industry have
faced over the last twenty years or so, and their responsesto these challenges
have shaped a modern textile industry that is now in the developed countries,
and in competitive pockets of the industry in the developing countries, only a
distant cousin of the one Keith Pavitt described in 1984.
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